
Moroccan Monarchy *and the* Islamist Challenge

Maintaining Makhzen Power

Mohamed Daadaoui




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Introduction

This study examines the factors behind the survival and persistence of monarchical authoritarianism in Morocco and argues that state rituals of power (ROPs) affect the opposition forces' ability to challenge the monarchy. Despite the much debated global crisis of authoritarianism, in which authoritarian regimes came under attack from pro-democracy groups and movements, the traditional systems in the Middle East stand as an exception. This exceptionalism has pushed many in the literature to single out Islam as a major obstacle in the way of democratic change and the Middle East as "a zone of resistance to the ideals that have toppled authoritarian regimes of the left and the right."[1] This essentialist view is contested by North Africa area specialists who argue that it is "western authoritarianism that is in crisis in North Africa,"[2] pointing to the fact that the authoritarian regimes that have failed in recent years are not the "traditional" ones, but those that adopted Western modernization models.[3] While Tunisia's and Egypt's secular, liberal authoritarianism, and Algeria's and Syria's radical one-party authoritarianism is under duress, Morocco's traditional monarchical authoritarianism seems to be more resilient.

The Arab world is undergoing seismic sociopolitical changes borne out of a youth movement hungry for vast political reforms. While this Arab spring has so far toppled despotic regimes in Tunisia and Egypt and mounted serious challenges to authoritarian regimes in Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Algeria, Morocco's monarchy still appear popular with most Moroccans. Where Tunisians, Egyptians, Yemenis, Syrians, and Libyans called for regime changes in their political systems, Morocco's protesters have called on the king to reform the political system, sack the government, and fight corruption. This reality points to a sizeable monarchical popularity. The current study argues that the popularity of the king is the result of years of increased ritualization of the political discourse performed by the regime around specific sociocultural sources of legitimacy. Thus despite many challenges to its legitimacy in the postindependence era (e.g. political Islam, military coups, socioeconomic imperatives of modernization, and deteriorating economic conditions), the monarchy in Morocco

has managed a stable political system. The survival of the monarchy in Morocco not only features a panoply of institutional manipulation and coercive means, but a unique framework of authority that is anchored in the political culture of Morocco. This study reintroduces a niche for culture and cultural explanations in the study of regime stability, political legitimacy, and monarchical authoritarian survival in the Arab world, previously de-emphasized in the dominant institutionalist literature on authoritarian survival in the Arab world.

This study engages two main bodies of the literature: first, the dominant institutional approach to the prevalence of authoritarianism in the Middle East. Second, this study provides an alternative way to conceptualize political legitimacy and power in the Middle East by revising the performance-popular belief thesis prevalent in the literature on legitimacy and assumed in the institutional approach to authoritarian survival in the Arab world. This thesis emphasizes the role of state performance and effectiveness to legitimacy, and equates political stability with popular belief and support of state effectiveness in fulfilling its functions usually in capitalist and democratic societies.[4]

Using the case study of Morocco, this study shows the limitations of the institutional approach, which analyzes institutions at a distance from their sociological and cultural context, while interestingly enough, referring to cultural themes. The study also conceptualizes political legitimacy and power in the Middle East as a sociopolitical concept grounded in values and beliefs about a given regime, which have resonance in local sociopolitical culture. Thus, the research focuses on the particular socioreligious elements of the monarchical political structure that are subject to regime manipulation and are grounded in the local political culture in Morocco, without reducing the cause of authoritarian stability to an essentialist view of Islam.

This study argues that the ritualization of the public discourse in Morocco through the cultivation of ROPs serves to clutter the public sphere and hinder the opposition's mobilization capabilities when challenging the regime. As chapter three argues, the monarchy in Morocco has managed to fashion Foucault's disciplinary-repressive approach to power, which produces and reproduces authority within a careful use of ROPs. This approach to power is not a substitute for traditional manifestations of power per se, but "has infiltrated the others, sometimes undermining them, but serving as an intermediary between them, linking them together, extending them and above all making it possible to bring the effects of power to the most minute and distant elements. It assures an infinitesimal distribution of power relations."[5]

ROPs are displayed in elaborate ceremonies and spectacles to aggrandize the regime and sanctify it in the national memory. The combination of modernity and tradition is also an important facet in the use of ROPs, which are in essence religious/traditional manifestation of regime legitimacy. However, they have been also codified and institutionalized in the body of law, constitution, and political system within modern apparatus of the state in Morocco. ROPs point to a dialectical rather than a dichotomous relationship between modernity and tradition, similar to the one observed in Rudolph's study of political development, caste, and politics in India, in which modernity and tradition infiltrate and transform each other: "The assumption that modernity and tradition are radically contradictory rests on a misdiagnosis of tradition as it is found in traditional societies, and a misapprehension of the relationship between them."[6] An understanding of social change and political development within a specific society requires recognition of this interrelationship between modernity and tradition, its problems and its potentialities. The modern does not appear suddenly and structurally unrelated to the forms that have preceded it. The modern acquires its relevance through a close association with local traditions: "The components of 'new' men may exist among the 'old'; it is not always necessary for new men to be the progenitors or creators of a modern economy or polity."[7]

The existence of ROPs within the institutional framework of the Moroccan state could only be fleshed out through a socio-institutional approach that views cultural manifestations of power as institutions. Foucault's approach to power echoes in many ways Gramscian views of hegemony and domination, although Gramsci does not emphasize the process of power reproduction that Foucault focuses on. For Gramsci, hegemony is the means used by the state to exercise its domination without recourse to the use of violence. Gramscian hegemony is inextricably linked to legitimacy, through which a class rules a whole society with the consent for the policies of the state and the nature of the state.[8] State hegemony is advanced in the public sphere through education, media, state performances, and spectacles. These spectacles and rituals construct a hegemonic discourse in Morocco and elevate the monarch above the public sphere and the political system. As the interviews in chapters five and six show, monarchical hegemony and supremacy over public discourse is consented to by various segments of the political class and society, with little use of violence. Hegemony does not only rest upon state coercion, otherwise, it "becomes simply the backing for violence, or even worse, is

only obtained by violence (the case of fascism), this hegemony is in fact no longer assured."[9]

A Socio-Institutional Approach to the Study of Rituals of Power

This research adopts a socio-institutional approach to explore the extent to which the institutionalized ROPs of *baraka* (divine blessing), *amir al-mu'minin* (commander of the faithful), *sharaf* (prophetic lineage) and *bay'a* (act of allegiance), in addition to the institutional explanations of political manipulation, coercion, and clientelism, account for the resilience of the authoritarian regime in Morocco. The merits of a socio-institutional approach lie in the fact that it anchors the institutions of authoritarianism in a sociopolitical framework. It blends the institutionalist concerns with political structures with their cultural underpinnings. It also provides a holistic picture of the dynamics of authoritarian resilience in Morocco.

Sociological institutionalism grew out of the frustrations with functional bureaucratic explanations of institutional behavior. Existing rational explanations focused on the efficiency of rational formal structures to the detriment of the environment in which institutions were created. Early sociological institutionalists argue that "organizations exist, proliferate, and have the form they do not because they are efficient but because they are externally legitimated."[10] The renewed interest in the role of culture in legitimizing institutions sparked a whole new literature, which mapped normative and cultural environments that shape the behavior of organizations in professions such as mental health, in the arts and culture, in municipal governments, in national governments, and in the creation of whole business sectors.[11]

Sociological institutionalism emphasizes cognitive and cultural explanations and views institutions as a reflection of cultural themes. Institutions, for sociological institutionalists, are comprised of "much more than just formal rules, procedures or norms, but the symbol systems, customs, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide the 'frames of meaning' guiding human action."[12] Scholars among this approach argue that many of the modern formal institutions are not simply concerned with efficient political action; they are, instead, culturally imbued actions comparable to local rituals, ceremonies, and myths. In a sense, institutions become an expression and a vehicle through which rituals and belief in institutions is produced and reproduced.[13]

Formal structures, in this approach, are therefore a reflection of the myths of their environments, and institutionalization refers to

"the process by which social processes, obligations, or actualities come to take on a rule-like status in social thought and action."[14] The analytic status of culture is important for sociological institutionalists, who conceive it as a "toolkit" of habits, myths, and skills that are necessary for generating political actions. The focus is not on culture as a system of values, but as a vehicle for political change and a frame that constructs "approved means and desired outcomes."[15] This view of culture is dynamic and seeks to couch it within its institutional cloak. Thus, culture becomes "a repertoire of capacities from which varying strategies of action may be constructed."[16] Culture, for socio-insitutionalists, is a framework for interpreting and shaping preferences, and for anchoring the state as the expression of sociologically embedded institutions.[17] Culture, therefore, frames the symbols and rituals that are important in a political discourse and are used to legitimize a given regime. Culture, in this sense, is not reduced to an essential broad explanatory variable, as this study examines cultural elements that are politically manipulated and are of particular resonance in the sociopolitical arena. A socio-institutional approach is best suited for the proposed research because it seeks to examine the role of the institution of the *makhzen* (central government), as a sociopolitical instrument imbued by symbolic, historical, and traditional meaning, to enhance the sociopolitical legitimacy of the monarchy and generate stability and survival of the monarchy.

This approach is best suited to the current study, since it views institutions as a reflection of cultural forms and seeks to explain institutional practices in cultural terms.[18] Using this approach, this study integrates the "institutional explanations" of authoritarian survival based on political structures and "cultural explanations" based on an understanding of culture as shared attitudes or values. Institutions of survival in the Arab world cannot be viewed at a distance from the sociocultural context in which they operate.

Using a socio-institutional approach, this research demonstrates that the modern political system of Morocco is but a reformulation of the traditional institutionalized symbols of legitimacy developed within the authority of the makhzen both in its temporal and spiritual realms. Such authority has allowed the monarchy to diffuse the Islamist challenge and manage the political system in postindependence Morocco amidst a slow process of liberalization. As this study illustrates, the institutionalization of myths, rituals, and symbols has to date proved effective against the Islamist challenge to the monarchy's religious legitimacy.

A socio-institutional approach emphasizes the role of the state in institutionally manipulating social and religious rituals and symbols in order to fashion a new cult of legitimacy that creates a political culture that is conducive to the primacy of the monarchy in the political system in Morocco. The survival and the stability of the monarchy in Morocco is due, in large part, to its religious capital and its construction of a discourse of legitimacy based on Moroccan socio-religious concepts and practices of baraka, amir al-mu'minin, bay'a, and sharaf. These symbols constitute a part of the historical authority of the makhzen in its spiritual guise. Unlike most anthropological approaches, this book does not reduce makhzen to an essential unchanging Islam and draws a distinction between everyday Islamic rituals and the symbols and practices associated with the religion and which are subject to the state's political framing.

In other words, this study is not concerned directly with Islam and the daily rituals associated with it, as understood by Moroccan Muslims, since the role of the monarchy in them is tangential. Instead, this research focuses on the politically developed and manipulated socioreligious symbols and practices that are used to legitimate the institution of the monarchy in Morocco. Symbolic manipulation of the sources of legitimacy in Morocco, and appeal to these particular symbols of Moroccan social identity, allows the monarchy to diffuse the Islamist challenge to its legitimacy amidst a slow process of liberalization, mainly by imposing two strategies of co-optation and confinement. This research suggests symbolic manipulation as an alternative way to conceptualize power separate from its classical components of extraction, allocation, and coercion.

Legitimacy in the Moroccan context is based on a combination of factors deriving from the traditional authority of the makhzen. Other sources of popular adherence to the monarchy are fabricated out of cultural and religious symbols. A legitimacy made up of institutionalized symbols has greater flexibility, resilience, and longevity than one based solely on empty formal institutions, which are vulnerable to wars, economic failures, and political challenges.[19] The monarchy has constructed a quasi-divine aura around itself based on lineage to the Prophet, the annual ceremony of bay'a, amir al-mu'minin, and baraka. Using its vast legitimacy, the monarchy has been able to manipulate the political system by playing various parties off against each other in a difficult and often perilous balancing act. The monarchy has also relied on clientalisitic and coercive means to promote stability. Using a large system of patronage, King Hassan was able to divide the opposition into loyalists and radicals. The former received

substantial subsidies and privileges in exchange for their quiescence, while the latter were largely marginalized outside the system.[20]

The use of patronage does not contradict the framework of this analysis as it is subsumed under the system of rewards and punishment historically and culturally allotted to the king as the amir al-mu'minin within the authority of the makhzen. The use of patronage is material and not purely ideational or symbolic; however, it has historically been part of the authority of the sultan within the makhzen. As the amir al-mu'minin and the sharaf, it conjures up and perpetuates the image of the monarch as the giver and the bestower. This study, in fact, refers to symbols of legitimacy, and material incentives and coercion have caused the stability of the authoritarian regime in Morocco. However, these material incentives, political manipulations, and coercion have to be understood within the institutionalized symbols of baraka, bay'a, sharaf, and amir al-mu'minin. In other words, material factors need to be understood within an overall analysis of the role of ROPs in advancing the form of monarchical authoritarianism in Morocco. These symbols are part of the historical authority of the makhzen. What helps the makhzen's legitimacy is the fact that the ruling family that governed Morocco since the seventeenth century possessed a solid religious legitimacy (lineage to the prophet), a strong tribal alliance, and a ruling class that was created and strengthened to preserve the continuity of the authority. Thus, the legitimacy of the monarchy in the political culture in Morocco has always been accepted as a principle and, as such, it is a mere reformulation or renewal of this authority. This authority has developed through the period of state building and has shaped the authoritarian path in Morocco.

Methodology

This research analyzes the factors behind the resilience of the monarchy in Morocco. The survival and the stability of the monarchy in Morocco is due, in large part, to its religious capital and its construction of a discourse of legitimacy based on Moroccan socioreligious concepts and practices of baraka, amir al-mu'minin, and bay'a along the lines of the authority of the makhzen. The research herein adopts a sociological institutionalist approach to the study of authority of the makhzen and focuses on the socio-institutional and symbolic dimensions of politics. Echoing Lisa Wedeen's study of Syria, the study offers a "materialist approach to rhetoric and symbols."[21] A materialist approach emphasizes only those symbols and rituals that

are observable and used by the state in its practice of domination.[22] In so doing, the book seeks to accomplish three main tasks.

The first task traces the process of state building in Morocco, which predates colonial rule, but is tied to the monarchical regime through the authority of the makhzen. This task also helps determine the major actors within the regime coalition supporting the monarchy. This task also examines the historical development of the institution of the makhzen and explores its continuity and change in its administrative and symbolic guises, within Moroccan political system. The first two tasks are accomplished through historical analysis, archival analysis, content analysis of official documents and royal speeches, and newspapers in the postcolonial period marked by the long reign of Hassan II (1961–1999).

The second task is to examine the symbolic, traditional, and ritualistic components of the institutions of makhzen, and to assess their penetration in the Moroccan society and political culture. One of the key analytical objectives is to examine the resilience of the monarchy's institutionalized symbols of legitimacy in the context of the Islamist challenge. This challenge illustrated the main argument of this research that the monarchy in Morocco has maintained its stability, not only because of institutional mechanisms, but also through a vibrant discourse of socioreligious symbols that have throughout the history of Morocco become part of the institutions of the political system.

This research analyzes the ways by which the regime manufactures and builds these symbols in the public discourse through public education, the press, and in various state-sponsored ceremonies and practices to facilitate the stability and prevalence of monarchical authoritarianism. This study is also ethnographic in nature, transcribing and analyzing different religious symbols in governmentally-sanctioned rituals and ceremonies. These symbols are part of the public discourse; an analysis of their uses also informs the way they resonate in society. The symbols included in this study are: amir al-mu'minin, baraka, sharaf, and bay'a. The latter, as a practice that signifies political succession, is an elaborate ceremony that merits a full ethnographic account. The use of participant observations is important to this type of research, substantiating the role of myth, ritual, and discourse in the politics of legitimation in Morocco, through immersion in community life and by "thick" description.[23] This type of exercise discerns the meanings of the different rituals and symbols and places them in the context of their political usage. One of the benefits of this approach is that it untangles "the complex

specificness and circumstantiality" and gives actuality to the concept of legitimacy.[24]

The third methodological task assesses the resonance of the regime's symbols of baraka, amir al-mu'minin, sharaf, and bay'a in Moroccan society at large. This points to a nexus between the institutional context of legitimacy and individual support of the regime's symbolic power. This task is to be accomplished through the use of interviews and surveys. The goal is to assess the degree of penetration and acceptance of these symbols both in political discourse and in society at large. This helps explain citizens' attitudes and actions towards the regime. This is of utmost importance to the research and constitutes a major contribution to the literature. It establishes an alternative approach to legitimacy anchored in popular belief and support, not of state performance, but of the state's symbolic and historical claims to power. Surveys and interviews are likely to demonstrate that, while popular support of state performance is low, these beliefs are directed at the government and a corrupt bureaucracy rather than at the legitimacy of the monarchy. As explained earlier, the position of the monarchy, above the political fray, is a priori a by-product of its symbolic and historical authority.

A 289-respondent survey was conducted in the period between December 2006 and January 2007, in the greater Marrakech and surrounding rural areas. Sampling of respondents is done according to domain (urban and rural), by gender, and by socioeconomic status, performed by neighborhood type (upper class, middle class, popular), since neighborhoods in Morocco are generally indicative of one's social status. Statistical data is acquired from Morocco's Directorate of Statistics. These surveys assess Moroccans' attitude towards the Moroccan economy and political system in general, as well as the level of the appeal of the socioreligious symbols and discourse manipulated by the state.

This variety of respondents aims to produce an assessment of symbolic appeal by class, age, domain, and education. I hypothesize that the appeal will be substantial among the majority uneducated rural population and less within the ranks of the educated urban dwellers, who equate the monarchy's legitimacy with political stability and the maintenance of order. The use of a loose, less structured format is important because of risks involved with the research, as many Moroccans may not feel comfortable talking about the monarchy in public. Thus the questions in the survey first establish popular beliefs in the symbols and rituals of baraka, amir al-mu'minin, sharaf, and bay'a. Secondl, the survey underscores the linkage popular belief places between those symbols and the monarchy.

In addition to the survey, elite interviews were conducted with government officials over the last three years, especially with those officials entrusted with cultivating the state's cult of legitimacy, and politicians of the opposition parties, including members of the Islamist parties. Of particular interest are interviews with the head of state Islamic Councils in Marrakech, along with officials of both the ministry of Islamic Affairs and the ministry of Protocol in Rabat. The interviews examine the particulars of this discourse of legitimacy as well as the ways such socioreligious concepts of baraka, amir al-mu'minin, bay'a are institutionalized and disseminated to become part of the political system in Morocco. I also conducted interviews with Islamist groups in order to assess the impact of these symbols on their action in the political system in Morocco and their response to the state symbolic discourse. One of the main goals behind these interviews is to examine how these symbols hinder opposition political action and mobilization in the Moroccan political system.

These interviews are particularly important in the context of the Islamist challenge to the monarchy. While the Islamists have capitalized on institutional opportunities afforded within the process of liberalization, their challenge to the monarchy's legitimacy has failed because of the resilience of the institutionalized symbols of the monarchy's legitimacy. All Arabic and French quotations used in this study have been translated by me. All Arabic words have been transliterated in the same way as these words are commonly transliterated in the literature, that is simplified versions such as bay'a, *ʿulema* (religious clerics), and Muhammad have been used throughout this study.

OUTLINE OF THE STUDY

Chapter one of this book examines the theoretical formulations on the prevalence of authoritarianism and focuses on dominant institutional explanations to state authoritarianism in the Arab world. The chapter offers a critique of the institutional inability to account for the variation in outcome of institutional manipulation in Middle Eastern political systems. Institutional explanations de-emphasize cultural elements of regime survival and view institutions of authoritarian survival at a distance from their cultural framework, while at the same time highlighting and often drawing on purely cultural elements in their analyses. Institutional explanations have, in varying ways, referred to cultural themes that are part of the repertoire of strategies at the disposal of authoritarian regimes in the Arab world. Institutional explanations also conflate state performance with

legitimacy, which is an overall characteristic of the literature on legitimacy in modern political studies. This chapter also surveys the literature on legitimacy and is critical of its lack of differentiation between the nature and sources of legitimacy and those of state performance. As the case of Morocco showcases, failed state performance does not translate well into a lack of overall legitimacy of the regime. As the survey results later demonstrate, the monarchy has been above any reproach, while most of the blame for Morocco's economic plight is cast upon the government.

Chapter two examines the process of state formation in Morocco, where state ROPs are formally institutionalized within the apparatus of the formal institutions of the state. State formation in Morocco in many ways mirrors the process of modernization of the traditional authority of makhzen through the bureaucratization of old patterns of power such as *dahir* (royal decrees), consultation and arbitration, and ROPs of baraka, bay'a, amir al-mu'minin, and sharaf. Traditional modes and practices have been instrumental in supporting the monarchy's goal to establish an ancient political system within the contours of a modern political power, which is enhanced by the use of rituals of power.

Chapter three analyzes these symbols of state power as independent variables that explain state power and prevalence of modes of authoritarianism within a disciplinary-repressive approach to power. It explores the political manifestations and significance of rituals and symbols in Moroccan political culture. Analysis moves on to consider a socio-institutional framework as it examines the interaction of cultural symbols and rituals with interests and institutions. Cultural symbols and frames are viewed as accentuating devices that underscore a social condition and redefine dominant sociopolitical themes justifying monarchical hegemony in the public sphere in Morocco.

Using the case of Islamic activism in the Middle East, chapter four rethinks the concepts of civil society and the public sphere, whereby informal discursive strategies are undertaken in state-society relations. As chapter five argues, this discursive sphere is where the Islamists have mounted their challenge to regime hegemony. The two leading Islamist groups in Morocco, *Al 'Adl wal-Ihsane* (Justice and Charity) and *Al 'Adala wa Tanmiya* (Justice and Development), have failed to penetrate and demystify the existing dominant cultural hegemony. This failure has forced a shift in strategy for both Islamist groups who no longer seek to capture the state or change the existing political order; rather their goal today is to mitigate the authoritarian effects of the regime and to introduce a dimension of political accountability within the state.

Chapter five argues that the Islamists are engaged in a Gramscian war of position, along a discursive-institutional spectrum corresponding to the various strategies used to press for social justice based on Islamic teachings. Evidence from elite interviews suggests that the monarchy's religious authority and its ROPs hinder the mobilizational capabilities of opposition forces in Morocco and weaken their ability to shake societal belief in the legitimacy of the regime.

1

Theoretical Approaches to the Prevalence of Authoritarianism

Approaches to monarchical survival are at the center stage of a wider debate on regime types, processes of liberalization, and authoritarian survival in the Middle East.[1] The literature on democratization, and on democratic transition in particular, provides a conceptual starting point for the debate on authoritarian survival in the Arab world. Since the early 1980s, there has been an upsurge in academic interest in the processes and potentialities of democratic transition. This attention was triggered in large part by democratization of the remaining authoritarian regimes in southern Europe as well as in Latin America. Combined with regime openings in East and Southeast Asia, and then most dramatically the transformation of former communist regimes in Eastern Europe and Central Europe, these trends were considered by many observers, especially in the West, as parts of a larger, global democratic trend, known as the "third wave of democracy,"[2] and which sustained an explosion of new scholarship on democratic transition, breakdown, and consolidation.

Despite initially hopeful reforms, the record of successful democratic transitions remains abysmal in the Arab world. This state of affairs, which some readily called cultural exceptionalism,[3] led scholars to the study of the factors behind the persistence of authoritarian rule in the region. Many explanations have been put forth drawing on many larger theoretical frameworks, such as modernization theory (MT), historical sociology, insitutionalist frameworks, and political economy. These various frameworks seek to explain the factors that hinder democratization in the Arab world and facilitate authoritarian survival.

MT provides in many ways the starting point for debates on the prevalence of authoritarianism. In the 1950s and 1960s, MT examined the requisites of democratization in developing countries and sought to draw useful implications from developed states' political development that could inform analyses of the developing countries. Dankwart Rustow, for instance, outlined "three specifically political requirements" for modernization: identity, authority, and equality.[4] Modernization scholars argued that certain high levels of economic development coupled with rising levels of social mobilization, manifested through increased literacy, urbanization, and nonagricultural employment, would ultimately lead to the fall of authoritarianism.[5] MT's level of economic development was indeterminate and merely provided for a context that could enhance transition to democracy. In particular, this accounts for the variation in outcomes around the world, whereby southern European countries' economic prosperity has facilitated their subsequent democratic transition, whereas countries in the Middle East, even those with high levels of income and economic development—that is oil-rich countries in the Gulf—still suffer from a democratic deficit, even though Gulf countries did not feature high levels of social mobilization. In contrast, MT did not account for democratic governance in other countries with lower levels of economic development and social mobilization, such as India.

The failure of this early wave of MT to account for the varied outcomes, particularly in less developed countries, led to a reformulation of the theory. Samuel Huntington and Karl Deutsch contributed to this theoretical revision and contend that social mobilization in developing countries far exceeded the levels of economic development and, most importantly, the rate of political institution–building necessary to buttress that development.[6] Instead of democratization, Huntington spoke of "praetorianism," and specifically addressed the fate of traditional monarchies in the process of modernization.

Huntington argues that lagging economic growth, ineffective bureaucratic performance, and modernization's vast socioeconomic changes would ultimately threaten the traditional and clientalisitic nature of these monarchies, ultimately bringing about their demise.[7] In what Huntington called the "king dilemma," the monarchy's traditional centralization of power clashes with modernization's economic and social mobilization change, which will lead to the monarchy's ultimate extinction.[8] Huntington argued that the future of traditional monarchies is "bleak" as they are destined for possible violent coups or revolutions.[9] The eventual shape and form of government may vary from society to society, given the particulars of history and

culture; however, the broad mobilization of society brought about by modernization can only mean, from this theoretical perspective, that eventually governments must become democratically representative to be accepted as legitimate by the people. The 1979 revolution in Iran and Egypt, and Iraq in the 1950s, exposed the king's dilemma, and the outcome of a popular republican form of government replacing monarchy was in keeping with the general conclusions of MT. However, the continuing internal stability of the Gulf monarchies, if we exclude here the external threats as witnessed in the case of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, cannot be explained by the dominant assumptions of MT.

With the exception of Iraq, Yemen, and Libya, the Arab monarchical state, however, has stood the test of time and that of the literature. In particular, the resilience of Arab monarchies has been an exception to MTs as exemplified by Huntington. Instead of coups and revolutions, some Arab monarchies have managed to perfect their hold of their societies, not only through a mixture of coercion and institutional manipulation, but through a manipulation of sociocultural frames of governance. Such frames can only be analyzed through a detailed and particularistic study of those societies. In fact, MT's main weakness is its excessive linearity and the breadth of its model to the detriment of other alternative explanations of democratization and, conversely, to the prevalence of authoritarianism. MT readily dismisses the role of culture as tertiary, in which any conception of legitimacy and sociocultural frames is labeled essentialist.[10] This dismissal triggered early debates on "the centrality of culture" as a variable explaining democratic outcomes. Lipset, for instance, argued early in the 1960s and later in the 1990s that, in addition to economic factors, cultural variables account for the difference in democratic outcomes in the world. He particularly observes in the case of Canada that "the correlations between Protestantism and past British connection point to the importance of cultural factors" while "French-speaking and Catholic provinces of Quebec seemingly lacked the conditions for a pluralistic party system and democratic rights."[11]

MT's overall formula for independence and its emphasis on economic growth was criticized by dependency theories, which viewed modernization's focus on "decolonization plus growth plus democratization" as a formula for hegemony and domination.[12] Dependency theorists were critical of modernization's view of development as synonymous with egalitarian democracy and representative government, and a strong welfare system. This view is most apparent in the works of early modernization theorists, such as Shils, who argued

that "democracy has a chance of overcoming the gap between the rulers and the ruled by arousing and liberating the capacities of the ordinary people in the villages."[13] Dependency theory, drawing on a Marxist approach to underdevelopment, focused on the institutional legacy of European colonizers. Dependency theorists viewed decolonization as a policy to further colonial interests after independence. Colin Ley's study of Kenya, for instance, finds that the changes that took place in the economy as independence approached were carefully planned to protect the interests of the white settlers and international capitalism.[14]

MT's broad framework, and dependency theory's focus on the institutions and structure of exploitation, led to a recent attempt to subject societies to contextualized, institutionalist analyses. This focus on the state's social control ushered in new scholarship that rejected both modernization and dependency arguments, and called for more contextualized analyses of societies. Joel Migdal's state-in-society approach asserts that "the structures of domination [are] constructed by the process of hidden and open conflict of varying sets of rules and their promoters, including the networks, alliances, and fabrications that are part of the process."[15] For this approach, societies are more complex than described in previous accounts of the state. Societies are not mere dichotomies, but instead are composed of "a mélange of social organizations."[16] The state, for Migdal, is one institution among many that competes to exact social control over society. Social control involves the ability of the state to "to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways." Social control is "power" or, more precisely, what Michael Mann has called "infrastructural power."[17]

Migdal compares strong states, like Israel, that have achieved "a high level of legitimacy" and have exerted a great degree of social control with weak states that are unable to exercise the same social control over their societies.[18] However, weak, diffused states, such as sub-Saharan countries, can exist within, but cannot overcome their strong societies, which demonstrate strong social control through a variety of ethnic and traditional organizations.[19] Applying Migdal's framework of strong-weak states in the Middle East, Ayubi argues that in addition to generating hegemony and enforcing laws, a strong state is able to generate a "greater proportion of tax revenue that comes from direct taxes on individuals."[20] In this respect, Ayubi singles out Morocco as the only Arab country in which "taxes on individual incomes have exceeded taxes on corporate income ever since 1982."[21] However, Morocco is not a strong state because of its

inability to achieve most of its declared developmental goals. Ayubi recognizes the importance of regime's religious symbols of power, but does not examine how they may play a role in generating hegemony and strengthening the Moroccan state.[22] Migdal's state-in-society approach and Ayubi's focus on the structure of the state in the Middle East fed into larger institutionally based analyses of the state.

The school of "new institutionalism," for instance, broke with MT as it de-emphasizes structural factors for more institutional factors. New institutionalism views the particular regime institutional configurations and dynamics as important variables that could explain certain political outcomes. As March and Olsen argued, "actions taken within and by political institutions change the distribution of political interests, resources, and rules by creating new actors and identities, by providing actors with criteria of success and failure."[23] In this respect, state institutions and the particular dynamics that govern them facilitate or inhibit democracy or authoritarianism. The study of authoritarianism in the Middle East is decidedly institutionalist in nature. This literature has drawn extensively on the overall body of the democratization literature, especially, the theory of democratic transitions.

Democratic Transitions Theory: Lessons for the Arab World

Regime transitions from authoritarian rule are not seen by democratic transtions' scholars as a function of underlying preconditions at the level of deep economic and social divisions and formations. O'Donnell et al. explicitly state that individual actions are "much less tightly determined by 'macro' structural factors during the breakdown of authoritarianism than during the breakdown of democratic regimes."[24] O'Donnell et al. delimit transitions from authoritarian rule, on the one side, by the authoritarian regime's launching of the process of dissolution of the authoritarian regime, and, on the other, by the installation of the democratic regime signified by the first free elections. Their study suggests that a good starting point for looking at the crisis of an authoritarian regime is the "opening": the appearance of political and ideological space for a challenge against that regime. This opening is largely determined by elites' contingent choices and in a context in which permanent authoritarian rule lacks legitimacy. A possible transition is also characterized by the authoritarian rulers' intention to extend significantly the sphere of protected individual and group rights.[25]

During the process of transition, the rules of the political game are in flux, and they are usually arduously contested: "Actors struggle not just to satisfy their immediate interests and/or the interests of those whom they represent, but also to define rules and procedures whose configuration will determine likely winners and losers in the future."[26]

Transitions ought not to be confused with liberalizations. Liberalization is identified with measures taken by an authoritarian regime in the direction of providing more secure guarantees for the rights of individuals and groups.[27] Liberalization can be a sign that the process of transition is about to begin, but it should not be confused with democratization, which involves expanding political participation and competition.[28] O'Donnell and Schmitter argue that

> authoritarian rulers may tolerate or even promote liberalization in belief that by opening up certain spaces for individual and group action, they can relieve various pressures and obtain needed information and support without altering the structure of authority, that is, without becoming accountable to the citizenry for their actions or subjecting their claim to rule to fair and competitive elections.[29]

Although, in most cases, liberalization has a multiplier effect leading to increasing demands for more rights, the process could be reversed by the authoritarian rulers at any time. Regime transitions are abnormal periods of "undetermined" political changes in which there are not enough structural or behavioral parameters to guide and predict the outcome. Transitions emanate from divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, between hard liners and soft liners that widen under the instability of political liberalization.[30]

Transition scholars offer a "contingent" model of change, which assumes that in the political game during transition periods, one actor's initiative prompts another actor's response and that political events follow from actors' contingent choices. From a contingent point of view, political outcomes stem from interaction and bargaining. The key to democratic transition, according to O'Donnell and Schmitter, is the ability of elites to arrive at a negotiated agreement that grants everyone a piece of the transitional pie. Elite "dispositions, calculations and pacts" are important because "they set important parameters on the extent of possible liberalization and eventual democratization."[31]

The contingency approach is voluntarist and de-emphasizes the role that external factors, political legacies, and institutional constraints

play in bringing about regime change. Linz and Stepan attempt to reconcile the role of past political legacies with regime transition as they argue that past elements of nondemocratic regime influence the kind of transition paths available and the tasks different countries face when they embark on their path to develop consolidated democracies.[32]

Democratization scholars, at first, devoted much interest to processes of democratization and political liberalization in southern Europe and Latin America with little or no focus on the Middle East. O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead's seminal study of transitions from authoritarian rule is an example of this trend. Similarly, Diamond, Linz, and Lipset's study of democratic politics in the developing world ruled out any consideration of most of the Middle East, arguing that "the Islamic countries of the Middle East and North Africa generally lack much previous democratic experience, and most appear to have little prospect of transition to even semi-democracy."[33] This lack of attention to the Arab world is largely due to the absence of any sustained democratic government in the region. However, with the renewed international and domestic calls for democratic reforms, many Arab states undertook a careful process of liberalization, which quickly was shut down when it proved to be politically costly for current regimes in the Arab world.

For contingent choice scholars, authoritarian regimes liberalize as a means to diffuse tension and placate the opposition,[34] when they are faced with social and economic challenges. This argument only partially fits the Middle East, where regimes, both monarchical and republican, resorted to some measures of political liberalization as a survival strategy when faced with economic and social challenges. Yet attempts to liberalize cannot be explained by divisions between regime soft liners and hard liners. With the exception of Yemen, there is no evidence that political liberalization processes anywhere in the Arab world involve any divisions or conflict among the elite and regime coalition. These processes were in most cases a by-product of external, not internal, pressures. The processes of liberalization in the Arab world were, however, short-lived as those regimes quickly reversed their course and embarked on a process of deliberalization when faced with real challenges from organized opposition groups. Wiktorowicz, for instance, argues that the economic crisis reduced regime legitimacy as the regime failed to provide for basic commodities and services for its people. This also forced most regimes to adopt liberalization policies and to engage in what Quintan Wiktorowicz, echoing Glenn Robinson's study of Jordan, called "defensive

democratization," which lacked any real commitment to democracy on the part of the state and was "part of a regime survival strategy in the face of economic crisis and political instability."[35]

These policies ushered in a type of "liberalized authoritarianism"[36] that lies in the "gray zone" between dictatorship and democracy. Detractors of the transition literature point to this "gray zone" as a major weakness of the transition paradigm.[37] Critics of the transition paradigm erroneously assumed that transitions happen on a linear trajectory of opening, breakthrough, and consolidation, with political liberalization and divisions among hard liners and soft liners as major catalysts in this process. Carothers, for instance, calls on the "democracy-promotion community to discard the transition paradigm."[38] However, Carothers misreads O'Donnell and Schmitter's argument and arguably the whole transition literature, which emphasizes the unstable nature of this process: "Transition toward democracy is by no means a linear or a rational process" and is fraught with "too much uncertainty about capabilities and too much suspicion about intentions."[39] In fact, there is more likelihood that the regime will remain authoritarian than become democratic.[40] The fact that transitions can evolve into something else other than democracy does not weaken the transition literature as Carothers contends. On the contrary, it does buttress overall claims about the uncertainty and instability of this process.

Carothers's critique could well be addressed to other scholars in the contingent choice approach to transitions. For example, while Adam Przeworski upholds O'Donnell and Schmmitter's argument on the inherent instability of transitions, he, nonetheless, implicitly assumes that transitions move forward or backward on a trajectory between political liberalization and democratization. Przeworski observes that liberalization could replace democratization, and he argues that political reforms and openings could ultimately prove fatal for the authoritarian regime as "the melting of the iceberg of civil society" would "overflow the dams of the authoritarian regime."[41]

Transition scholars do not account for a process of liberalization that is frozen. The emphasis of the contingent approach on the instability of transitions only fits partially in the Arab world, where political liberalization took place up to a point and stopped. However, the transition literature does explain the prevalence of authoritarianism in the Arab world, since there are no significant divisions between elites within the regime coalition as to the future democratization of the regime. This prompts several questions about the dynamics of regime coalitions in the Arab world. In Morocco, these dynamics

are characterized by a total domination by the monarch, who makes use of his sources of legitimacy and patronage to maintain the regime coalition. The contingent approach also does not address the effect of past political, institutional, and cultural legacies on the "transition paths available and the task different countries face when they begin their struggles to develop consolidated democracies."[42] These legacies are especially important in the case of Arab regimes, which have been mired in authoritarian practices and where modern state institutions were created to accommodate regime coalitions at the advent of colonial period.

The contingency school assumes a closer fit between state and regime, in which authoritarianism in Latin America "often inherited the legacies of past democratic states," which facilitated the democratic transition once the authoritarian regime weakened.[43] The Middle East, however, features a different state-regime relationship, as regimes existed prior to the modern state. Lucas argues that current regimes have managed to surround existing regime coalitions with modern states as a byproduct of colonial legacies, as is the case in Jordan, the Gulf states, and Egypt.[44] Morocco partially fits this particular state-regime relationship as elements of a state system in the form of the makhzen predated colonial rule, but were expanded and modernized during the French protectorate. The relationship between the state and the regime is important to an understanding of the authoritarian institutions in the Arab world, because these institutions are imbued with regime clientalisitic, and traditional practices and symbols. Thus, any study of these institutions has to examine the cultural elements that are integral parts of these structures.

Lucas examines the role of past political and institutional legacies in his study of the politics of survival of the monarchy in Jordan, but at a distance from their sociocultural framework. Using Linz's original definition of authoritarian regimes[45] and Linz and Stepan's later refinement of this definition,[46] Lucas classifies Middle Eastern monarchies as a subtype of authoritarian rule. Lucas's institutional typology explains the survival of the regime in Jordan and proposes a nuanced relationship between state, regime, and society that transition from authoritarianism and contingency scholars did not account for.

Lucas's typology conceptually and empirically facilitates the study of Arab monarchies within the overall democratization literature, which previously neglected this monarchical type. Geddes's seminal review of the democratization literature, for instance, ignores the monarchical authoritarian type in her classification of authoritarianism.

Monarchical authoritarian rule in the Middle East features different dynamics than those outlined in Geddes's personalistic type, in which she collapses Linz and Stepan's (1996) sultanistic and civilianized regimes, arguing for the centrality of the individual personalistic leader in managing the regime.[47]

Lucas's typology challenges Geddes's classification and argues that whether dynastic or linchpin, monarchies in the Middle East are not sultanistic regimes, even though they are ruled by personalistic leaders. The Arab monarchies, instead, share five major authoritarian features: (1) the monarch is a personalistic ruler, but he does not rule alone, as the king or emir stands at the center of a regime coalition that can include a broad social base; (2) a degree of political pluralism is allowed; (3) the mass population remains politically quiescent or may be mobilized along communal or clientalistic lines; (4) the monarch's powers are predictable and generally constitutionally organized; (5) a mentality (not an ideology) of the regime may be based on anticolonial leadership, religious prestige, or traditional privilege.[48]

It is the last of the five characteristics that this research examines. This mentality is constructed by the regime itself, drawing on traditional, symbolic, and religious elements that justify the king's primacy in the spiritual and temporal realms, and undermining democratic traditions. This "mentality" in its religious and traditional guise, and the resulting manipulation of its symbols, facilitates the authoritarian rule in most of these monarchies and especially in the case of Morocco. The symbolic and religious "mentality" associated with the makhzen subsumes all other features of authoritarian rule. It provides the basis of monarchical rule in Morocco and sets the king above the political fray as he manages political pluralism and popular mobilization. Finally, it is this "mentality" that is predictable and constitutionally organized, and that promotes the survival of the Moroccan monarchy. Thus a systematic examination of its contours within the Moroccan political culture is warranted.

In the Arab world, liberalized authoritarian regimes "dictablandas" are the norm. In countries such as Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Algeria, Syria, Bahrain, and Kuwait, authoritarian rulers initiated liberalization reforms and opened up spaces for individual and group action without changing the nature of their authority. Arab authoritarian regimes oscillate between exclusionary and inclusionary authoritarianism as political opposition is curtailed through regime intimidation and/or co-optation,[49] whereby the prospects of a meaningful democratization remain elusive. In some of these countries, (Syria, Libya, and Egypt) we are seeing a new phenomenon of "hereditary

authoritarian republics." Several Middle Eastern rulers are actively grooming their sons to take over after their deaths. So far, only Syria underwent a hereditary type of regime change through constitutional means. Many observers and scholars of Middle Eastern politics predict that other Arab republics will follow the Syrian model. This type of authoritarianism is characterized by limited elections, targeted repression, and political manipulation of the opposition. Daniel Brumberg argues that this constitutes a new system of liberalized autocracies "whose institutions, rules and logic defy any linear model of democratization."[50]

Institutions and the Persistence of Authoritarianism

Many explanations of the prevalence of authoritarianism in the Middle East favor institutional frameworks emphasizing the role of political structures and manipulative strategies in promoting authoritarian stability. Brumberg, for instance, advances three factors that generate and sustain authoritarian rule in the Arab world: *"dissonant"* politics, *"nonhegemonic"* approaches to governance, and sufficient wealth to provide multiple state interests.[51] Each of these factors functions similarly, to provide for a greater level of societal pluralism and openness. Counterintuitively, each appears to lend legitimacy to autocrats by reducing the perceived autocracy of their regimes. Promotion of dissonant politics along with nonhegemonic restraint lends societies figurative, if not literal, pluralism, discourse, and competition. In dissonant politics, regimes allow competition between Islamists and non-Islamists. Brumberg suggests that this practice is more likely in cases of greater factional contention, and serve autocratic interests. Sufficient state wealth is the final critical component of Brumberg's model. He suggests that "enough economic development and competition to free the state from obsessive concern with any single interest, class or resource" provides a multiplicity of interests that, individually, might be less likely to threaten autocrats.[52] Liberalized autocracies, according to Brumberg, have been more successful in Arab monarchical regimes, because "these kings have more institutional and symbolic room to improvise reforms than do Arab presidents."[53]

This monarchical advantage is clearly manifested in Morocco and Jordan, in which the monarchy has capitalized on its symbolic power and institutional prerogatives to craft a stable authoritarian regime. In Morocco, liberal reforms worked to "depoliticize" the public sphere and emphasize economic reforms.[54] Similarly, in his study of

monarchical survival in Jordan, for instance, Lucas argues that the regime was able to use political liberalization as a survival strategy when it was needed,[55] but later reversed towards a process of "*deliberalization*" to prevent any meaningful political opening.[56] In these states, regimes have maintained control over policymaking by subverting the democratic procedures they initially set up.[57]

Ellen Lust-Okar examines the link between economic crisis and political reform in Morocco and Jordan, and argues that any sustained oppositional movement to these monarchies is largely a function of the nature of the political environment created by the ruler. For instance, she finds that in an "undivided environment" such as Jordan's—where opposition groups are excluded from legal political participation or all opposition groups are allowed legal participation—oppositional forces that emerge out economic crises are more sustained. Lust-Okar presupposes that once excluded these groups are marginalized and are unable to mount any meaningful challenge to the incumbent ruler.[58] Lust-Okar's analysis fails to note that the environment of the political system in Morocco could be a function of past historical legacies that have been institutionalized during the process of state formation.

Lust-Okar's emphasis on regime dynamics is important in studying the stability of authoritarianism in the Middle East. In fact, internal dynamics within a regime type are important factors in the survival of monarchies in the Middle East. Michael Herb's useful typology is important in this regard. Herb distinguishes between dynastic and personalistic monarchies. In "dynastic" monarchies, "members of the ruling families monopolize the highest state offices . . . and distribute members throughout lower positions in the state apparatus, especially in key ministries."[59] The almost inseparable relationship between the state and the ruling family of dynastic monarchies is of relatively recent origin and is an important characteristic in the dynastic model.

In Herb's analysis, dynasticism engenders stability through several mechanisms, such as the "monopoly of state power," the "quality of leadership," smooth "transfer of power," the "accountability of the ruler to dynasty," and the "information network" afforded by the size of the ruling family.[60] Herb's analysis is mostly adequate in describing the category of dynastic monarchies in the Gulf; however, it raises the question of whether we can extend it to linchpin monarchies of Morocco and Jordan, where "the ruling family generally participates only in the political institutions of the monarchy, not in the state bureaucracy."[61] Herb locates monarchical survival within the

monarchy itself, which differs from explanations that stress external sources of survival.

One such explanation is Lisa Anderson's analysis of the factors behind the unexpected resilience of monarchy in the Middle East. In so doing, she rejects the arguments of regional exceptionalism and cultural determinism that posit that monarchy is a traditional and, therefore, congenial type of regime in the Islamic world. Anderson charges that those types of arguments are empirically unsatisfactory because they fail to explain the apparent ability of Middle Eastern monarchs to accommodate and even foster nontraditional social and political change.[62] Anderson argues that the prevalence of monarchy in the Middle East is the reflection of imperial policies. Monarchies in the Middle East were "installed, retained, and refurbished" because they served colonial purposes.[63]

Middle Eastern monarchies have survived, according to Anderson, because of their flexibility in accommodating projects of nation building and state formation. Anderson addresses the case of the monarchy in Morocco and argues that the institution of hereditary succession promoted by European powers dramatically increased the monarch's arena of arbitrary prerogatives, even for the monarchy in Morocco.[64] Anderson rightfully pointed to the monarchy's strategies to legitimate their rule. For instance, the monarchy has instituted the ritual of bay'a annually to symbolize the allegiance of the Moroccans to the king. The king was also successful in elevating the monarchy as the ultimate expression of national sovereignty and alienated those, such as the al-Istiqlal party leader during French occupation, Allal al-Fassi, who advocated a constitutional monarchy that reigns but not governs. This study complements some of Anderson's explanations as it seeks to examine the process of symbolic institutionalization of other more important symbols of monarchical rule than the institution of hereditary succession. Anderson's explanation, however, is historically arguable, since the process of state building in Morocco was not started with French colonial rule; rather, it was expanded under the protectorate as elements of a state apparatus preexisted the advent of the French in Morocco in 1912. In addition, Anderson credits the colonial period for solidifying the monarchical rule in Morocco. However, historical events tell a different story: the monarchy was not French friendly, and Sultan Mohammed V was exiled for his resistance to the French.

Unlike Anderson's historical-institutional argument, F. Gregory Gause examines regional factors behind the resilience of monarchy in the Arabian Peninsula and contends that "the success and failure

of monarchy in the Arabian Peninsula in the twentieth century had more to do with the position of Arabian countries in the regional security picture and the international political economy than with their particular domestic characteristics."[65] Gause argues the role of foreign political and military assistance in distinguishing between successful monarchies and failed ones. In addition to foreign support, surviving monarchies in the Arabian peninsula also benefited from oil revenue that served "to bolster domestic rule over relatively small populations," and was used "to build extended patronage networks without incurring limiting political obligations to domestic groups or alienating any powerful domestic constituency through taxation."[66]

Gause's argument emphasizes external factors at the expense of domestic cultural explanations and, doing so, it fails to take into account the idiosyncratic features and cultural foundations of other monarchies in the Middle East. In addition to Gause's regional factors, international factors are also of importance. As Fred Halliday puts it, "All of the monarchies of the Arab world, and some of those that survived as long as they did, owed their survival to the intervention of external forces."[67] Halliday illustrates his point using several historical examples of external intervention in saving Arab monarchical regimes. In Morocco, Halliday asserts that the monarchy was saved twice in the early 1970s, during two abortive military coups against the monarchy.[68] Halliday fails to mention that these external interventions were made *after* the coups failed, the culprits were executed, and the regime regained control of the country. Halliday's argument discounts important domestic variables, institutional or cultural, that effectively sustained authoritarian regimes in the Arab world after those instances of turmoil.

One recurrent theme throughout the literature, albeit de-emphasized, is the role of leadership as a variable in the survival or demise of monarchies. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman highlights the leadership variable in his investigation of the factors behind the monarchical failures and subsequent coups in Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya. Maddy-Weitzman argues that, in addition to structural changes, the demise of those monarchies was due to a leadership deficit, which gave rise to oppositional-revolutionary politics that were further worsened by the regional and international environments.[69] Maddy-Weitzman reinforces Huntington's "king dilemma" argument and argues that political institutions in Iraq, Egypt, and Libya could not keep up with socioeconomic changes brought about by modernization.[70] Maddy-Weitzman's analysis lacks any reference to cultural factors and, instead, focuses strictly on structural and personalistic variables.

However, these personalistic characteristics that Maddy-Weitzman analyzes should be subject to a wider sociocultural analysis, for a charismatic, skillful leader functions in relation to the cultural values and constructs an ideology that could resonate within a particular society. It is the cultural framework on which charismatic and traditional rulers ground their authority.

Ideology can also be an important variable in the survival of monarchies in the Middle East. Gabriel Ben-Dor argues that the monarchies survived because they were successful in containing radical subversive trends opposed to their rule and in imposing a more conservative ideology in politics.[71] Ben-Dor does not explain the tenets of this conservative ideology in the context of the Middle East; rather he insinuates it in terms of the relationship between tribalism and monarchy. Ben-Dor argues that the survival of a monarchy is closely tied to the existence and continuity of tribal structures. If these structures are upset by socioeconomic changes, the monarchy may lose its relevance in society and be "overthrown by forces of change."[72] Ben-Dor's explanation is limited by the fact that not all monarchies in the Middle East rely on a tribal base. Despite his assertion to the contrary, Morocco's monarchy does not have as strong tribal identification today as in Jordan and on the Arabian Peninsula. His analysis is limited and, while it looks at a cultural aspect of the society in the Middle East (tribalism), it limits its explanatory power to socioeconomic factors. Ben-Dor's use of the term ideology is flawed insofar as what he examines is a set of traditional symbols that Arab regimes, especially monarchical ones, have used to legitimate their rule. These constitute a mentality, not an ideology, based on religious and traditional privilege.[73]

Critique of the Institutionalist Approach

The dominant institutional approach to the prevalence of authoritarianism in the Middle East highlights various institutional strategies for the current state of affairs in the Arab world. This bleak state of affairs is characterized by limited elections, curtailed civil liberties, and a shrinking political space for dissent. These explanations provide a useful explanation of the dynamics of regime stability for many of the Arab governments; however, these explanations need to be contextualized within a socioculturally informed framework. Such a framework is what provides a meaning for these regimes to exercise their politics of manipulation. In the case of Morocco, these sociocultural frames are highly entrenched within Moroccan political culture

and help set the monarch above any political reproach, even when the menu of manipulation is clear.

Institutional explanations suffer from two main limitations. First, these explanations do not account for variation in the outcome of institutional manipulation in Middle Eastern political systems. In the Moroccan case, institutional manipulation is credited for the prevalence of authoritarianism and for placating various opposition political parties through limited elections and reduced political space for dissent. However in the case of the Islamist groups, they have, in varying ways, mounted a counter-challenge to the monarchy and its regime coalition by obtaining considerable gains in those elections and through appeals to a wide segment of the population by providing socioeconomic incentives that the government was unable to provide.

The politics of inclusion and exclusion do not fully explain the resilience of the authoritarianism in the Moroccan system, especially in the absence of outright repression today. As interviews with political officials show in chapter four, the use of violence and coercion has largely been de-emphasized. In the words of a member of the Parti de la Justice et du Développement/The Justice and Development Party (PJD): "Violence is a thing of the past and the ancient regime. And so far it has not been a preferred method of the current one."[74] Despite these strategies, the Islamists remain a force in the political system in Morocco. The Islamists, for example, flexed their muscles on March 12, 2000, by staging a large demonstration in the Moroccan capital to protest the king's reforms of the *Mudawanna* (Family code) that gave women equal rights in family matters and put more restrictions on polygamy.[75] This event was significant because it marked the resurgence of the Islamist movement since the early 1980s and, most importantly, it showed public acknowledgement of a long, organized, and popular Islamist opposition. The *ulema* marched alongside the banned 'Adl wal Ihsane and its rival parliamentary party 'Adala wa Tanmiya.

Second, institutional literature has sought to distance itself from idiosyncratic cultural explanations. Institutionalists' explanations de-emphasize cultural elements of regime survival and view institutions of authoritarian survival at a distance from their cultural framework while highlighting cultural elements in their analyses. Institutional explanations have, in varying ways, highlighted cultural themes that are part of the repertoire of strategies at the disposal of authoritarian regimes in the Arab world. Brumberg, Anderson, and Lucas, have all incorporated a role for cultural elements in their explanations, albeit

a tertiary or epiphenomenal one. Brumberg acknowledges the dual role of the monarchs in Jordan and Morocco "as modern leaders of a nation (*watan*) and traditional patrons of the Islamic community (*ummah*),"[76] and their use of ideological and cultural "dissonance" to maintain their regimes. However, these particular cultural and ideological structures or symbols are not systematically examined in order to assess the extent to which they independently contribute to the prevalence of authoritarian rule in select Arab monarchies.

Similarly, Lisa Anderson's analysis points to symbols and rituals in postcolonial Morocco; however, she does not offer a deeper understanding of their genesis, development, and historical saliency in the Moroccan political culture. Anderson does not consider why these particular symbols—subject to institutionalization—are important to the resilience of the monarchy. Their significance can be traced within makhzen's historical framework, continuity, change, and how it has shaped the modern political scene in pre- and postcolonial period in Morocco. The institutional supremacy of the monarchy in the political sphere is not a new feature related solely to subsequent demands for liberalization. In the case of Morocco, this supremacy is but a reformulation of a historical, symbolic, and coercive authority of the makhzen, which cannot be adequately captured without examining sociocultural development. An understanding of these institutions is also important in the context of the particular regime-state relationship that exists in the Middle East. As Lucas argues, most regimes in the Arab world have surrounded their regime coalitions with a state apparatus, mostly during the colonial period. Thus, any understanding of these institutions has to be grounded in the set of traditional and tribal privileges that Arab regimes possess.

Institutional explanations emphasize government's performance in the economy as an important variable in legitimacy. These explanations presuppose that authoritarian rulers initiate processes of liberalization to offset economic challenges; they generally perceive such challenges equal to a legitimacy deficit. While this may or may not be true, it is not sufficiently established in these explanations; rather it is assumed without any systematic or empirical study. Institutional explanations and, especially political-economic arguments of authoritarian survival, conflate legitimacy with economic performance. In the early 1990s, most authoritarian Arab rulers initiated various processes of liberalization as a direct result of lagging economic performance; most scholars assumed, and never empirically established, that these challenges amount to meaningful challenges to legitimacy, or constitute instances of illegitimacy. In a sense, the process of

liberalization as a survival strategy is used to manage the illegitimacy of these regimes. While this may be true, we simply do not have adequate empirical evidence to sustain that assumption. This conception of legitimacy is a feature of the overall theory of legitimacy in political science.

Modern Theory of Legitimacy: Rethinking Weber

Weber's conception of legitimacy provides, in many ways, the starting point for contemporary debate about legitimacy and power. Weber believed that, crucial to a state's existence, there has to be "a minimal willingness to obey; that is an interest in obeying is essential in every real model of domination."[77] For Weber, state actions were legitimate if the governed accepted the state's authority and submitted themselves to it voluntarily. Weber's conception of legitimacy implies a normative component that it is based on the beliefs and judgments of individuals. Pakulski emphasizes this Weberian normative dimension and states that legitimacy refers to authority having generalized normative validity among participants in social relations, and that legitimacy implies voluntary compliance with authority.[78] This conception of state legitimacy also has an instrumental component as it is a tool used by the state to accomplish actions, a mechanism "whereby government officials are endowed with the power to make authoritative decisions."[79]

Weber distinguishes between three alternative claims to legitimacy. A claim might appeal to legal-rational procedures, to "a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands."[80] Legitimacy can also be based on "traditional grounds—resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and those exercising authority under them."[81] A claim to legitimacy might also appeal to charisma, "resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him."[82]

Weber's classification of the types of legitimate authority has been widely reviewed and examined in the literature of political science and political sociology. This literature analyzes the different types of legitimate authority: rational, traditional, and charismatic; however, little analysis has been devoted to Weber's discussion of legitimacy in relation to legitimate orders. Weber defines such orders as systems based on the belief in/or by the actors in its binding quality or rightness.[83]

Such legitimacy is based on tradition, affectual attitudes, rationality, or legality.[84] Weber's discussion of order is distinct from authority, which is a relationship between actors in which the subjects perceive the commands of certain actors as binding.[85] Authority is a component of order for, wherever authority exists, political order ensues. Norms are also a part of order and are rules of conduct that govern actors' behavior.[86] In many respects, norms are juxtaposed with authority as "polar principles of social organization."[87] Both denote two main aspects of the legitimacy equation: command and obedience. Norms set the boundaries of behavior while authority rests on the compliance to commands, and the interaction between authority and norms underlines the institutional structure of any ordered interaction.[88] The amalgam of norms and authority, and the particular relationship between the two, defines the type of legitimacy in Weber's classical typology of legitimate authority.

Of particular interest to the current research is Weber's conceptualization of traditional legitimate authority. The monarchy in Morocco does appear to possess a traditional legitimate authority where power is based on a set of traditions and is sustained to promote loyalty to a chief and to solidify a system of personal authority.[89] Weber argues that traditional rule is legitimized in one of two ways: in terms of the traditions themselves, which set the parameters of power, or by the will of the ruler, backed by an obedience based on an unlimited personal loyalty to him. These criteria fit the Moroccan case, as does Weber's charismatic authority, defined as "a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with exceptional powers."[90] In Morocco, charismatic authority translates into the concept of baraka, where the power of God appeared in the "exploits of forceful men, the most considerable of whom were kings."[91]

Charisma in the Moroccan context is derived from Islamic symbols and rituals. Despite this seeming fit between Weber's two types of legitimate authority and the monarchy in Morocco, these definitions, as ideal types, are static and fail to examine the different ways an authority cultivates its legitimacy in a dynamic process of symbolic manipulation. It also provides no systematic account of how those sources are entrenched in local political cultures and their sociopolitical development.

Weber's conceptualization of legitimacy has sparked various readings. Scholars interested in modern capitalist and democratic systems are among those who made use of Weber's view of legitimacy, and in a sense strayed from it. Unlike Weber, these more recent studies of

legitimacy have focused more on regime performance and population satisfaction as it relates to the extent to which the regime has been able to fulfill its goals or the political values that are shared in that particular political system.

Friedrich, Easton, and Lipset approach legitimacy through the state's correctness of procedures, the justification of its decisions, its constitutionality, the fairness with which it treats its subjects, and, most importantly, "the widespread public belief that the society's governing institutions and political authorities are worthy of support."[92] Modern democratic studies of legitimacy and political stability ground their legitimacy-stability thesis on the stabilizing effects of democratic institutions, accountability, and bureaucratic rationality. Lipset, for instance, emphasizes popular belief and support as a condition for political stability. In fact, legitimacy and popular belief are intimately linked for Lipset: "Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society."[93] The claim to legitimacy, for Lipset, is relative and evaluative in its focus on popular belief and support of state's effective performance and its fulfillment of its mandate. The state's mandate is defined, in large part, by its ability to arbitrate and resolve conflict among the different groups in society. The state's legitimacy, for Lipset, lies in the system's capacity to engender that popular belief. Such a view mainly emphasizes structural elements of state performance, particularly the production of force and economic goods, while de-emphasizing regimes' manipulation of ideological and symbolic components of their legitimacy.

Modern democratic scholars locate definitions of legitimacy in the popular belief that "a given rulership is believed to be based on good title by most men subject to it."[94] However, such belief is located in a secular political culture that it is largely the product of the functions of modern political institutions, and "the extent to which the system satisfies the basic functions of government."[95] Modern definitions presuppose an open society where a state's performance is debated. This tradition seeks to rationalize modern life away from traditional authority. Primordial and traditional authority poses a challenge to studies of legitimacy and political stability, since the belief in its legitimacy is based on primordial and ascriptive beliefs that can be institutionalized in the state and cultivated from above at a distance from a state's performance and effectiveness in performing its functions.

Political legitimacy has been understood in two main ways. First, legitimacy refers to a set of values and norms that are important in the functioning of a political system. This constitutes what Pye and

Verba referred to as "political culture"[96] or "a legitimacy style"[97] and which are subject to the process of political socialization. This "moral basis of authority" is concerned with the functions and role of the government, its rights, and the methods by which it is accountable, changed, and selected.[98] Second, legitimacy has been used to "refer to the extent to which the relevant portion of the population perceives that the regime is behaving" in congruence with, or in violation of, political norms and values.[99] Therefore, the unit of analysis is the degree of people's "positive or negative judgment of what is perceived" about the performance of the state.[100] This second meaning of legitimacy focuses squarely on the satisfaction of the population with government's actions in relation to the salient political norms and values they believe in. When satisfaction occurs, no crisis of legitimacy is possible.

Performance and popular support are two dominant themes in the literature on legitimacy in Western political systems, since "western political systems and their social and intellectual bases are on the whole more oriented towards rationality and appreciation of performance than are those of the Third World."[101] However, a number of other scholars extended the link between legitimacy and performance to studies of legitimacy and political stability in the developing world. Verba argued that the problem of legitimacy and performance "characterizes most of the crises" of the developing world: "Successful performance in any of the other areas depends on the legitimacy of the government, and the legitimacy of the government depends to some extent upon its performance in other areas."[102] While Verba points to relative claim between legitimacy and performance, his argument opens up discussion on the contours of the relationship between state performance and its claim to legitimacy.

Both forms of legitimacy, while useful, ignore an important aspect of legitimacy: state manipulation of existing traditional symbols as tools in the legitimation process by which the state acquires social support for its authority. While the literature accurately emphasizes the importance of popular belief for legitimacy, this belief is constrained and limited to the work of institutions and the perception of how "right and proper" they are.[103] In other words, performance and satisfaction variables are not sufficient to advance our quest for an accurate theory of legitimacy that could inform our analyses in developing countries, where such variables are difficult to assess or, as in the case of Morocco, lacking. The two aspects of legitimacy result from an attempt to rationalize and empirically map a complex and culturally laden concept of legitimacy. A study of legitimacy should,

as this research establishes, start from an overall examination of how entrenched those norms and values (important to assessing regime performance) are in the local political culture. For these norms and values do not exist in a vacuum, and attention to their sociopolitical genesis and development is important to an understanding of their uses and their resonance.

Legitimacy in the Middle East

As Michael Hudson prophetically stated in the late 1970s, legitimacy continues to be a central problem for governments in the Arab world, and it is crucial to regime stability.[104] Hudson's argument is especially salient amidst international calls for democratic reforms and the reemergence of political Islam as a viable challenger to regime legitimacy in the Middle East. Hudson's seminal work on legitimacy provides a comprehensive analysis of Arab regimes and a sociological analysis of the components of legitimacy in the Arab world. He approaches legitimacy institutionally and within the imperatives of rapid economic and social changes of modernization:

> The legitimacy problem in the Arab world is basically the same as that in most newly independent, rapidly modernizing states . . . it results from the lack of what Dankwart Rustow has designated as the three prerequisites for political modernity: authority, identity and equality.[105]

Legitimacy, for Hudson, lies in the "rightness" and efficacy of the political structures in a given order, which can prevent violence in a political life.[106] Treatment of legitimacy in this sense emanates from a concern with political stability and change, and is indicative of a core concern within the modernization literature. Hudson echoes some of Huntington's themes as he examines the possible models of how legitimacy can be achieved in the modern era. These include a "transformationist" model whereby traditional models are transformed, usually by revolution; the "mosaic" model in which traditional loyalties remain even during a period of modernization; and the "social mobilization" model where the masses are mobilized and brought into support of the regime.[107] Hudson accurately highlights the significance of the personalistic and traditional elements in the degree of legitimacy monarchical regimes have attained.[108] However, his treatment of individual cases studies, including Morocco, is superficial and does not delve into the sociocultural determinants of this personal leadership, though Morocco clearly fits the "mosaic" model

since traditional authority has been refurbished through modern institutional forms. Hudson does not also attempt to trace these traditional forms in the political discourse or how they are manipulated by the regimes. This perhaps would have been a mighty task for a work that takes the whole Middle East as a case study.

Most modernization scholars have primarily focused on economic development, the organized instruments of physical force, bureaucracies, and class structures. Such variables, however, do not provide adequate insight into the sociopolitical determinants of legitimacy and political stability. Scholars in this tradition suggested an analysis of classes and rapid economic development as they engender instability and a crisis in the public order.[109] Some argued that political instability occurs when “a period of improvement in material conditions is followed by a sudden and sharp reversal.”[110] Sharp reversals are expectations in the minds of the people; however, James Davies shies away from relating these expectations to any considerations of legitimacy. The significant variable lacking in these studies is a consideration of the role of legitimacy as a sociocultural phenomenon in the politics of developing and authoritarian countries and its effects on regime stability. As this study later shows in the case of Morocco, these sharp reversals are often directed at the government and not at the monarchical regime, which is largely insulated from political and social dissent due to its religious legitimacy.

The way in which modernization scholars de-emphasize sociocultural components of legitimacy was further carried by institutionally oriented scholars such as Binder, Eckstein, and Gurr. These scholars focused on Western political systems in their study of political legitimacy and have examined the state as an analytically distinct and autonomous political variable by gauging its effectiveness in terms of institutional capacities or relative autonomies.

In many models of authoritarian states, legitimacy is not regarded as an important influence on the state’s political power. Theda Skocpol, for example, defines the state as “a set of administrative, policing, and military organizations headed, and more or less well coordinated by an executive authority” that “extracts resources from society and deploys these to create and support coercive and administrative organizations.”[111] The state’s political power is based on “the support or acquiescence not of the popular majority of society, but of the politically powerful and mobilized groups, invariably including the regime’s own cadre.”[112] This support is separate from any consideration of legitimacy because it is limited to the few political

elite that have vested interest in current regime. Legitimacy, as this research suggests, has to include a measure of widespread social support and belief.

Skocpol's definition of state power does not recognize the power of political framing in the repertoires of the state's legitimation. This dimension, for instance, proved to be important before and after the Iranian revolution, as Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Behishti played on symbolic representations of the Shah as the usurper and oppressor, much like Yazid during his war of attrition against Hussein.

State-focused approaches were also influenced by behavioralist studies of political systems and legitimacy in their emphasis on individual attitude and behavior towards state actions. These studies view legitimacy as a relationship between the state and its subjects by which the latter obeys the state's authority out of a belief in the rightfulness of the state to issue such commands. Migdal, for instance, asserts that a state's control over society is determined by the population's compliance with state's demands, voluntary participation by social groups in state-run institutions, as well as political legitimacy.[113] Legitimacy is "more inclusive" than compliance and participation, because while

> compliance and participation may result from calculations by individuals of the array of rewards and sanctions at hand; legitimacy includes the acceptance of the state's symbolic configuration within which the rewards and sanctions are packaged.[114]

Migdal's approach is an exception among state-oriented scholars as his view of the state adds a symbolic dimension to state-society relations. However, Migdal does not elaborate on the state's "symbolic configuration," its components, and its salience in the local political culture and how it is used within a process of legitimation.

Ayubi's statist approach, while rejecting the idea of legitimacy, offers a nuanced approach to the study of the state in the Middle East. Unlike Hudson who sees legitimacy at the heart of the puzzle of contemporary Arab politics, Ayubi seeks to explain the lack of Arab unity, the prevalence of authoritarianism in the Arab world, the weakness of Arab governments in the areas of taxation and law enforcement, and Arab governments' fickle economic development strategies. Drawing on broad neo-Marxist Gramscian perspectives, Ayubi uses a political-economy approach to examine this ambitious agenda while refuting cultural explanations for the sociopolitical and

economic ills of the Arab world. Ayubi's approach considers "the way in which the state in many cases adjusts the economic imperatives and reshapes the socio-economic alliances."[115]

Ayubi distinguishes between two types of corporatist style of maintaining power in the Arab world: a community-based consociational type in the Arab Peninsula and Arab monarchies of Morocco and Jordan; and an interest group–based type of social dirigisme, which characterizes the countries of Syria, Iraq, Tunisia, and Egypt.[116] However, neither corporatist type is able to generate a single class that is able to exercise hegemony over society. In this respect, the class system in the Arab world is dependent on the state. The ability to generate a hegemonic discourse, along with the capacity of the state to enforce laws, collect taxes, and implement development plans is what makes a "strong" state "that can bind the individual and the groups to the state."[117] Arab states, for Ayubi, lack these characteristics and as a result are weak. They might be hard (highly centralized) or fierce (highly coercive), but they are not strong in the sense that they can fully penetrate society.[118]

Despite the impressive scope of Ayubi's argument, he does not address legitimacy per se in his analysis and does not offer any answer to the prevalence of authoritarianism in those countries in the Arab world that do not fit the corporatist or the rentier state mold. Even his discussion of the prospects of democracy in these states does not advance anything new beyond the prevalent "no representation without taxation"[119] argument that explains authoritarianism in the Arab oil countries. Thus, while Ayubi rejects cultural explanations, his analysis of hegemony in the Arab world lends itself to cultural explanations. Since in the Middle East there is no coherent independent class ideology away from the state, one can make the argument that, in noncorporatist states, there is an alternative traditional, symbolic, and historical mentality that is "diffused by agencies of ideological control and socialization into every area of daily life."[120] This mentality could serve as a source of hegemony in the Gramscian sense, which could be used as a vehicle for building legitimacy for these states. Nevertheless, such argument is ultimately subject to empirical evidence and systematic research.

A Critique of Modern Theory of Legitimacy

The literature on legitimacy and political stability suffers conceptual and empirical weaknesses. First, while the literature recognizes cultural elements of legitimacy as an important variable in regime stability,

there is an insufficient grasp of the difference between the nature and sources of legitimacy and sources of state performance. This is also likely to be a byproduct of the intellectual legacies of Marx and especially Weber, who sought to solve the fact-value distinction through a categorization of cultural constructs, including legitimate authority into ideal types. Ideal types are "subjective presuppositions" that give significance to cultural constructs.[121] For Weber, ideal categorization is the essence of true science and of true politics: "The objective validity of all empirical knowledge rests exclusively upon the ordering of the given reality according to categories which are subjective."[122]

While Weber's three sources of legitimate authority do not focus primarily on performance as a form of legitimacy, modern scholars of legitimacy have, in varying ways, conflated state performance, which can be an alternative source of support for a regime, with legitimacy as a value-laden construct. Performance (i.e., the production of services, goods, and the resolution of societal conflicts among groups) lends itself to rational calculations because performance factors and their agents—bureaucracies, democratic institutions—can be assessed provided that there is a popular agreement on their goals or the political values that shape them. This view of legitimacy does not advance the study of legitimacy and political stability beyond a state's institutional capacities to perform its functions effectively. Lipset, for instance, while maintaining a distinction of legitimacy as evaluative and performance as instrumental, does link the two within the context of legitimacy crisis.[123] Lipset explains that a crisis in legitimacy happens after a new social structure is established and when this new system is "unable to sustain expectations of major groups (on the grounds of "effectiveness") for a long enough period to develop legitimacy."[124] This view is limted to new social structures and neglects a state's active role in using its sources of political legitimacy beyond the confines of performance. It also does not make a distinction between state and regime legitimacy, which is important in the case of Morocco.

Furthermore, while the literature recognizes the importance of popular beliefs for a claim to legitimacy, it assumes that belief to be intimately linked to state performance as one aspect of legitimacy leading to regime stability. In the democratic literature, the final basis for legitimacy is rationality, which assumes that individuals make political decisions "about support for government *rationally*, or at least act as if they did."[125] A rational framework for legitimacy implies that relations with authority are shaped by an environment in which the ruled and the rulers "act rationally in order to gain the maximum possible advantage for themselves at the least possible

cost."[126] This framework is located in the functions of state institutions and the degree to which they fulfill their goals. This framework also de-emphasizes how legitimacy can be based on traditional symbols of authority. This view of legitimacy meant an underemphasis on values and beliefs as embedded in local cultures and a larger focus on economic factors and instruments of coercion among other factors of state performance. This study views legitimacy as a product of state manipulation of socioreligious symbols that have certain appeal within a local political culture. The norms and beliefs surrounding legitimacy are "the product of history, tradition and ideologies. They are sociologically primordial, psychologically superego related, [and] morally sacred."[127]

The literature on legitimacy suggests that lack of public confidence could result in political instability. However, theoretical and empirical considerations suggest that this argument must be revised if it is to be applied in nondemocratic societies. To improve its applicability, it is necessary to ground legitimacy in its major variables socially and culturally. This conceptualization of legitimacy is increasingly salient in the context of Middle Eastern monarchies such as Morocco. Personal leadership and traditional-based legitimacy have been singled out, in varying degrees, as salient variables in the study of legitimacy in Middle Eastern monarchies.[128] However, no study to date has offered an in-depth, sociopolitical examination of the particular elements that traditional monarchies rely upon. Such a study is timely especially given the challenge of political Islam, which, with the exception of Shi'a Iran, has unsuccessfully contested the monarchy's symbolic and traditional claims of legitimacy. Thus an understanding of these symbols and rituals is exceedingly important and could be achieved through an innovative approach that seeks to analyze and contextualize political dynamics of manipulation within a sociocultural framework.

2

The Makhzen and State Formation in Morocco

Since independence in 1956, Morocco has witnessed a remarkable symbiotic relationship between two dissimilar systems of power. The first is rational and corresponds to modern state function of bureaucratic and administrative governance while the latter is traditional in nature and has buttressed those rational institutions of power in Morocco. This patrimonial system refers to the vibrant authority of makhzen, which predates the colonial era and in many respects has strengthened the process of state building in Morocco. Much of the current authoritarian state in Morocco is to be understood within this peculiar relationship, where makhzen operates within the rational mechanisms, with a whole set of traditional and patrimonial practices that legitimize the menu of institutional manipulation outlined in the institutional explanations in the literature on authoritarian survival in the Arab world.[1] The symbiotic relationship that this research advances is preferable to other explanations of makhzen as an ancient mode of government, which saw its final days with the advent of the French colonial rule.[2] Makhzen has had a remarkable continuity as it has recast its traditional, patrimonial, and symbolic power within modern political institutions in Morocco.

Definitions of the makhzen formulated either through interviews with politicians, or by makhzen scholars, lack a precise sense of the notion of the concept. Makhzen, for most Moroccans, is an apparatus of state violence and domination, and at the same time a system of representation of traditional royal power.[3] Makhzen is also a system of conflict resolution controlled by the king, who dominates all fields of the social universe.[4] It evokes fear, awe, and respect in the Moroccan political culture and refers to a patrimonial institution that has managed to adapt to the realities of modern Moroccan politics. A clear conception of makhzen is still elusive and, to capture its meaning, a

cursory look at its origins and historical development seems necessary at this point.

The development of makhzen was established progressively throughout the history of Morocco. Deeply rooted in Islam and informed by political practices, makhzen has managed to strengthen its authority in society. Makhzen literally refers to the sixteenth-century institution where taxes were gathered before being sent to the treasury of the ummah.[5] However, its emergence as a sociopolitical system dates back to the twelfth century when the sultans of Morocco broke away from the Abbasid dynasty in Baghdad. Makhzen was then used to denote a bureaucratic establishment and, with the advent of the great Berber dynasties (Almoravids, Almohads, and Merinids), it was used to refer to the whole government, including the army and the administration. From the twelfth to the end of the nineteenth century, makhzen indicated the government in Morocco as formulated by both the Sa'adian and Alawi sharifian dynasties to meet the necessities of internal and external rule and, particularly, to unify the greater Morocco along religious lines.[6] As such, the usage of the word makhzen meant a centralized political system with the sultan (later king) at center of a structure comprising the army, bureaucracy, ulema and the different Sufi lodges (*zawiya*), which were instrumental in propagating the sultanisitc power in society. Thus, throughout its development, makhzen has shifted from its literal meaning as the government's treasury to a sociopolitical interpretation as "a reservoir of power." This power consists of the political authority of the government and the army, in addition to, social symbolic authority represented by the sultan as the head of religious power.[7] A study of the makhzen has to examine this sociopolitical dimension as it is the factor facilitating the perennial role of monarchy in the political sphere in Morocco. In the following sections, attention is devoted to the administrative elements of the makhzen, its sociopolitical characteristics, and the role of Islam in advancing the discourse of makhzenite authority in colonial and postcolonial Morocco.

This chapter examines the process of state formation in Morocco, where rituals of power were formally institutionalized within the apparatus of the formal institutions of the state. State formation in Morocco in many ways mirrors the process of modernization of the traditional authority of makhzen through the bureaucratization of old patterns of power such as dahir, *shura* (consultation), and rituals of power of baraka, bay'a, amir al-mu'minin, and sharaf. Traditional modes and practices have been instrumental in supporting the monarchy's goal to establish an ancient political system within the contours

of a modern political power, which is enhanced by the use of rituals of power.

State Building in the Middle East

Despite the variegated meanings of state building and disagreement about the contours of the state, the concept involves ongoing state penetration of society for the purpose of resource extraction. This important relationship was important in the early stages of European state building, where extraction and taxation constituted the "nerves of the state."[8] The extraction dimension of state building was also a quintessential element in the definition of the state as "an organization with a comparative advantage in violence, extending over a geographic area whose boundaries are determined by its power to tax constituents."[9] Such a definition reflects the Weberian conception of the state as an instrument of legitimate violence with extractive capabilities, in which taxation and extraction are important tasks for the state to control in order to continue its survival.[10]

In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the ability to extract taxes has served as a defining element in the scholarship on state building. State building in the MENA has been studied in reference to the colonial legacy of the region. However, several scholars in the literature argue that the framework of state building in the MENA was settled long before the advent of colonialism.[11] Colonial powers did set the current boundaries of the Middle East, but the majority of the countries in the region are "the product of indigenous and regional forces mostly unrelated to European colonialism."[12] Prior to the colonial encroachment, there existed forms of discernable authority over various parts of the Middle East. In addition to the overall rule of the Ottoman Empire, which controlled most of the modern Arab world, except Morocco, the region had various forms of authority that exercised extractive power over its people. Illiya Harik's typology of the Arab state illustrates this argument, addresses the nation-state problem, and develops a typology of political systems stressing not only exogenous but also local and endogenous factors leading to the emergence of these states.

For Harik, a state is an authority established over territory and people "for an extended period of time, stretching over at least several generations. The jurisdiction of the state includes powers to implement the law, impose taxation and demand military service, loyalty and allegiance to the established authority."[13] In this definition, the majority (15 out of 18) of the Arab countries predate colonialism

and should not be overlooked as they possessed sources of their own legitimacy.[14] Harik provides a typology of the Arab state system in accordance with their bases of authority:

> ***The imam-chief system***: authority is invested in a sanctified leader (Yemen, Oman and Morocco).
>
> ***The alliance system of chiefs and imams***: authority is invested in a tribal chief supported and awarded a legitimate authority beyond the confines of his tribe by virtue of his identification and/or alliance with a prominent religious leader and his teachings (Saudi Arabia).
>
> ***The traditional secular system***: authority is vested in a dynasty from religious attributes. State hegemony is cemented further by the possession of coercive power in the hands of a cohesive group (Qatar, Bahrain, UAE and Lebanon).
>
> ***The bureaucratic-military oligarchy***: authority originates in urban-based garrison commanders, who in time develop an extensive bureaucratic apparatus (Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia and Lybia).
>
> ***The colonially-created state system:*** states that have been carved out from the defunct Ottoman Empire on the basis of foreign imperial interests and in the absence of any credible local base of authority upon which to erect new structures (Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Palestine).[15]

This typology expands Weberian ideal types of legitimate authority and supports the argument made in this chapter that the process of state building in Morocco predates French colonial rule. In general, colonialism affected the boundaries of modern Arab states at the turn of the twentieth century as part of a larger imperial policy.[16] Colonialism, however, did not create the regimes and ruling elite coalitions within those states. Under British and French colonial rule, formal institutional structures emerged in the Middle East that have become the most basic and significant unit in Middle Eastern politics and in shaping collective identities.[17] Identities that centered on Arabism and nationalism, for instance, have been singled out as instrumental in state building as "more [of] a tool than an obstacle to state formation."[18] Massad's study of postcolonial Jordan, for instance, stressed the importance of colonial institutions of the military and law in constructing a national identity and national culture in Jordan around a "juridical-disciplinary dyad."[19]

Despite colonial institutional legacies on the Arab state, regimes were locally rooted and enjoyed legitimacy in the eyes of their people, and their authority endured way before the advent of colonialism in the region. In Morocco, the traditional state was vested in the

administration of the makhzen, which formed the basis for power and included rituals and religious ceremonies.

Makhzen as a State Administration

The monarchy in Morocco has had a remarkable longevity dating back from the eighth century to the present. Even during the period of 1912–1956, when the country was under a French protectorate, the protectorate maintained the trappings of the monarchy and its associated institutions. The current ruling dynasty in Morocco, the Alaouites,[20] has been in power since the mid-seventeenth century, when its founder, Sharif Ali ben Youssef, and particularly his sons Muhammad and Al-Rashid, managed to unify the country under one centralized power between 1635 and 1671. Initially, the power of the Alawis relied less on maraboutism and zawiya,[21] which previously had been instrumental to the previous Sa'adian dynasty. The Alaouites' power relied largely on military power and sharifian prestige.[22] The Alaouites, especially during the rule of Isma'il (1672–1727), in many ways established the historical antecedents of modern-day institutions of the makhzen.[23] Isma'il, for instance, built up a new army made from slaves (known as '*Abid al-Bukhari*) brought from sub-Saharan Africa,[24] reduced the power of the Sufi lodges, and imposed a system of heavy taxation, which has constituted the main temporal part of the authority of the makhzen. While Isma'il established the temporal foundations of the makhzen, his grandson Muhammad III sowed the seeds for the spiritual legitimacy of the monarchy. Muhammad III (1757–1790) rebuilt Alawi power on new foundations as he emphasized the role of the monarch as a religious leader and decentralized the government by investing power in local chiefs.

This system of government consisted of two spheres of influence: *bled al-makhzen* (land of governance) and *bled es-siba* (land of dissidence). The former was under the effective control of the sharifien government and paid taxes to the makhzen, while bled es-siba recognized the spiritual legitimacy of the monarch, but was dissident in its refusal to pay taxes to the makhzen coffers. Taxes are what distinguish the two bleds, and it was the ability of the makhzen to levy taxes that effectively established its temporal control of those lands. In this regard, Muhammad III also promoted trade and promulgated a new system of taxation that relied more on custom duties and less on direct individual taxes.[25]

Muhammad III, as amir al-mu'minin, sultan, and a sharif,[26] managed to build legitimacy for the Alawite kings based on religious

symbols, the strength of the institutions of the makhzen, and a delicate balance of power between bled es-siba and bled al-makhzen. This equation accounted for the stability of the monarchy for most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as dynastic struggles and local revolts became increasingly rare. This stability was disrupted during the French protectorate (1912–1956), which curtailed most of the administrative powers of the sultan and replaced its traditional administration with modern bureaucratic and technocratic structures.[27] However, the sultan retained his spiritual power as the final arbiter in matters of Islamic justice and *habous* (pious endowment).[28] The French protectorate ironically strengthened the authority of the makhzen as it extended the power of the sultan to the hinterlands of bled es-siba previously outside the administrative control of the monarchy.

After the independence in 1956, Muhammad V was by most accounts a religious leader and, like Muhammad III, he promoted the position of the monarch as a religious leader protecting the religious values of the country. After Muhammad V's death in 1961, his son Hassan II ascended the throne. During the next 38 years, the country fared comparatively well relative to its neighbors. Relations between the monarchy, the government, and the people are still stable. But this stability was in large part due to the personal skills of Hassan II, a form of authoritarian pluralism, "Hassanian democracy," and a recultivation of the historical and symbolic authority of the makhzen. In addition to religious and symbolic factors, the monarchy in Morocco has also used external factors to channel mass support and legitimacy.

Moroccan sultans/kings, as heads of the ummah, have always been the core of the makhzen authority. Internally, makhzen consists of two major groups: royal court services, directly subservient to the king and attached to his various royal domains and palaces commonly called "*Mechouar*." The second personnel group constitutes the government entrusted with the task of performing state services and to facilitate the administrative function of the makhzen. Both groups perform at the complete disposition of the monarch and do not possess any autonomous powers. In rural areas, makhzen is represented by a local administration headed by the different "*caids*," who serve to extend royal sovereignty in remote tribal land. Caids, however, are reputable local tribal and/or regional notables who possessed vast stretches of land and allied themselves with makhzen in order to protect their territorial and economic interests. Caids are assisted by "*Sheikhs*" and "*Muqaddemin*," whose task is to serve at the complete

disposition of caids. In urban centers, makhzen is assisted by pashas and "*Mohtassib,*" who is a municipal officer in charge of supervising moral behavior and the markets.[29] Finally, in the lands not formerly under the tutelage of the sultan, called bled es-siba, power resided in the traditional "*jma'a*" (an assembly of local notables), which govern autonomous tribes, not under the direct control of the sultan, as they are not subject to sultanistic taxes, but definitely under his dominion.

Makhzen refers both to an administrative apparatus and to particular social and cultural symbols, as well as practices and rituals that have always buttressed functions of the state. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, makhzen was comprised of three main groups. The first group is exclusive and is composed of the king and two or three *wazirs* (viziers or ministers) or *hajibs* (major domo), who set the policy guidelines that effectively run the country internally and externally. The second group within the authority of the makhzen is the chancellery composed of *katibs* (secretaries), who were technocrats charged with writing and disseminating the general state policies and measures decided upon by the sultan and his wazirs. The third entity in the makhzen is composed of treasurers and intendants entrusted with the financial and economic functions of government. These three functions are the backbone of the administrative authority of precolonial makhzen and in many ways mirror the functions of a modern state.[30]

This study of the makhzen authority is, in fact, a study of the constituting elements of the Moroccan state and political system. This kind of study can be achieved through an examination of its two constitutive elements: the traditional patrimonial power of the sultan as a religious head of state, and the king as head of the modern state in Morocco. The former is a function of historical development and is imbued with a symbolic legitimacy rooted in Islam, while the latter is a by-product of the French colonial legacy of Morocco.

Characteristics of the Traditional Makhzen

Several theories have been advanced about makhzen as both a governmental institution and a system of social organization. These theories distinguish between different types of makhzen. First, some in the literature advance the idea of the "tribal makhzen," or "makhzen in tribe." Building on Ibn Khaldun's concepts of *'asabiyya* (group solidarity), *da'wa* (proselytism), and *dawla* (state), which linked political

authority and its practices to tribal society, tribal makhzen suggests that the conflict between rural dwellers and nomads resulted in the emergence of political authority in the makhzen. Such a view locates makhzen historically in the tribe, and makhzen dynamics and structure are those of the tribe.[31] In this respect, the alliance between makhzen and tribe is primordial and vital for the survival of the throne. The fecundity of the makhzen relies on the appeal to 'asabiyya by some tribes called "*guish,*" which provided the backbone of the Moroccan army for centuries.

For other sociologists, makhzen is seen as an apparatus of violence with the sole purpose of maintaining the ruling regime, and to creating "an absolute state, a centralized state, to impose a unique law...and submit its subjects to a merciless and ruinous tyranny."[32] In this respect, makhzen perpetuates social disorder and fuels intertribal warfare, in order to reinforce its role as an arbiter. There is no question the makhzen has, throughout the history of Morocco, relied on authoritarian means to buttress its rule and unite the different tribes within a centralized state. This dimension of the makhzen is what Western scholars have mainly focused on. John Waterbury, for instance, points to the continuing violence of the makhzen, and its reliance on a coalition of interests devoid of any constructive or common positive will. Thus, makhzen, for Waterbury, exists to further the special interests of the three groups and individuals that constitute it.[33] Waterbury's and Clifford Geertz's conception of the makhzen are historically specific and do not provide an overall account of the makhzen's development in the political culture in Morocco. Waterbury's analysis, in particular, is simplistic and partial. Salahdine, for instance, argues that the makhzen's use of violence has always been of last resort and that what has governed Morocco is the logic of cohabitation, conciliation, and negotiations, not coercion.[34] Germain Ayache levels a stronger critique of Waterbury's view of a brutal makhzen and suggests that the makhzen accomplished many other social functions, notably the role of an arbiter in the conflicts between diverse social groups.[35]

The authoritarian characteristic of the makhzen is also the main theme in those in the French colonial literature such as Montagne, Terrasse, and Bellaire, who have identified a "feudal Makhzen," suggesting an affinity between the makhzen and feudalism. Much like the feudal system in the European Middle Ages, there is a lack of centralized authority, where lords (nobles) were empowered by the king to rule over peasants who worked the land. Thus the political system relied on overlapping spheres of influence by various lords, caids in the

Moroccan case, with the king at the center of the political power.[36] Local feudal caids in Morocco acquired tremendous clout and privileges, but functioned as the representatives of the sultan in Moroccan hinterlands. This local feudalism is fundamentally authoritarian, as its organization relied heavily on the makhzenite tribes of "guish" to exercise its functions of coercion and exploitation of the peasants. In effect, caids', pashas', and governors' chief function is to maintain the public order and dissuade any type of peasant dissent.[37]

While tribal and feudal makhzen established the makhzen's political and social authority, its religious force derived from its alliance with the various "zawiyas" that, historically, had been important allies of the different dynasties in Morocco. This has prompted many in the literature, such as Geertz, to examine the concept of "Makhzen and Zawiya (Sufi Lodge)," stating that the makhzen at its core is a religious establishment with discernable political institutions and structures. Accordingly, zawiya is not only a mystical and religious establishment, but a political milieu, in which the power of the monarch is propagated. Zawiya also played a mediating role to settle tribal conflicts that could have threatened the longevity of the monarch, whose authority has been both spiritual and political.[38] Zawiya played important roles in the political system of Morocco and in the making of the political elite. Makhzen and zawiya relations have always been dictated by the sociopolitical realities of the time. Makhzen has found a strong socioreligious ally in the zawiya in ruling over the different tribes in rural Morocco. Zawiyas benefited amply from royal benevolence in exchange for their alliance.[39]

Makhzenite authority over the different tribes was absolute as the sultan ruled supreme in urban and rural areas, "as a descendant of the prophet, all powers were concentrated in his hands."[40] As the monarch integrated local power centers, such as the zawiyas into its makhzen authority, the regime sustained its rule and became more immune against both internal and external dangers. Such dynamics of inclusion and conflict resolution still exist in the today Moroccan political arena; however, these are not only a by-product of institutional manipulative mechanisms. They also are a result of centuries of monarchical dominance in the sociopolitical sphere. Such domination has only been possible because of the monarchy's reliance on religious symbols of legitimacy.

Symbols of sharaf, amir al-mu'minin, and baraka, have buttressed the coercive functions of the makhzen. In fact, this new "sharifian makhzen" substitutes the equality of actors in the politico-religious arena, a hierarchical structure one that has subverted tribal power, for

a sharifien power that is above all institutions and conflicts.[41] It is this supremacy, political, social, and religious, that sustains the monarchy in Morocco and legitimizes its authoritarian rule.

Despite the different conceptions and definitions of makhzen, most scholars agree that it is the product of a long historical process that dates well before the colonial period in Morocco. Similarly, most agree that the king is the pole of the makhzen, not just as an institution, but as a style of government that combines both the temporal and the spiritual. This style has had a remarkable continuity in the modern political system in Morocco and can be seen in the royal court, its services, protocol, ceremonies, costumes, and language.[42]

The makhzen garners historical and symbolic legitimacy that is consecrated in the political culture in Morocco, promoting political stability and using various socioreligious symbols, rituals, and practices as part of its discourse. The temporal-spiritual duality has created a dialectic of master and disciple (and reward and punishment) that has given the authority of the monarch resilience and stability in the political system. The most visible aspects of the makhzen are seen daily in the different rituals, ceremonies, and symbols used in sociopolitical discourse and in the constitution of Morocco. Its less invisible aspects lie in the monarchical manipulation of different factions in Morocco through clientalistism or coercion, legitimized by the symbolic use of rituals of bay'a, amir al-mu'minin, baraka, and sharaf. The interplay between this "hard power" and "soft power" is what makes for the resilience of the monarchy in Morocco.[43]

This duality in the modern political system of Morocco is particularly salient in the context of the symbols and rituals of baraka, amir al-mu'minin, sharaf, and bay'a, which are used to construct a cult of legitimacy for the monarchy. The monarchy in Morocco plays on its symbolic representation both in prestigious ceremonies and symbolic, religious discourse that have built a veil of mysticism around the monarch. This mysticism has, throughout years, elevated the monarch to a saintlike person.[44] This sacrosanct personality has also benefited from a paradigm of authority juxtaposing absolute authority against absolute submission in Moroccan culture.

Rooted in Islamic mysticism, this paradigm can be observed in the rituals and public ceremonies, which promote the prestige of the king within a fundamental dialectic between *master* and *disciple*.[45] This dialectic informs major aspects of Moroccan personal, political, and gender relations. Its influence is so pervasive and so firmly embedded that it ultimately legitimizes the authoritarian structure of power. Abdellah Hammoudi, for instance, contends that as long

as the master-disciple dialectic remains the dominant paradigm of power relations, authoritarianism will prevail as the dominant political form.[46] Religious symbols and rituals resonate in Morocco because they appeal to a cultural narrative that is well entrenched in the Moroccan political culture and identity. The task of studying these symbols, and their impact on the political system, is an empirical task, one that shows us how and why they resonate in the Moroccan sociopolitical arena.

One recurrent theme in any conception of the makhzen authority is Islam. The powerful role of the monarch in the political system is a function of a religious heritage that has made the monarchy vibrant throughout the centuries and continues to sustain it to date through constitutional means and through a process of state centralization. Therefore, we can wonder about the specific Islamic symbols that have consolidated the makhzen and the means that have prolonged makhzenite traditions.

Islam and the Sources of Legitimacy

The history of Islam in Morocco, as elsewhere, is characterized by this struggle between centripetal and centrifugal forces: the ‘ulema trying to centralize and the sufis to disaggregate and decentralize power. Islam in Morocco is the supreme reference for a hierarchy of legitimation that has enabled makhzen to extend its hegemony over civil society and the political system in general. In the precolonial era, Islam was the only basis for the person of the sultan. After the protectorate, Morocco has promulgated five constitutions, which consolidated the monarchical rule and perpetuated Islam as the basis of makhzenite power.[47] The religious basis of royal power in Morocco is reinforced by the contractual base of bay’a, which is a ritual of allegiance in the Islamic jurisprudence.[48] This ritual constitutes another source of legitimacy and legitimation in Morocco. Bay’a is a symbol of choice and allegiance that is bestowed upon the king in annual ceremony that conjures up historical images of the Islamic empire in the aftermath of the death of the Prophet. This ritual affirms the royal authority over a specific territory as a spiritual and temporal head entrusted with the task of securing civil order. It is a covenant that the ruled forgo to the ruler on the condition that the later delivers on those guarantees of order and security.

Today, bay’a is a glorified symbol of royal power and a pillar of its cult of personality. Each year this grandiose spectacle reinforces the perennial power and absolute supremacy of the king and the complete,

unfettered obedience of his subjects. Each day of the throne, 4000–5000 dignitaries, 'ulemas, government cabinet, military corps, parliament members, high-ranking bureaucratic officials, and local elected and appointed leaders, line up in front of the king's pure blood horse and bow five times in complete submission to royal authority.[49] While steeped in tradition, the ritual of bay'a serves to reinforce the image of the king above the political fray, which is key in the monarchy's survival in facing the challenges of Islamist and non-Islamists political forces.

Another source of legitimacy is the king's sharifian heritage as the descendant of the Prophet and as leader of the Muslim ummah. In the sharifian empire, the king's sharifian character, whereby he is endowed with baraka is the real basis for his power.[50] This quality is further institutionalized through the Moroccan constitution, especially in Article 23, which states that the person of the king is "sacred and inviolable." Islamic symbols continued in the postcolonial period to be the anchor of legitimacy for the monarchy. Every other modern institution was built around and aimed at perpetuating this legitimacy. The 1962 constitution, which declared the king as the amir al-mu'minin, only confirmed a royal perennial power largely accepted within the political arena in Morocco. Even today, in all the interviews with political officials, even those in the opposition do not contest that religious legitimacy. Even more illuminating is the statement of a high ranking official in the Islamist 'Adala wa Tanmiya, who proclaimed the king as the defender of the faith, whose sole problem is not the fact that he is not advancing democratic ideals, but Islamic ones.[51]

Religion in Morocco is never relegated to an individual private exercise; it is rather a unique sociopolitical problem, which cast its shadows on the legitimacy of the Moroccan polity. King Hassan II, much like his predecessor Mohamed V, always invoked the religious basis of the monarchical legitimacy in official statement and public discourse. Moroccan monarchs have also reinforced Islamic practices, such as combating un-Islamic practices in society, presiding over religious symposia and conferences, building mosques all over the kingdom, and, most importantly, funding multiple religious and koranic schools under the aegis of the ministry of religious affairs and the different religious councils charged with controlling all manifestation of this brand of populist Islam.[52] Religious councils are key institutions in the propagation of royal religious legitimacy. Through regulating religious affairs and *moussems* (saints' days), these councils put the religious at the disposal of the political and reinforce the domination

and hegemony of makhzen over religious discourse. Since the 1970s, this monopoly over the religious has served to marginalize Islamists' attempts at religious-based reforms. The organization of special Islamic symposia and conferences (in which Moroccan and foreign 'ulemas take part), the prevalence of religious themes in educational curricula, and the broadcasting of religious programs on state-owned television and radio serve to maintain a civic education that sacralizes the persona of the king, principle of national territoriality, and the monarch as the amir al-mu'minin endowed with baraka as a direct descendant of the Prophet. This unwavering attachment to Islam, which the Makhzen has forged for centuries, informs a traditional mode of government today in Morocco.

Makhzen preserves traditional Islamic forms of government and has also developed other modes of governance, strategies, and techniques necessary for its supremacy in the sociopolitical arena in Morocco. In addition to its role as an arbiter among competing tribes, and sociopolitical forces, it has also utilized coercion and violence as a means to preserve peace and to manipulate the political game in order to further its prestige and hegemony.[53] However, the use of violence was limited for the sake of a much more symbolic role of arbitration as a sharif and a head of Islamic community. In addition to arbitration and violence, makhzenite authority utilized nationalism to unite Moroccans when faced with external dangers. This nationalism and religious symbolism proved important catalysts for the independence movement against the French occupation.

Makhzen and the French Protectorate: The Modernization of the Moroccan State

The modern institutions of the makhzen emerged with the process of state building in Morocco, which was energized during the colonial period (1912–1956). At the eve of colonization, the authority of the makhzen was perceived by the European colonizers to be chaotic and anarchic.[54] This perception lacked an understanding of the complex system of allegiances that led to relative stability in Morocco. This system was built upon allegiance to the monarch who was considered the spiritual head of the region. Under the sultan, myriads of tribes functioned autonomously, with the Berber tribes in the distant hinterland mountainous regions and the Arabic tribes closer to the center of power, and the imperial cities of Fez, Marrakech, and Rabat.

The maintenance of order was left to the local tribes, "generally self-defined in kin terms, in which virtually all adult males were warriors

and which maintained various levels of size."[55] The most interesting aspect of the sharifian state was the relationship between the center and the peripheral regions. The general structure of this relationship is divided into two broad domains of influence known as bled el-makhzen and bled es-siba.[56] Tax collection is essentially what differentiated these two sections of the sharifian society. The lands immediately surrounding the urban areas were all part of the bled el-makhzen. They paid taxes to the sultan and provided the backbone of the army. The bled es-siba, however, refused to pay taxes to the sultan, yet they accepted him as the spiritual head of the region. Therefore, even in areas where the makhzen did not have institutional authority, the sultan's role as a spiritual leader was recognized and accepted. Thus while the institutional reach of the makhzen was challenged at different periods in Morocco's history and later extended by the French colonial rule, the symbolic power of the sultan was never subject to question.

The whole structure held together on the premise that the sultan of the sharifian state was considered a direct descendant of Prophet Muhammad and, therefore, theoretically the head of the entire Muslim community in the region. Thus, Islam is one of the strongest threads of identity in Morocco, with Moroccans subscribing to common beliefs of the orthodox Sunni school of faith and the *Maliki* school of jurisprudence. The dual system of makhzen "governance" and es-siba "dissidence" would remain in effect until the French occupation of Morocco, which effectively extended the authority of the institutional makhzen to the hinterlands of bled es-siba.[57]

Under the protectorate, sharifien makhzen maintained its traditional institutions and practices within a new modern state. The French simply expanded the authority of the makhzen over the whole territory of the greater Morocco, bled es-siba included. The modernization of the administrative apparatus, the construction of a bureaucratic structure, and the organization of a standing army may have signaled a rupture with the old makhzen. However, the heart of the authority of the makhzen remained unchanged. The supreme authority of the monarch was expanded after Muhammad V's return from exile. In fact, in 1956, on the eve of independence, the Moroccan sultan regained his sovereignty and power, but this time he presided over a much larger territory that effectively came under the dominance of the makhzen. The monarch managed to conserve and augment his prerogatives and to represent the central power and a governmental structure much like the old system of makhzen.

Since independence in 1956, the structure of Morocco's political power is composed of two spheres of dominance: the first consists of

the king as a sultan, sharif and amir al-mu'minin; the second circle provides for the king as the head of the modern state. These two fields constitute the pillars of political power in Morocco. The first field provides the sources of power legitimacy; the second provides the modern institutional coercive mechanisms that constitute the contours of the monarchical power. These fields function in a symbiotic manner as the traditional sphere of dominance controls the temporal, modern field of power. Any understanding of Morocco's authoritarian monarchical rule must reflect a deeper understanding of both domains, especially the traditional one, as the modern institutions of Morocco are a function of its traditional authority. It is this traditional field to which the dominant institutional explanations devote little analysis or readily dismiss as epiphenomenal.

Contrary to the nationalist movement's claim that the French colonial rule aimed at the "destruction of the Moroccan personality,"[58] the French protectorate played an important role in conserving the traditional structure of the Moroccan monarchy and its makhzenite authority, whereby creating a modern state structure along the way. Makhzen traditional authority was key for the French in order to facilitate the initial occupation of Morocco. The text of the treaty of the protectorate in 1912 clearly preserves the traditional mode of the regime as it aimed to safeguard "the religious state, the respect and the traditional prestige of the sultan."[59]

For the French colonial power, its "mission civilisatrice" primarily sought to build a centralized form of government and extend it beyond the territories formerly under the direct tutelage of the makhzen, namely bled es-siba, while, at the same time, preserving the sharifian institutions, his different rural delegates, and the whole traditional system of governance. The protectorate reinvigorated the sultan's traditional power, but more importantly endowed it with a modern state apparatus that would prove instrumental in maintaining the sultanistic grip over modern Morocco after independence in 1956. The preservation of the traditional power of the sultan and his spiritual influence were instrumental for subsequent French colonial administrative efforts to extend their control of the country. Their policies were tailored to the Moroccan sociopolitical past and grew out of a fundamental understanding of the unique position of the monarch. The first French colonial administrators, Marshal Lyautey (1912–1925), articulated this understanding as he explained the sultanistic unique position in 1920:

> The sharif (Sultan of Morocco) has nothing in common with the Bey in Tunis or the Sharif of Mecca; he is a crowned Imam, a

> political sovereign, but above all a religious chief that all Muslims in the Maghreb and even beyond there in Timbuktu . . . view as the viceroy of Islam on earth.[60]

Lyautey sought to preserve every facet of Moroccan life and his use of the sultan's spiritual privilege only masked the French colonial administration's real goal of directly controlling Morocco in a new system of governance. After 1920, the French worked to diminish the power of the pashas and caids, even subverting their power for that of civil officials of the modern state. This marked an important shift in the evolution of the Moroccan state from its traditional and primordial system of governance into a more modern administrative and bureaucratic model of government. Makhzen conserved its appearance and protocols so long as they did not interfere with the political and administrative apparatus of the protectorate. Thus, while the French diminished the traditional mode of makhzenite power, they kept intact the institution of monarchy as the symbol of unity. The monarch continued to rule until he was exiled in 1953 as the temporal and spiritual leader of Morocco, with a host of executive and arbitrary powers.[61] French colonial rule strengthened the administrative reach of the monarchy, which had a "strong nation" centered on its religious legitimacy, but a "weak apparatus."[62]

With a centralized system of government, the protectorate introduced sweeping political and economic reforms, which succeeded in modernizing makhzenite authority. It managed to imbue makhzen with a modern system of administration that proved important in extending sultanistic power in Morocco. French colonialism, most importantly, sought to "enframe" Moroccan society by introducing sweeping economic, political, and social regulations, and massive public work projects. As Timothy Mitchell observed of British colonial rule of Egypt, these reforms and practices represented a "pervasive process of 'order'" as colonial "projects were all undertaken as an enframing, and hence had the effect of representing a realm of the conceptual, conjuring up for the first time the prior abstractions of progress, reason, law, discipline, history, colonial authority and order."[63]

The protectorate introduced various governmental reforms. The French administration distinguished, for the first time in the history of Morocco, between the legislative and judicial function of the government. It also created a form of cabinet ministries composed of various caliphs (delegates) to the wazirs, who was serving under the discretion of the sultan. Each one of the delegates managed a general policy

area such as agriculture, finance, public health, public works, social affairs, and education.[64] At the local level, the protectorate instituted a new structure of civil controllers and indigenous affairs officials, entrusted with the task of managing various rural conflicts. In addition, local authority structures, caids, and pashas, were also preserved to buttress makhzenite power as agents of these new changes. These colonial reforms signaled a change in state formation in Morocco and provided for the coexistence of two seemingly antithetical systems of government. This new hybrid system is crucial in maintaining the authoritarian rule in Morocco. It has made the monarch less susceptible to internal and external challenges and provided for a duality in the Moroccan political system, two circles of power and authority: monarchical and governmental. These reforms allowed the monarchy to "gradually merge the traditional authority of makhzen with modern European-style administrative institutions."[65]

Economically, French colonial policies introduced a new capitalist mode of production and helped develop an urban working class, which ironically proved lethal for the French protectorate as it constituted the backbone for the national liberation movement. Lyautey's vision for Morocco was not shared by later French administrations in Morocco, which sought to divide Morocco along ethnic lines. Thus, in 1930, the French authorities issued the Berber Dahir, which called for the establishment of separate courts and educational systems for the Morocco's Berber population. This segregationist attempt was met by wide resistance and was viewed by the nationalist movement as a ruse to divide Morocco into Arab Berber states and a religious affront to Moroccan Muslims.[66] The Berber Dahir had the unintended consequence of sparking the flame of a Moroccan nationalist movement headed by the likes of Allal al-Fassi, Ahmed Bellafrej, who later along with Muhammad Hassan al-Quzayri founded the Istiqlal party (party of the independence) after the Moroccan declaration of independence of 1944. The nationalist movement was important in the later fight for independence and sought from its inception to rally around the king as the symbol of Moroccan territorial unity and sovereignty. Al-Fassi and Bellafrej were also astute politicians, who realized early that their movement would lose steam and popular support if it did not espouse monarchical legitimacy.

The Istiqlal movement supported the sultan and his makhzenite authority—spiritual and temporal—as the symbol of Moroccan nationalist aspirations and struggle for independence. The Istiqlal party called for preserving "national traditions, the attachment to Islam, the Arabic language and faithfulness to the throne."[67] This

was probably a missed opportunity to curb royal power and prestige, but the local urban elite in Morocco utilized the spiritual power of the monarch to rally Moroccans against French colonial presence.

After the independence, the Istiqlal party failed to bring to fruition its vision for a new democratic Morocco. The monarch's traditional power, further strengthened by the protectorate, and the Al-Istiqlal's lack of appeal in rural Morocco, proved to be insurmountable for the party. However, the party is credited, along with the sultan, as a major force of independence and an important actor in the 1955 declaration of "Celle-Saint-Cloud," which effectively ended the French colonial rule in Morocco. According to that declaration, the king has sole control over the legislative power with the assistance of a consultative assembly,[68] which aimed at preserving the status quo ante and the continuity of governmental structures as reformed by the French. This was done to appease bourgeois elements of the nationalist movement, who benefited from land reforms during the French protectorate and to offset the challenge posed by the urban working class, which called for reforming the existing economic and political structures. These structures were strengthened in postindependence Morocco within a dual system of government: traditional and modern.

In postindependence Morocco, there existed two political forces: the king, representing the sharifien dynasty, and the Istiqlal party with various national forces, which were instrumental in mobilizing Moroccans against French colonial rule. The monarch naturally sought to preserve his powers and effectively worked to consolidate the traditional powers of the monarchy and to weaken all the other political forces in Morocco, namely, the Istiqlal party.[69] The monarchy accomplished this dual task by invoking its traditional sharifien powers and by fomenting a process of multipartyism, which favored the popular movement party and the communist party. The divisions within the Istiqlal party in 1959, and the creation of UNFP (French acronym for the Union of National Popular Forces), led ultimately to the weakness of the national movement and the end of a potential one-party system with the Istiqlal party and the king at the helm. Any partnership with the Istiqlal party was contrary to the traditional status of the monarchy above the political fray as a guarantor of stability and an arbiter among the different political forces:

> If we admit that in Morocco, there can be a unique party, we also have to admit, as a logical consequence, that I should be the president or secretary-general of the party...this is inadmissible...we have never

> seen a king, presiding over a party or be part of a party; a king shall be above all parties.[70]

The monarchy, henceforth, does not seem to tolerate another hegemonic political force that could exert any influence on the political system. Only the king represents popular will through his sharifien descent which positions him beyond the political. This position renders futile any conception of a unique party. The perennial position of the king is anchored in spiritual and primordial customs and practices, which are integrated in the modern political mosaic in Morocco. This mosaic was carefully developed in the years following independence and continues to exercise its control over all the political manifestations in Morocco.

Postindependence Morocco is not unique and shares many similarities with other postindependence Arab Middle East states. In Egypt, for instance, the political power struggle between the monarchy and the Wafd party is reminiscent of that between the Istiqlal party and the monarchy in Morocco. In addition, the Wafd party, like the Istiqlal party in Morocco, was instrumental in Egypt's fight for independence from British colonial rule in 1922, and later fell prey to absolute monarchical power of King Fuad (1917–1936) and to institutionally weak legislatures. Candidates from the Wafd party, however, were able to run for elections and won 90% of the votes in the 1924 parliamentary elections, probably the only free elections in the history of postindependence Egypt. The elections enabled Wafd party's charismatic nationalist leader, Sa'd Zaghlul to become the first popularly elected prime minister in Egypt until his death in 1927. The Wafd party remained popular after Zaghlul's death, but later Wafdist governments, especially the one headed by Zaghlul's successor, Mustapha al-Nahhas, were largely seen as corrupt and inefficient.[71]

Makhzen in Postcolonial Morocco: Modern Institutions with a Traditional Veneer

The fate of makhzen and of the monarchy has always been intertwined. In the aftermath of the independence and with the advent of the constitutional project, royal dominance is clearly asserted in constitutional texts and through symbolic practices of arbitration as a amir al-mu'minin. The establishment of modern political institutions neither changed nor transformed makhzenite authority. The current modern state in Morocco features western style institutions

of government and precolonial power traditions. As figure 2.1, given below illustrates, at its core, the state in Morocco consists of discernable traditional institutions recast within modern structures.

The politics of institutional manipulation are embedded in a precolonial authority structure that enervates them with royal traditional customs and modes of governance. These modes have not ceased to develop and to coexist with the modern state functions. The traditional structure has been preserved and cloaked with a modern veneer. Manifestations of traditional modes of government are maintained through practices such as the protocol. Protocol is a set of ancestral practices governing all aspects of life in the royal establishment. A severe discipline governs dress codes, the distribution of royal gifts (*hadaya*), to the manner of kissing the king's hand. Protocol is so important to the royal court that it has been institutionalized into the cabinet ministry in charge of royal protocol, which among other practices, organizes and perpetuates the spectacular annual practice of allegiance or bay'a.

Other traditional practices also persist in Morocco today such as the office of grievances, which is an ancient custom by which sultan, kings, and caliphs used to hold *majlis* (court) in order to hear citizens' complaints and grievances *(shikaya)*. This practice is still maintained in the Gulf kingdoms of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, and Qatar. In




Figure 2.1 Diagram of the Moroccan State.

Morocco, and like all other traditional modes of government, the ancient majlis has been institutionalized into an office of requests situated in the royal palace in Rabat. This office receives requests addressed to the palace from different regions in Morocco. Each shikaya is not heard by the king directly, but circulated among the appropriate ministries. As in bay'a, this process reinforces the linkage between the king and his subjects, which has been key in maintaining the legitimacy of the monarchy. This also confirms the status of the king above the political institutions of the government. By virtue of his traditional practices of governance, the king is "completely master of the game," behind the political practices of modern institutions of power. The monarchy, by preserving the makhzenite traditions, strengthens its perennial position and political control of Morocco.

The dominance of the monarchy in the sociopolitical arena is further institutionalized in the Moroccan constitution, which effectively diffuses makhzenite authority into three separate branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. While this separation of powers is informed by western style government, it does effectively place all powers under the iron grip of the monarch. Article 1 of the constitution promulgating a constitutional monarchy in Morocco is misleading, insofar as the king is not a figurehead acting as a symbol of unity for Moroccans. In fact the constitution, amended five times since the independence, has largely served to the traditional prerogatives of the monarchy. While the Moroccan constitution integrates a western mode of government, it preserves the traditional principles of powers intact.

The organization of power rests on certain ideological foundations. Take for example Article 19 of the constitution, which identifies the king as the guarantor of independence, unity,and the continuity of the state. The king is also the protector of the faith and the constitution. This effectively presents the king with absolute power over all aspects of the state apparatus. King Hassan often reminded his subjects of his position: "It is necessary that your king, protector of the constitution and defender of everyone's liberties, can at all time control and conduct the affairs of the state."[72] This stance is reminiscent of Louis XIV's dictum "l'etat c'est moi," which is indicative of the degree to which authoritarian and personalistic rule in Morocco has endured since its independence. However, such authoritarianism is not just institutional, but primordial and anchored in the traditional practices of the Moroccan state. Any reference to direct plebiscitary powers, national sovereignty, a meaningful separation and independence of powers, is subverted by a conception of the monarchy directly attached to a set of traditional rights given to the caliph by

virtue of his sharifien lineage. Thus plebiscitary powers are substituted by an annual renewal of allegiance to the king and the institution he represents. A Hobbesian leviathan king becomes synonymous with national sovereignty, instead of with his population.

The king's supremacy is absolute as he presides over the ministers' council and, through his discretionary powers, over the parliament. Politicians within the government and those in the opposition accept these powers. For the latter is only opposing the performance of the government in the different policy fields; the king remains, as an interviewed politician affirms, "the supreme institutional power."[73] In almost all of the interviews conducted in Morocco, there is a consensus that the parliament and the government collaborate with royal power as political instruments necessary to exercise its power. The monarchy is viewed as necessary to maintain the cohesiveness of the political system. The parliament, while officially subject to popular elections, does not play a legislative role since all laws emanate from the palace or made in the name of the king. Similarly, the magistrates receive their judicial powers through a delegative mandate from the king and render their verdicts in the name of monarch.[74] This practice is a constitutional reformulation of traditional practice of delegation whereby the caliph, divinely entrusted with instituting justice, hands over judicial power to the magistrates and legislative authority to the parliament, with the ultimate resort resting with the monarch. The monarchy, therefore, lies between God, his Prophet, and the constitution. The monarchy dominates the constitution and all facets of political power; the constitution does not alter the traditional nature of his powers. The religious rationality of the bay'a situates the monarchy above all worldly commandments and all separation of powers.[75] The constitutional and administrative rules occupy a subordinate position and, as in the past, the bureaucracy is at the disposition of royal power.

The Institutionalization of Traditional Makhzenite Power

The practice of delegation and the power of arbitration constitute the pillars of the process of the institutionalization of traditional makhzen power in Morocco. These practices are also reinforced by the other modes of governance, including shura and dahir as the backbone of royal power in Morocco. Through these modes and practices, the monarchy has succeeded in establishing an ancient political system within a modern administrative state power characterized by

bureaucratic division and reinforced by the professionalization of the agents of authority.

The Power of Delegation and the Function of Arbitration

The practice of delegation has constituted an integral part of royal power throughout the centuries. In order to facilitate his perennial power, the king delegates to an individual or a group of people some governmental prerogatives that they exercise in his royal name. This function has always functioned as a traditional institution, without recourse to any constitutional or scriptural reference; however, it is a fundamental pillar of traditional practice of power in Morocco. Various dahirs maintained this practice in its general character. The dahirs of 1953, 1957, and 1971 bestowed royal delegative powers to a grand vizier. With the modernization of the Moroccan state and the creation of a ministers' council, delegative regulatory and administrative powers were given to a prime minister.[76] The practice of delegation was essentially sustained and institutionalized through dahirs. The power of delegation is a cornerstone of Moroccan political system, inasmuch as the king consents and grants power to his ministers, to the different agents of authority in urban and rural Morocco, and to the legislative body of the parliament.

The constitution is particularly silent on the practice of delegation, but it does provide for the supremacy of dahirs as the institutional mechanism through which the practice of delegation is bestowed. Article 52 of the constitution, for instance, stipulates that "the king exercise regulatory power. Dahirs shall determine where this power is delegated by the king to the prime minister."[77] Through the practice of delegation, the political system is divided into two structures: First, the state government is headed by the prime minister, who is only serving in the name of the king and through powers delegated by him. Second, the prime minister executes the laws and, in turn, delegates some of his regulatory powers to other ministers in his cabinet, who execute dahirs and laws along with subordinate agents of authority such as the *walis* (governors) and caids.

The practice of delegation is fundamentally different from the Western liberal principle of separation of powers. The subject of the difference is the provenance of the laws, which in the Moroccan context is strictly royal. In addition, the practice of delegation is key within Islamic law as a basic mechanism allowing passage from a theocratic to a delegative political system. In this structure, God gives his power to a caliph;

the community is the intermediary, which delegates its power to the king through the practice of bay'a.[78] While ancient in practice, delegation was not discarded in modern political institutions, but has found its niche within the institutional use of dahirs. The practice of delegation explains much of the supremacy of the Moroccan monarchy, but it also presents it in a less theocratic guise. Since power is delegated to the government and other agents of authority, the ills of society and the stagnant economic performance is usually attributed to the government and not to the king, who is seen above the structure of governance. This also inoculates the monarchy against challenges and criticisms from other political forces in Morocco and explains the failure of the Islamists in challenging the monarchy on socioeconomic grounds. The traditional practice of delegation is not the only institutionalized power in modern Morocco, the power of arbitration is an additional ancient royal prerogative, which perpetuates the perennial status of the monarchy and contributes to its supremacy in the sociopolitical sphere.

In the postindependence era, the monarchy maintained this function as it mediated conflicts among the various political forces. King Hassan II, in particular, made the arbitrary function one of the pillars of monarchical rule in Morocco. This function enabled the king to mitigate conflict between the rural elite and a potentially destabilizing urban elite within the national movement parties. The king set up arbitration commissions, which successfully negotiated various agreements within the Istiqlal party, the National Union of Popular Front (UNFP), and the Popular Movement (MP).[79]

Royal arbitration is widely accepted by all political forces in Morocco and has proven to be an effective tool in managing the political system. The king is endowed with a traditional role as the supreme arbiter, a head of state above all political parties, and a guardian of the constitution:

> The constitution makes us [the monarchy] an arbiter...I am sure many of you have declared the power of the king to be enormous...I would ask them to observe a simple example. Imagine two football teams on the field, remove the referee's power to whistle and exclude a player and see how you can play gentlemen![80]

The practice of arbitration and delegation are two traditional sources of royal power, which have been reinvigorated within the context of modern political institutions in Morocco. Their institutionalization has been promulgated through constitutional texts and institutional practices such as dahirs and shura.

Dahir and Shura

Two additional makhzenite practices have been maintained in Morocco's modern institutions: shura , which is an old principle in Islamic law, and dahir, which is a royal discretionary act in regulatory, administrative, and legislative domains. During the process of modern state formation, the constitution replaced the old system of shura with a new representative body. This body, however, is not characterized by democratic practices such as in Western style polities. The use of dahir in Morocco is different from the discretionary powers that extra-presidential systems possess in Latin America. The dahir emanates from the monarch's religious authority and is treated by the legislature and the cabinet as a sacred text. In keeping with Islamic traditions, the parliament and the local assemblies are consultative branches of the royal power. This was made apparent after Hassan II's accession to power, when he addressed the parliament in 1963: "I shall bestow upon you part of the powers that have been with the ruling family for twelve centuries . . . I have made the Constitution by my very hands, and it has not given the deputies any powers, only obligations."[81] This authoritarian feature is characterized by the absolute power of the monarch, who can at his will dissolve the parliament. The monarchy has never considered its perennial status as authoritarian. On the contrary, it has maintained its Islamic-consultative nature, since any constitutional pronouncements are subject to plebiscitary powers of the *jam'a* (community).[82] However, in the absence of transparency and political awareness, the consultative process is far from its Islamic ideal and has since the independence been used to legitimize royal absolutism.

Shura is also exercised through royal discretionary power of dahir, which constitutes the single most important source of legislation in Morocco. All royal decisions are taken under the guise of dahir. These are above the political system and all constitutional texts. In fact, the constitution itself was promulgated according to the 1963 dahir, which effectively enabled the king to exercise his dominance over all political aspects of the Moroccan system. Dahirs have the force and appearance of laws, always begin with a religious greeting, and are signed under the title of amir al-mu'minin. This is done to invoke the religious stature of dahirs, which are not subject to annulment or appeal. Dahirs were codified into an "official bulletin" in the years after 1969 with the publication of the finance law.[83] The continuity of this institutional decision-making practice is invoked in all royal appointments and is given formal status similar to that of

ancient sharifian letters and correspondence. The dahir is a sacred act of sovereignty, immune to all judicial processes and inviolable.

Dahirs and the practice of shura, along with delegation and the arbitrary function of the monarchy, are ways in which the old system of makhzenite authority and its traditional practices were maintained in the modern state. These practices and functions were not only invigorated through constitutional texts and dahirs, but they were also maintained within revamped traditional local institutions, which have always constituted the backbone of makhzenite power.

Morocco has revived old traditional institutions and incorporated them within the fabric of modern political institutions. Institutional reforms to the old makhzenite structure were seen a necessity for the monarchy as it suddenly found itself controlling a larger territory than it did prior to the advent of the French protectorate in 1912. Thus after the independence, the Moroccan territory was organized into various provinces of urban and rural communes ruled by walis and caids. The reorganization of the national territory coincided with a process of professionalization of various agents of authority, who were recruited to various positions in the Moroccan administration in accordance with a merit-based system. This system, however, did not eliminate the ancient clientalistic nature or the traditional structure of government.

The new institutional reforms promulgated new specialized and professional positions with new nomenclature. Appointed by a dahir, governors assumed administrative control over the various provinces. In accord with the practice of delegation, governors represent royal power and are entrusted with executing the laws within their provinces. Governors also serve as an intermediary between local urban and rural authorities with the help of caids and pashas. During colonial rule, caids exercised vast executive and regulatory powers, and constituted local centers of colonial power. After independence, most of them lost their power and domains. In the aftermath of the 1963 legislative and communal elections, the state depoliticized these various local agents of authority. The monarchy was later successful in "reconstructing an administrative base with integrated local elites."[84]

Caids are chosen by governors and are also delegates of the central power and can facilitate relations with different localities. Caids and pashas also play a pivotal role to further makhzen's function of arbitration as they mediate local conflicts and receive local shikaya. In many instances, the caids' arbitration is preferred to any other legal mechanism and is reminiscent of the "double function of makhzen,

where the line between the executive and the judicial is often times blurred."[85] Other local agents, such as the Sheikhs and Moqaddems, are also necessary in the function of the modern administration, as a link between the caids and the people. These agents serve as eyes and ears for caids and, in effect, are government informants.[86]

The institutional reorganization of makhzen after independence was an attempt to renew local institutions and local community traditions under the aegis of a new modern state. In fact, the state structure appears modern, but its nucleus is comprised of renewed traditional modes of government. Insitutional mechanisms for political manipulation are facilitated by the existence of a primordial system that sets the monarch above the political system. This system garners wide-ranging support within Moroccan society. Moroccan politics are performed within a cultural context that legitimizes the perennial role and status of the monarch in the political system.

Makhzen slightly departs from its precolonial past and has modernized its state institutions. It has simultaneously developed a symbiosis of two systems of governance. Makhzen has maintained its traditional political structures necessary for its legitimation. At the same time, it has reformed its institutions into a modern administration within a façade constitutional monarchy. Symbolically, makhzenite power is contextualized within the various forms of religious legitimacy as the monarch is the imam, whose powers are unlimited. Politically, makhzen is the only constant force, while all other political forces are transient and ephemeral. At the societal level, makhzen is endowed with a religious and symbolic mechanism, which enables it to adapt to all phenomena. Thus, faced with the evolution of society, makhzen constitutes an agent of national cohesion.

The duality of the makhzen informs modern institutions and their menu of institutional manipulation of opposition forces and the political elite. The traditional-modern synthesis of governance in Morocco has led to the ritualization of the public and political discourse in Morocco. The pillars of this process of ritualization are specific traditional sysmbols of political legitimation, which are primordial and distant from any consideration of economic performance. The next chapter examines the symbols of legitimation of bay'a, sharaf, and baraka. These symbols are placed in a political context as they condition the political discourse and hinder political action of the opposition political forces in Morocco. These symbols also garner tremendous popular support, which places the king far above all political forces and renders him immune to any challenges, especially those of the Islamist persuasion.

The process of the ritualization of the political system in Morocco is exercised through elaborate ceremonies, constitutional means, and the active role of the ministry of Royal Protocol. Its symbols have become part of the political discourse in Morocco and are a modern reshaping of the symbolic authority of the makhzen. The historical authority of the makhzen is symbolic, institutional, and is subject to state manipulation, which in turn positively affects regime stability as it generates legitimacy for the monarchy through manipulation of rituals of power. This research does not minimize the role coercion or political manipulation has played in the legitimacy equation in Morocco; however, the use of violence and institutional manipulation has to be anchored in the overall institutionalized symbolic framework. To present violence, coercion, and institutional manipulation as the main components of the monarchy's survival is to advance a distorted and incomplete picture of the Moroccan political system. Stability of the regime in Morocco is not only attributed to symbolic, historical legitimacy, but also to state manipulation, not only of symbols, but of the different factions that populate the Moroccan political scene. The monarchs have also had recourse to a vast system of patronage, used in various ways to reward its loyal clientalisitic base of land owners and economic upper classes.

Political manipulation, coercion, and clientalism, are particularly effective for the stability of the authoritarian regime in Morocco, when combined with the institutionalized symbols of baraka, amir al-mu'minin, sharaf, and bay'a. The effectiveness of these institutionalized symbols is nowhere apparent than in the monarchy's response to the Islamist challenge. These symbols have allowed the monarchy to diffuse the Islamist challenge, which failed to successfully contest the traditional legitimacy of the monarchy, while leveling a significant challenge to its political manipulation of the political system amidst a slow process of liberalization. The organizational continuity of these symbols has enabled the monarch to remain above the political fray as the arbiter in Morocco's political system and beyond any reproach through the discourse of baraka, amir al-mu'minin, bay'a, and sharaf.

As the survey conducted in Morocco suggests, institutionalized symbols of legitimacy garner wide appeal in the political culture in Morocco. These symbols promote political stability as they have created a political culture that is conducive to various authoritarian practices (political manipulation of the system, clientalism, and coercion). These symbols legitimate these practices in the Moroccan context and have had a remarkable continuity between past and present Morocco

within the makhzen. Its most visible aspects are seen daily in the different rituals, ceremonies, and symbols used in the sociopolitical discourse and the constitution of Morocco. Its less visible aspects lie in the monarchical manipulation of different factions that populate the sociopolitical arena in Morocco. The process is rendered effective with the symbolic use of rituals of bay'a, amir al-mu'minin, baraka, and sharaf.

Evidence of monarchical resilience is apparent in the context of the Islamist challenge to the monarchy. Islamist groups have managed to challenge the regime coalition's primacy in the political system and in society at large. While Islamist groups have capitalized on the government's socioeconomic shortcomings, they have been less successful in challenging the traditional religious legitimacy of the king. Even the militant 'Adl wal Ihsane, which, in the past, was vocal in its criticism of the religious legitimacy of the monarchy, has modified its stance towards the monarchy and focuses today more on social reforms in the absence of meaningful coercion and royal material incentives. 'Adl wal Ihsane remains outside the political system, and its once-vitriolic leader Abdessalam Yassine now contends that his group is "a movement focused on spiritual education, not a political party."[87] This invites many questions as to the reasons behind this sudden shift in 'Adl wal Ihsane's goals and rhetoric. This study argues this is largely due to its failure to challenge the monarch's religious legitimacy.

The next chapter examines the duality of hard and soft power in the modern political system in Morocco, focusing on those symbols that are used to construct a cult of legitimacy for the monarchy. Particular attention is devoted to the symbols of baraka, amir al-mu'minin, sharaf, and bay'a . The monarchy in Morocco, playing on its symbolic representation both in prestigious ceremonies and symbolic, religious discourse, has built a wall of mysticism around the monarch. This mysticism has throughout years elevated the monarch to a saintlike person.[88]

Any general study of legitimation in Morocco is empirical and examines the interrelationship between royal authority, culture, and society. This research analyzes the cultural foundations of the monarchy, once coined within makhzen and argues that at the heart of Moroccan culture lies a paradigm of authority that juxtaposes absolute authority against absolute submission. Rooted in Islamic mysticism, this paradigm can be observed in the rituals and public ceremonies, which promotes the prestige of the king within a fundamental dialectic between *master* and *disciple*.[89] In conflict with other cultural

forms, and reelaborated in colonial and postcolonial circumstances, this dialectic informs all major aspects of Moroccan personal, political, and gender relations.

Some scholars go as far to suggest that the influence of this dialectic is so pervasive and so firmly embedded that it ultimately legitimizes the authoritarian structure of power.[90] Such dialectic of "master and disciple" is broad and is difficult to operationalize. For that reason, this research focuses instead on the four particular symbols of socio-religious legitimacy that have been institutionalized in the Moroccan political system as major tools by which the regime has performed the process of ritualization of political discourse. These sysmbols explain the stability of the monarchical authoritarian regime and legitimize all other forms of institutional manipulation in Morocco.

Conclusions

State formation in Morocco in many ways mirrors the process of modernization of the traditional authority of makhzen through the bureaucratization of old patterns of power, such as dahirs, shura, and symbols and rituals of power of baraka, bay'a, amir al-mu'minin, and sharaf. This shift was initiated by French colonial rule and later continued in the postcolonial era primarily by King Hassan II, who sought to preserve and stabilize the regime and state in Morocco. Traditional modes and practices have been instrumental in supporting the monarchy's goal to establish an ancient political system within the contours of modern administrative power chacaraterized by bureaucratic division and reinforced by the professionalization of the agents of authority. As stated earlier, the state in Morocco features a symbiotic relationship between two modes of government: a rational modern power that surrounds a primordial traditional system of governance, which centers on religious symbols and institutionalized rituals of power. As this study explains, these rituals of power, backed by the threat of violence, are state mechanisms of discipline that serve to clutter the public sphere. More importantly, rituals of power hinder the ability of opposition political forces to challenge the regime and force them to adopt a passive, positionary strategy with the aim of changing, not capturing, the state in Morocco.

3

Politics and Culture in Morocco: A Disciplinary-Cultural Approach to Power

Recent scholarship on the prevalence of authoritarianism in the Arab world has focused on institutional factors that facilitate regime manipulation of oppositional forces. Chapter two discussed the institutional framework and its shortcomings in providing an accurate picture of the state-society relations in the Middle East. In addition, this framework strips institutions from their sociocultural roots, ironically in a region where politics is heavily influenced by cultural factors. The approach that most adequately conveys this perspective in Arab politics ought to combine the institutional framework emphasized in the literature with sociocultural determinants of regime stability that are studied in sociology and anthropology. Institutional explanations dismiss the role of symbols and culturally derived variables as epiphenomenal;[1] however, they fail to address a central question: Why do states in the Arab Middle East spend so much resources and energy to cultivate state rituals of power? Similarly, if these symbols are useless and futile, why do states seek to incorporate them in their political authority?

This chapter analyzes the symbols of state power as independent variables that explain state power and prevalence of modes of authoritarianism. Culture is an elusive concept, which poses great methodological challenges for social science research. Cognizant of these challenges, the approach adopted in this chapter focuses on the material interpretations of cultural symbols. While insisting on ethnographic detail, the chapter covers the political manifestations and significance of rituals and symbols in Moroccan political culture. Analysis herein utilizes a socioinstitutional framework for examining the interaction of cultural symbols and rituals with interests and institutions,

attempting "to fully appreciate the role of culture in political life."[2] This chapter advances an intersubjective view of culture and focuses on the shared meanings of particular symbols and places them in their political context. Culture, defined as a system of meaning and identity, has contributed to the understanding of a wide range of issues, such as collective action, political motivations, priorities, and patterns of association.[3] Cultural symbols and frames are accentuating devices that underscore and embellish a social condition. They also redefine dominant sociopolitical themes to justify the seemingly unjust.

Cultural understandings are helpful with regard to the debate about the establishment and maintenance of authority in political communities such as Morocco, where politics is an extension of cultural narratives. As Marc Howerd Ross puts it, political authority is "culturally constituted and consists of regularized procedures that members of a community consider more or less legitimate, meaning that they have been arrived at by a procedure they consider fair, although the issue may continue to be highly contested."[4] In this sense, culture has provided a new lens for looking at political authority separate from structuralist and rational paradigms that focus on the formal institutional realms, or on individual contingent and strategic choices underlying political authority.

The boundaries of power and authority are somewhat ambiguous. This is not unique to the Moroccan case. Arab Gulf states also use popular Islam to promote their legitimacy and political authority. These states reconstructed, synthesized, and even invented symbols that appeal to the populace at large. A strong political authority does not just rest upon economic or political incentives. To look at a state's political authority from a largely economic perspective, as implied by the "rentier state" arguments of economic incentives, does not necessarily guarantee political authority. Quite the opposite may be hypothesized; derivation of the surplus from the world market in the form of oil wealth may ultimately weaken a state's authority by isolating it from the community, as happened under the Shah's exorbitant expenditure on the military elite.[5] However, the construction of a particular form of historical, socioreligious memory, whether through the use of history writing or the reinterpretation of folklore and symbols, helps create a more favorable environment to exercise and maintain political authority. The ability to recast history and deploy culture is different and more subtle than the overt resort to codified forms of institutional authority, whether of a "traditional" (Gulf and Middle East monarchical states) or "rational legal" (democratic states) nature. It entails the construction of hegemonic discourse in the Gramscian sense of the term.

In Morocco, the dual nature of the state developed through the various stages of state formation is reinforced by a process of ritualization of political discourse. This means that political authority and power in Morocco are subject to a constant influx of sociocultural symbols that garner great societal significance. The ritualization of the political discourse serves to pacify and weaken oppositional forces in Morocco, while empowering the monarch as the epitome of the nation to rule unchecked. This ritualization relies on four main symbols of legitimation. These are the king's claim as amir al-mu'minin, his sharifian lineage, baraka, and the elaborate annual ceremony of allegiance—bay'a. These are not mere symbols but institutions that have been constantly energized and renewed to maintain the monarch's religious supremacy and cultlike personality. In their institutional guise, these symbols uphold the monopoly of the regime over the religious sphere in Morocco and facilitate state co-optation and "bureaucratization of religion,"[6] which weakens the resilient oppositional forces, especially the Islamists' challenge to the monarchy.

Our attention now turns to the characteristics of Moroccan political culture and the particular symbols at the heart of the ritualization process of political discourse in Morocco. It subsequently analyzes the interpretation and significance for the dynamics of political action and contends that these symbols constitute particular foci of power. The ritualization of political discourse in Morocco enhances the dominance of the monarchy in the political system and the public space. It also serves to create a disciplinary-repressive approach to power, which cultivates regime's hegemony and garners wide societal appeal. The use of the survey for this study is to generate hypotheses rather than testing existing ones, and provides the study of rituals of power with an interesting problematic in terms of perception of political institutions in Morocco. Survey results from the greater Marrakech area demonstrate support for the monarchy and its rituals of power, as well as society's dual perception of the political system. More importantly, as chapters five suggest, the ritualization of the political discourse in Morocco hinders the ability of opposition forces to challenge the regime's hegemonic control over cultural themes of power and authority.

The Politics of Symbols: Spectacles and Iconographies

The ritualization of the political process in Morocco refers to the use of ceremonies, spectacles, and public performances that consecrate the king's status as the arbiter and guarantor of order and stability.

By definition, this process relies on rituals and symbols of socioreligious importance to society. By invoking culturally and historically resonant symbols, the regime reproduces legitimacy. However, these symbols are not independent as the monarchy helps shape the way they are perceived in society. In other words, the monarchy does not piggyback on the resonance of the symbols; rather, it manufactures symbols that become subsequently important in society because they are tied and used by the regime. This contention sustains the argument in the literature that political authority lies with those that control dominant narratives, in addition to dominant political and economic structures.[7] Gramscian domination and hegemony indicate the importance of ideas, symbols, and images in manufacturing dominant discursive references. The concept of hegemony, ironically, was not defined fully by Gramsci himself. In his *Prison Notebooks*, there are multiple references to hegemony in regard to the relationship between intellectuals and the world of production, but no single explanation of it is articulated. Gramsci generally contends that those in charge of modes of production are also in control of social hegemony over ideas and symbols.[8]

The concept of hegemony has been subject to vast scholarly interpretations and is understood in a Gramscian sense as the "process of ideological domination."[9] Other scholars, such as Stuart Hall, problematize the concept in the following way:

> The horizon of the *taken for granted* [emphasis added]: what the world is and how it works, for all practical purposes. Ruling ideas may dominate other conceptions of the social world by setting the limit to what will appear as rational, reasonable, credible, indeed sayable or thinkable.[10]

The realm of "the taken for granted" is a key component of how post-Marxists and anthropologists understood the concept of hegemony. This realm creates "false consciousness" on the part of subordinate groups, who live in a society that is dominated by an "order of signs and practices, relations and distinctions, images and epistemologies . . . that, being presumptively shared, are not normally the subject of explication or argument."[11]

This conception of hegemony posits that the ruling classes are able to impose a hegemonic ideology of a "just social order" that leads to a false consciousness among the subordinate classes.[12] The poor (peasants; proletariat) come to believe the ideology that dictates their place in society and adopt a fatalistic philosophy of life. This understating has come under criticism in the literature on culture and power.

James Scott offers one of the most articulate forms of this critique in his study of class conflict in the village of Sedaka in Malaysia.

Scott rejects the Marxist concept of "false consciousness" and ideological hegemony as advanced by Gramsci and other Marxist thinkers such as Miliband, Althusser, and Habermas.[13] Focusing on his study of the Sedaka village in Malaysia, Scott suggests a rethinking of these Marxist concepts of ideological domination and argues that elite values do not really penetrate down to the lower classes. The poor classes in Sedaka only give the outward appearance of accepting this ideology as a means of extracting certain concessions from the rich.[14]

Despite Scott's critique of Gramscian ideas of hegemony, concepts of domination and hegemony suggest ways in which images and ideas could produce power, especially in countries with an authoritarian form of government. In the Middle East, the ruling classes form and maintain their social hegemony through a state-constructed "civil society." The elites create cultural and political consensus through unions, political parties, schools, media, the mosque, and other voluntary associations where a ruling class exercises social hegemony over allied classes and social groups, and where the state (composed primarily of socioeconomic elites) has total control. While this constitutes hegemony, it is by no means "presumptively shared" as the literature suggests.[15] In the absence of empirical evidence, we cannot make any claims as to the degree of penetration of the components of hegemony in society. We can safely assume that the content of such hegemony is not axiomatic and is definitely contested by society.[16]

In the Moroccan context, Gramscian hegemony can be applied with a great deal of caution. The various symbols of legitimacy, while not axiomatic and readily "taken for granted," garner tremendous popular support. Drawing on the survey conducted in the greater Marrakech region, most respondents believed rituals and symbols used by the monarchy are part of the religious and traditional heritage of Morocco.[17] In a general sense, the regime in Morocco dominates the realm of symbols and ideas, but with the explicit consent of the people, who are aware of the cultural and ideological strictures utilized by the regime.

The various cultural symbols are practiced daily through elaborate ceremonies. Material representations of rituals and cultural symbols are reflected in the annual bay'a ceremony, the monarchy's sharifian lineage, commandment of the faithful, and its transcendental claim to divine blessing of baraka. Such practices are a material embodiment of the overall ideological structure that governs Moroccan political

culture. The core of this political culture is the institution of the monarchy as the representation of nation and state building.[18]

Unlike Western nation building, which in Benedict Anderson's depiction was located in the "common reading and speaking in common territories,"[19] Morocco's nation building was closely associated with the persona of the king and the repertoire of symbols at his disposal that inform the process of ritualization of the political discourse. In addition to symbols, the iconography of the monarch as father of the nation ruling over his citizen-children reduces dissent and thus makes it impossible for "alternative symbols, discussions and language to be articulated."[20] The use of a cult of personalized power is not unique to the Moroccan case and can be observed in the majority of Arab states, irrespective of their mode of government.[21] Syria's Hafiz Asad, Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Moubarak, and Al-Saud's kingdom all use varying forms of cult-personalistic power in an alliance with Wahhabism in order to cultivate obedience. The Moroccan case is unique only because it possesses vast symbolic rituals, which resonate deeply within society at large. Its power lies in the fact that it makes the traditional and religious part of present-day political realities in Morocco.

Political power in Morocco is not just punitive, coercive, and oppressive, but symbolic as well. State rituals of power are important in inculcating a sense of discipline and order in society. In Morocco, such rituals impart a sense of duty and obedience, even submission to the perennial authority of the king.[22] Such explanation is interpretivist and draws on a Geertzian approach to the study of culture as "a web of significance," and a context within which institutions and behavior are described.[23] Viewing spectacles, rituals, and ceremonies of state power as politically salient is important for the current study. They are instances, not only of the manifestation of power, but the epitome of power itself.[24] This power is understood in the Foucaultian sense of discipline backed by the threat of violence.

The state display of rituals dramatizes state power and provides particular instances where the state can enforce obedience and discipline. This interpretation is reminiscent of Foucault's conceptualization of power and discipline. Although Foucault's writings on the state and power are largely applicable in the context of early modern Western Europe, his overall insights, culminating in the concept of "power/knowledge" can, with caution, be applied in non-European societies. Foucault's ideas have been invoked recently in discussion of regimes, power, and discipline; however, a detailed analysis of their implications is still lacking.[25] Foucaultian analysis should be approached as

heuristic devices, which aim to describe and not so much to provide answers. As a proponent of post-structuralist approaches, Foucault resists all ordered explanations and contends their legitimacy. This, of course, poses tremendous challenges to positivist explanations and formal methods of inquiry. Post-structuralist analyses, such as Foucault's, are also difficult to operationalize in an empirical sense. Thus, this study's use of Faucoult's approach to power must be cautious and merely seeks to find a space for his insights within the current literature on the cultural representation of power.

Foucault argues that the state in Europe was able to control its citizens by manufacturing a "specific technology of power called 'discipline.'"[26] Citizens increasingly exercised self-restraint and self-discipline in their public behavior; saving the state the use of coercive mechanisms and leading to what Foucault termed a "carceral society."[27] This is where Foucault's argument cannot be applied anywhere in the Middle East. Far from a "carceral society," citizens in Middle Eastern societies have not internalized and incorporated the kind of self-restraining behavior that Foucault observed in premodern European states. Similarly, the Middle Eastern state still relies heavily on punitive and coercive means of authority. However, festive displays of power could accomplish the role of Foucault's discipline in a "carceral society," insofar as the state may "economize on the use of violence."[28]

This festive discipline is infused with particular statements that define the realm of the acceptable in society and is connected to social practices. Discourses, such as baraka, commander of the faithful, bay'a, and prophetic lineage in Morocco are practiced and intertwined with modern state institutions. Because of their societal appeal, these discourses provide a "regime of truth," which is composed of dominant hegemonic statements.[29] A regime of truth is not composed solely of formal, institutional manifestations of power, and governance; it effectively employs language, symbols, and primordial modes of reasoning.

Foucault's approach to power and his focus on body, language, and spectacles provide an insightful basis for the analysis of political authority in Morocco and in the Middle East, where the state displays its power through elaborate ceremonies and grandiose spectacles. Evidence from interviews conducted in the field suggests that symbols and rituals of state legitimacy penetrate deeply within society. The issue, however, is to what degree the expression of these opinions represents authentic belief or dissimulation. State power is effective and discernable as it manages to elicit support of the absurd and the

metaphysical. Issues of reliability are always problematic in field surveys; however, drawing on anecdotal as well as on formal and informal discussion with Moroccans, one can with great confidence assert that there is widespread popular belief in the symbols of baraka, commander of the faithful, prophetic lineage, and the practice of bay'a.

Regime rituals of power provide substance to otherwise abstract ideas and beliefs. Political culture becomes grounded in images and symbols of submission. Rituals of bay'a in Morocco, with its embodiment of ritual gestures, frame the monarch as a guardian of the nation through a covenant that is reenacted annually during this elaborate ceremony. More importantly, state rituals of power dominate public discourse and make it difficult for other groups to operate and articulate oppositional symbols.[30]

CHARACTERISTICS OF POLITICAL CULTURE IN MOROCCO

Culture and politics in Morocco produce a distinctive style of political authority that blends the traditional with the modern in a cultural synthesis. Moroccan political culture is complex, and no single facet of it ever dominated the sociopolitical arena. Several cultural patterns coexist within a framework of patrimonial authority, expemplifying "a distinctive style of adaptive modernization in the socioeconomic sphere and incremental democratization in the political arena."[31] The complex nature of Moroccan political culture is centered on a number of core identity determinants: Islam, Arabism, and Moroccan nationalism. These converge to form the basis for a "Muslim consensus,"[32] facilitating the monarchical dominance of the political culture in Morocco. In fact, the monarchy constitutes a fundamental axis within Morocco's political culture, blending all components of Muslim identity and extracting authority by utilizing a vast modern state technocratic and administrative apparatus, seemingly a reformulation of the traditional makhzen. The monarchy appeals to Islam and Islamic symbols for legitimacy, and is accentuated within a modern state structure. This symbiotic relationship between religious legitimacy and modern state administration accounts for the resilience of the monarchy for past three centuries. The two components of Morocco's political authority "are fused in a seamless whole at least into an integral institution which has, so far, proved quite effective in containing, even in capitalizing on, its own inner contradictions."[33]

In addition to the monarchical cultural framework, John Entelis distinguishes between three additional cultural strands in

Morocco: modernism, militarism, and messianism. Each of these factors contributes to the cultural mosaic in Morocco's political system and informs state and society relations. As Entelis argues, the modernist cultural strand in Morocco is rational, radical, and secular. Its main proponents are the liberals and the leftists. The former are firmly committed to rapid modernization and democratization, while the leftists (*gauchistes*) are considered socialist light as they blend demands for state-controlled modernization with calls for lesser religiosity in political discourse.[34] This description of the modernist sector is, in fact, incomplete, as it does not recognize those political forces to the right, like the pro-monarchical constitutionalist parties. These groups on the right are not committed to any real process of democratization and are interested in modernization for pragmatic reasons, as they benefit from their proximity to the monarchy.

Moroccan political culture is also characterized by a religious strand, comprised of oppositional nonsecular political forces. This category includes Islamist groups, which use Islam as the corpus for their own political contestation. In Morocco, the Islamists can be divided into three main groupings: the reformists, who have forged a synthesis of modern political ideas of democracy and political participation and work from within the political system; the nonmilitant radicals, the second group within the religious political culture , who are opposed to any form of political participation within the current monarchical regime, but do not advance a violent discourse; and lastly, the Salafis, who constitute the third main cluster within Moroccan political culture. The Salafis are clandestine Islamist radicals, who call for a return to the scriptural teaching of the Quran and the example of the Prophet. Their repertoire of contention is violent and included the Casablanca bombings in 2003. Each one of these clusters advances a distinctive sociopolitical discourse.

Other commentators, like Entelis, speak of a militarist cultural strand in Moroccan political culture. This may have been the case at the time Entelis made the argument in the late 1980s. However, today in Morocco, the military remains an enigma for the vast majority of Moroccans. This is due to the major restructuring that the military underwent in the aftermath of the two failed coups in 1971 and 1972. The putchists remained a minority within the senior military officer corps. After the king's drastic restructuring of the military's command structure, the military fell into his lap and into obscurity. In a survey conducted in the greater Marrakech region, about 80% of the 287 respondents displayed little confidence in the military. This is indicative of the fact that the military has basically disappeared from

public view and has, for the most part remained loyal to the monarchy, which has been able to subdue and buy their allegiance since the last alleged attempt to overthrow the monarch in the early 1980s.[35]

Instead of the militarist cultural strand, I suggest an indigenous cultural strand in Morocco. This refers to the ethnic Berber *Amazigh,*[36] Arab, and Sahraoui cleavages. This has always been subverted by the regime's focus on Morocco's Islamic identity. However, in recent years, and under the monarchy's initiative, Berbers have become more mobilized within groups and associations that aim to expose Amazigh culture and languages. There are also plans for making Berber languages part of the curriculum in Morocco. In Morocco's state television channels, a number of programs, in addition to news bulletins, are broadcast in the three Amazigh languages. The Berber/Arab divide is probably more noticeable on university campuses, where various skirmishes and clashes took place between Berber, Arab, and Sahraoui students. Indigeneous/ethnic conflicts have always been subverted by recourse to a stronger religious identity. Nevertheless, these could prove difficult when given enough political space as it is the case for the far stronger Kabyle movement in Algeria.

Islam, as stated in earlier chapters, constitutes the overarching identity determinant of all Moroccans. Islamic authority is much stronger than identity determinants in Morocco, as it "both transcends and suffuses national identity."[37] The fusion of religious and national identity is a palpable characteristic of the Moroccan political culture and is what creates a "Muslim consensus"[38] in Morocco. This consensus is what enables the monarchy to build a common group feeling, a cultural synthesis comprising religious, nationalistic, and secular strands, which are conducive of the primacy of the monarch in the political culture. Islam, in the Moroccan context, assumes different organizational patterns and manifestations than in the rest of the Muslim world. In addition to the scriptural Islam, common in the Islamic ummah, Islam in Morocco also garner a sufi and popular dimension. These forms are unique to Morocco and are intimately linked to the evolution of state and nation in the kingdom. These forms of Islam play a role in the everyday life of Moroccan people and are continuously subject to the state's organization and spectacles.

Islam and Political Culture in Morocco: "In the Realm of the Saint"[39]

In no other Islamic country has folk Islam been practiced at the highest echelons of political authority than in Morocco. In many ways,

folk Islam is the daily ritualized practice of Sufi Islam. Sufism (*tasawwuf*) is an Islamic practice and doctrine that greatly influenced the development of Moroccan Islam and, as mentioned earlier, the development of the state in Morocco.[40] Sufism began as an individual pietist (and later mystic) practice in the seventh century; however, by the ninth century, it evolved into informal meetings for people eager to share religion. These meetings, in turn, developed "elaborate rituals, music, dancing . . . and these practices were regarded by some Muslims as a threat to the integrity of Islam."[41] By the twelfth century, Sufis started to develop orders around spiritual leaders (*shaykh*) and disciples (*murid*). In Morocco, the head of a Sufi order, whose sanctity is ascribed and recognized locally, is called a wali.[42] Sufis, often described as mystics who seek to "encounter God directly in this very lifetime,"[43] are esoteric men, who adopt "a mystical path of purification attained through contemplation, experiential–inner knowledge of God, and organized rituals and practices."[44]

Sufi Islam relies on various rituals and practices centered on the relationship between shaykh and murid. Hagiographical narratives of Sufi leaders nourish peoples' social imagination and legitimize saints' spiritual statures. These narratives are also instrumental in legitimizing the significance of the realm of spirituality and in merging Sufi with folk Islam. The two forms, while related, are actually distinct. Sufism is a theological derivation of Islam from the Qur'an, while folk Islam is the practice of pre-Islamic rituals in addition to either formal Sufi or orthodox Islam. The distinction here is between formal and informal forms of Islam, which may exist at the same time. In Morocco, folk Islam has been practiced in relation to Sufism and not to orthodox Islam. Hence, the two are purposefully conflated for the purpose of this study.[45]

Throughout various junctures in Moroccan history, saints enjoyed a great deal of power and prestige, especially in rural Morocco, where saints and sheikhs made use of koranic scriptural texts to cultivate a folk Islam. Through Sufi orders and lodges, saints provided religious, social, and economic support for their localities and acted in many ways as tribal leaders. Their dual role as transcendental and temporal leaders made them instrumental to the monarchy, especially in those hinterland regions, where the authority of makhzen was weak. In modern Morocco, Sufi orders still perform a folkloric spiritual role. Although they have lost much of the political power they wielded in the past, "maraboutism continues to hold its ground among the majority of the population."[46] Many rural individuals and leaders still have ties to Sufi orders, and even the minister of religious

affairs is tied to the Bushishi Sufi order. This reflects the saliency of Sufi Islam for the Moroccan state and the efforts of the monarchy to counteract recent Islamist resurgence by a promoting a form of Islam that is friendly to the monarchy and that has been co-opted by the state.

The relationship between saintly maraboutism and the monarchy is important for the regime and feeds into the cultural synthesis on which the monarchy relies for its stability and legitimacy. This is particularly important in the former siba (dissidence) rural lands, where the monarch is considered as a supreme saint, whose baraka is more powerful and revered than all other saints. Baraka is a unique construct that is formulated within this Sufi-folkloric Islam in Morocco. Folkloric Islam is prevalent in the Moroccan countryside, while coexisting ironically with the orthodox official Islam advanced by the monarchy. Not only do some in the Muslim ummah view Sufi-folkloric Islam as outside the house of Islam (*Dar al-Islam*), but the '*ulama* (religious scholars) who are part of the religious bureaucratic apparatus of the state in Morocco, firmly reject maraboutism. As protector of Islamic Sunni and Maliki orthodoxy, they reject maraboutism, but constitute an integral part of the Muslim consensus around the monarchy.[47] This uneasy fit between the two forms of Islam in Morocco is reflected in the everyday life of Moroccans. Although most Moroccans would not claim to adhere to folk Islam, they do, in fact, engage in practices associated with popular/maraboutic Islam. The repertoire of such practices is vast and includes practices such as spirit possession, the use of magic, and avoiding the evil eye.[48]

The orthodox-Sufi/folkloric dichotomy is a defining characteristic of the Moroccan political culture and is primordial for any analysis of the interplay between power and religion as practiced in the various state spectacles and symbols of legitimacy. Folk Islam is also subject to attacks by the *Salafists* revivalists, who combated colonialism and popular religion, using reason to "demystify rural Sufism."[49] Despite all of the attacks, folk Islam remains a powerful and dominant force in Morocco and in various parts of the Islamic world.[50]

One of the cornerstones of folk Islam is its mystification of various symbols and rituals. Baraka and prophetic lineage are examples of those symbols and are intertwined in Moroccan culture. Only descendants of the Prophet are endowed with some form of baraka. It is a divine blessing where the power of God appeared in the "exploits of forceful men, the most considerable of whom were kings."[51] Geertz's depiction of baraka is minimal as it focuses solely on individual moral and social characteristics. Baraka is also transempirical, having an

independent and divine force that exists outside the realm of human tangible or material perception. It is a "supernatural influence of blessedness, holiness, and spiritual force."[52]

Despite its transcendental religious attributes, baraka is also immanent and can be experienced in the secular realm. This allows people to access and view its use in different social, economic, and political contexts. The political context is where the monarchy in Morocco primarily uses it as a tool to sanctify the monarchy. As commander of the faithful and descendant of the Prophet, the king in Morocco automatically acquires this blessedness or "God's grace on earth."[53] Baraka produces power and is the product of power.[54] This dual nature is particularly apparent in royal ceremonies and rituals that display the king as heir to the caliphal throne as the commander of the faithful. No other ritual exemplifies this transcendental nature of power than the annual ceremony of allegiance of bay'a.

Symbols of Legitimation in Morocco: The Contractual Covenant of Bay'a

It is in the nature of any society to express its customs and traditions in symbolic ways. This is particularly true in Morocco, where the sociopolitical field is replete with culturally symbolic manifestations of power and domination. This field's main component is Islam and Islamic-oriented rituals that perennially propagate monarchical rule in Morocco. It is no surprise, then, that throughout the history of Morocco, the accumulation of this symbolic capital of commander of the faithful, sharaf, baraka, and bay'a has always been crucial in wielding power. This symbolic content has contributed to the stability of the monarchy and continues today to provide it with a great deal of flexibility and resilience.[55] The grandiose spectacle of allegiance, bay'a, is the cornerstone of state rituals of power in Morocco. Its practice is as old as Islam in Morocco; it invokes awe and commands widespread appeal in society.

Steeped in tradition and reinforced with elaborate imagery, bay'a constitutes a fundamental element of the monarchy's symbolic capital in Morocco. This practice is an historical exercise of allegiance with tremendous political consequences. Bay'a is a contractual covenant between the monarchy, as the descendant of the prophet, and his people. Each year, the king commands an elaborate ceremony of *tajdid al wala'* (renewal of allegiance). During this ceremony, the ulama, representatives of the people, local authority, military, and high bureaucratic officials all line up and bow down to the king. Nothing is mundane about this practice; it is a repertoire of political

frames that the monarchs have utilized throughout the history of Morocco.

The first bay'a of Muhammad VI exemplifies the strength of this practice in Moroccan political culture. Although avowedly Western and modern in his political outlook, the new king of Morocco did not part with the ceremony of bay'a. His first bay'a was a grand spectacle of state power. Thus, on July 31, 2000, at the steps of the royal palace in Rabat waited about 5,000 men, wearing *djellabas* (Morocco traditional robe), from all corners of the kingdom to renew their allegiance to Mohammed VI. Also present, but at an adjacent platform, were representatives of the diplomatic corps of various foreign countries. Despite the smoldering heat, all present had been waiting for hours for the king behind the grand palace gate, who was inspecting his Arabian horses. Following bay'a tradition, seven Arabian horses were available for the king to choose to ride on.

Around 5 pm, the grand gates of the palace open amidst royal fanfare. At the beginning of the royal procession stand dozens of *'abid* (descendants of slaves still at the service of the royal palace). After the 'abid, the six nonchosen and unmounted horses are led by other 'abid. At the back of the procession, the king finally appears, riding a black Arabian horse. The king is the only one in the whole ceremony who is not on his feet. All participants are on the ground; even his brother and cousin by his side are on their feet. Wearing a white cape (*selham*) and djellaba, the king proceeds slowly under the shade of a green parasol, symbol of the three-centuries-old Alawi dynasty, to receive the renewal of allegiance. As the king proceeds on his horse, the dignitaries bow five times before the king and all at once appeal in chorus to the divine grace of the king. Subsequently, the *mokhazni* (servants of the royal palace) address the dignitaries and literally yell back the message of royal blessing "our lord bless you and appeal for divine grace to be bestowed upon you."[56] The process continues until all 5,000 dignitaries have bowed before royal power. A spectacle one political official described as "a symbol of power that cement ties between king and people."[57]

The first bay'a took place almost 1,300 years ago in the ancient Roman city of Volubilis, in northeast Morocco, by Moulay Idris, the first Arab king in Morocco. Since then, all the dynasties that ruled Morocco held steadfast to this ceremony of submission to royal power and to the sultan as a temporal and spiritual ruler. Bay'a buttresses the king's traditional and religious status as a sharif (Muhammad VI, for instance, is the thirty-fourth direct descendant of Prophet Muhammad). Throughout the history of Morocco, this ceremony

has taken place before thousands of submissive ulamas, notables, and tribal leaders. With the modernization of the Moroccan state, new actors were also included in bay'a. Today this "ancient concept of authority"[58] includes senior military officers, government officials, parliament members, governors, walis, and elected provincial leaders. Also present are nongovernmental guests, chosen by the palace from different provinces to attend the ceremony. These guests include top industrialists, business people, and highly touted students.

Bay'a is remarkable in its socioeconomic reach as it seeks to represent the nation in terms of regions. Each line represents some 60 provinces, grouped into economic regions and by subregions along geographical lines. Not surprisingly, and for nationalist reasons, the Sahrawi provinces are first in line of those giving allegiance to the king. This geographical procession advances northward, as the king receives allegiance from representatives of the Souss, Tensift regions until he reaches dignitaries of Tangiers, marking the northern tip of the kingdom. This geographical segmentation of subjects, observes one Moroccan political scientist, "proposes the king with a more consistent legitimacy than that offered by members of parliament."[59]

Beneath the ceremonial ritual of bay'a lies a fundamental premise of power delegation. Moroccans yield power to the monarch, who is entrusted with the task of securing the peace and social order. Thus, bay'a is understood as a traditional contractual agreement and is subject to rupture. Traditionally, ulama could renounce this contractual covenant. However, due to state incorporation of religious elites and the bureaucratization of religion, ulama are weak today and largely dependent upon the goodwill of the palace. Unlike liberal contractarian covenants, bay'a does not presuppose any democratic relationship between state and society. It is best understood as manifestation of makhzenite absolute power, which perpetuates the supremacy of the state in the Moroccan political culture. Through bay'a, commandment of the faithful, prophetic lineage, and baraka, the monarchy commands a premodern form of allegiance within modern state-society relations.

Rituals and symbols of state power are not the sole sources of power that the political regime possesses in Morocco. However, they serve an important purpose by enhancing the political authority of the state and by preserving the authoritarian rule in Morocco. State rituals of power help pacify opposition forces and render the monarchical cult of legitimacy axiomatic. Opposition forces do not focus their critique on the monarchy; rather their political action targets the state, understood to be separate and lower in stature than the monarchy. In interviews conducted in Morocco, various politicians

adhered to this distinction and leveled virtually no criticism against the monarchy's rituals of power.[60] Only some Islamists called on the monarchy to uphold Islamic ideals and lamented what they perceived as "secular and western" trends in Moroccan politics and society.[61]

The use of spectacles and rituals provide monarchical power with "emblematic constancy,"[62] which serves to rally individual and collective meaning towards a common sentiment. In the case of Morocco, the set of emblems used during bay'a, such as the white djellaba, the green parasol, and the black horse all are culturally-laden material objects that invoke a collective sentiment of awe and submission among a diversified population. As Emile Durkheim argues, "a collective sentiment can become conscious of itself only by being fixed upon some material object."[63] The process of ritualization of the political discourse, because it serves to sanctify the regime, is important for the prevalence of authoritarianism in Morocco. By staging elaborate spectacles, the state displays its power and control of the dominant symbols of authority. Regime iconography portrays the king as guardian of faith and the emblem of the nation-state,[64] while constructing idealized, anachronistic hagiographic versions of the monarch's rule. In fact, the disciplinary-repressive approach to power and the use of rituals of power has helped create a Moroccan national culture that centers on the interplay between traditional/religious and modern themes. The development of cultlike personalities mediates structure and displays political power, making it less necessary for the state to rely on coercive means. As one governmental official stated:

> "We have a consensus on the importance of his majesty to Morocco, and everyone considers him to beour religious sultan and political leader. We don't need to use violence against people like in [Saddam's] Iraq or in Syria . . . we simply don't need that because his majesty is held sacred by his subjects."[65]

The use of cultlike displays and its attendant ceremonies and rituals does not only exist in Morocco's monarchical rule in the Arab world. Jordan, for instance, provides a useful comparative case. Since its establishment as a state, the Hashemite monarchy has used similar symbols of prophetic lineage in order to build up political legitimacy, especially within the various autonomous tribes in the country. Jordan's national identity was also constructed through a disciplinary-repressive approach to power, which was accomplished through the colonial institutions of law and the military.[66] Nonetheless, this identity has always made use of the regime's religious legitimacy.

Elsewhere, the cult of Assad in Syria suggests a variation on state rituals of power, in which disciplinary symbolism is used to depoliticize society and exercise hegemonic domination over the political culture of the country. Syrians, however, do not believe in the different representations of Assad; they feign support and mimic expressions of submission. Therein lies the strength of the Syrian state because it makes belief in the absurd possible. Assad's regime has survived through institutional mechanisms of force; however, the threat of force is also as important as force itself. Such threat is conducted through symbolic channels constitutive of Assad's cult.[67] In Morocco, people do not necessarily feign support and belief in rituals of power, for the survey generally demonstrates that there is widespread belief in the monarchy's religious legitimacy.

Much has been made of the use of coercion in the Arab Middle Eastern state. However, the use of violence cannot be accredited for the panoply of survival mechanisms at the disposal of these regimes. No regime ever survives just because of repression. In Morocco, violence is not a preferred course of action for the state; the state has invested much of its resources in manufacturing a disciplinary-symbolic synthesis, which has proved resilient in the face of many challenges to the state. This synthesis elaborated through spectacles and displays of rituals, accounts for today's political power in Morocco. Representations and rituals of power substitute for the use of actual force. They also rely, in part, on the anticipation of punishment. Symbols are manifestations of power that serve to generate obedience and set the regime as omnipotent and subject of power. In Morocco, the king is powerful because people view him above the realm of worldly politics and in possession of traditional legitimacy. Rituals and spectacles of power are enactments of regime authority and are particular instances whereby the regime inspires obedience. The survey conducted in the greater Marrakech region supports this argument, since the majority of the sample-polled maintained a distinction between the monarchy and the government, and viewed the monarch as a rightful guide of the nation. The survey also supports evidence of a widespread belief in the rituals of power as enacted by regime and state in Morocco.

Royal symbols of Power in Moroccan Society: Survey Analysis

To many Moroccans, state rituals of power appeal to a repertoire of religious and traditional symbols of authority. Regardless of their socioeconomic status, Moroccans believe in royal symbols of political

power. Society relations with regime rituals of power have seldom been systematically examined in the literature. Various institutional explanations, as previously discussed, readily dismiss any appeal that these symbols might garner in Moroccan society.

Recent scholarly studies, however, have examined cultural forces operating in Morocco. Hammoudi's "master and disciple" dialectic, and Rahma Bourquia's focus on the cultural legacy in Morocco's political power are exemplars of such cultural studies. However, there is little knowledge of how Moroccans view cultural symbols and state reproduction of rituals. There is very little, if any, polling being done on issues of state symbolic representation. There are two reasons for this void. The first is theoretical and is due to the lack of scholarly interest in identifying and studying cultural variables independently from structural or institutional factors. The second reason relates to the difficulty of conducting opinion polls in Morocco and in the Arab Middle East in general. Public opinion polls are extremely hard to conduct due to bureaucratic, dilatory tactics, or outright prohibition.

Under my direction, a survey of 287 respondents was conducted in the greater Marrakech region in the period of December 2006–January 2007. The survey is based on three general areas of research. The first part examines public evaluation of general governmental performance in the areas of poverty, health, education, employment, and corruption. The second part of the survey deals with the public trust in the major political institutions in Morocco. Finally the survey concludes with an examination of public views of major state rituals of power. These include, baraka, bay'a, commander of the faithful, and prophetic lineage. The survey aims to construct a nexus between the institutional context of legitimacy and individual support of the regime's symbolic power. It should be noted that the results of this survey are by no means applicable to the whole of Morocco and are not subjected to any hypothesis testing. Rather, the results point to an interesting question regarding the relationship between regime legitimacy based on rituals of power and state performance. The results are indicative of the public mood with respect to political institutions, state rituals, and symbols of powers. The sampling method was done in what is called "snow ball" fashion. In order to get an accurate sample of the Moroccan population at large, the survey targeted both urban and rural areas in the greater Marrakech region. Sampling was also performed in terms of educational level and neighborhood. The latter is used as an indicator of socioeconomic status.

In its sampling method, careful consideration was given to accurately representing all segments of the population in accordance with

demographic and socioeconomic data of the whole country. For instance, out of the 287 respondents, 38% are illiterate—reflecting the high levels of illiteracy in the kingdom (modest estimates place illiteracy rate at 48%[68]). Similarly, 53% of the respondents are from urban areas, mirroring the 55.1% urban population in Morocco.[69]

The sample includes 287 respondents, 64.8% men and 35.2% women, from urban and rural areas in the greater Marrakech region. In terms of age, only 1.5% of respondents are under 16 years-old, 46.2% are 17–30 years-old, 32% are 31–40 years-old; 14.7% are 41–50 years-old, and 5.2% are above 50 years-old. The sample reflects the youthfulness of Moroccan demographics. The majority of respondents identified themselves as members of lower class neighborhoods (71%); the rest identified themselves as middle class (11.5%) and upper class (16.7%). In terms of education, more than 60% of the respondents had less than a university education; whereas 20% had a university education; and 0.7% had only a Koranic education.[70]

The survey yields many interesting findings and sets up an interesting question with regard to the public perception of the monarchy and its attendant symbols of legitimacy. The majority of the respondents place greater trust in the king than in other political institutions, while at the same time viewing symbols of baraka, prophetic lineage, bay'a, and commander of the faithful as religious and traditional symbols of authority. The survey also confirms Moroccans' increasing displeasure with the government's performance. This paradox, supporting the monarchy while condemning the government, is interesting and merits further analysis.

Government Performance: The survey included several questions to measure public evaluation of government performance, in general, and with regard to specific issues of concern to the Moroccan people. Areas of government performance that are evaluated are: job creation, prices, efforts to bridge the income gap, education, health, fighting poverty, and corruption. This variable engages the hypothesis advanced in the literature that state performance has a positive impact on the legitimacy of a political regime. This is particularly important for authoritarian regimes, whose legitimacy is often linked to their performance in socioeconomic arenas.[71]

The survey confirms popular dissatisfaction with their living conditions in general (75% of the sample surveyed in the greater Marrakech region). Given this high level of dissatisfaction, respondents' views of government performance are not surprising. Table 3.1 shows that 75% of the survey respondents are dissatisfied with government's overall performance. In addition, the respondents

Table 3.1 Government Performance in Select Areas

	Very Bad %	Bad %	Neither Bad nor Good %	Good %	Very Good %	Don't Know %	Total %
Overall	38.0	37.6	13.9	2.4	0.7	7.3	100.0
Jobs	48.4	39.4	7.7	1.0	0.3	3.1	100.0
Prices	40.1	46.7	7.7	1.7	2.1	1.7	100.0
Income	46.0	45.3	4.5	1.0	1.0	2.1	100.0
Education	35.9	46.3	7.0	3.8	0.7	6.3	100.0
Health	47.7	40.8	4.2	3.1	1.0	3.1	100.0
Poverty	51.9	35.9	8.7	1.7	0.3	1.4	100.0
Corruption	31.4	48.1	9.1	1.4	1.7	8.4	100.0

overwhelmingly expressed their utter dissatisfaction with government efforts in all above mentioned areas. In the survey 87% rated government performance in fighting poverty as either "very bad" or "bad." This is in spite of the government and his majesty's "king of the poor"[72] national campaign to combat poverty. The respondents seemed unimpressed by those efforts so far, as they also did in regard to the endemic corruption in the country's bureaucracy (31.4% and 48.1% rated government efforts to combat corruption as "very bad" and "bad" respectively).

Confidence in Institutions: This indicates public confidence in various institutions, including the monarchy, in Morocco. The hypothesis is that support/confidence in political institutions is low, especially when viewed in relation to public evaluation of government's socioeconomic performance. The results of survey partially support this hypothesis. The majority of respondents show little confidence in all institutions except for the monarchy. This presents a puzzle for the literature on legitimacy, which presupposes a close link between state socioeconomic performance and legitimacy.

The survey suggests that the respondents hold governmental institutions and political parties, but not the king, accountable for the dire living conditions in Morocco. Table 3.2 shows that about 65% of the respondents either highly trust or somewhat trust the king, compared to 71% lack of trust for local authorities. The validity of these findings can be established in view of other results about government performance. Survey respondents were openly critical of the government, but do believe that the monarchy is separate from the government and relatively immune from that criticism. Only 25% of the respondents expressed their distrust of the king.

Table 3.2 Confidence in Institutions

	No Trust at All %	Distrust Them Somewhat %	Trust Them Somewhat %	Trust Them a Lot %	Don't Know %	Abstain %	Total %
King	**12.9**	**13.9**	**22.6**	**42.9**	**1.4**	**6.3**	**100.0**
Local Authority	**39.4**	**32.4**	**16.4**	**6.6**	**4.2**	**1.0**	**100.0**
Police	**56.6**	**25.5**	**5.9**	**1.7**	**8.7**	**1.4**	**100.0**
Parties	**61.0**	**22.6**	**2.8**	**0.3**	**11.8**	**1.4**	**100.0**
Army	**25.4**	**13.6**	**7.0**	**5.2**	**48.1**	**0.7**	**100.0**
Courts	**54.4**	**26.1**	**7.7**	**1.0**	**9.8**	**1.0**	**100.0**

The survey results buttress the literature's emphasis on the importance of popular belief for legitimacy. This belief is constrained and limited to the work of institutions and the perception of how "right and proper" they are.[73] In other words, performance and satisfaction variables are not sufficient to advance our quest for an accurate theory of legitimacy that could inform our analyses in developing countries, where such variables are difficult to assess or, as in the case of Morocco, lacking. Thus, according to the survey, support for the monarchy is grounded in factors other than socioeconomic performance. As this research advances, these factors are sociocultural and relate to the monarchy's rituals and symbols of power, which are examined in the final section of the survey.

Symbols of Royal Power: The survey examines public views of baraka, amir al-mu'minin, bay'a, and sharaf. The findings of this section are significant as the majority of the respondents indicated that these symbols possess either a religious or traditional significance. The findings support one of the arguments of this research that that the monarchy's use of state rituals of power appeals to a repertoire of symbols in the Moroccan political culture and seems to be viewed largely as religious and traditional at least within the sample of respondents in this particular survey.

Accordingly, table 3.3 shows 74% of the respondents believe the king as the commander of the faithful to be a religious symbol (derived from religious practices and texts) and a traditional symbol (purely customary or tribal). Similar support is also shown with regard to the other symbols: 72% viewed the king's baraka as religious and traditional, while 77% expressed that the king's prophetic lineage is a religious and traditional symbol in its essence. Finally, 56% of respondents consider bay'a as a religious and traditional symbol of

Table 3.3 Royal Symbols of Power

	Relationship Between King and People %	Religious %	Traditional %	Political %	Other %
Amir	**8.1**	**59.2**	**14.0**	**17.4**	**1.2**
King's Baraka	**6.9**	**52.4**	**20.8**	**16.4**	**3.5**
Royal Sharif	**5.4**	**64.2**	**13.1**	**14.7**	**2.6**
Bay'a	**30.4**	**33.0**	**21.6**	**13.9**	**1.1**

authority. Interestingly, 30% viewed bay'a as a particular relationship tying them directly to the king. This relationship is neither religious nor traditional, but is viewed by the people as a covenant or contract that ties them to the institution of the monarchy.

These high percentages support the trust displayed, earlier in the survey, towards the king and detracts from the argument in the literature that lack of support for government performance result in a legitimacy crisis for the political regime. The survey provides an alternative way to conceptualize political legitimacy and power in Morocco by revising the performance-popular belief thesis prevalent in the literature on legitimacy and assumed in the institutional approach to authoritarian survival in the Arab world. As stated earlier, this thesis emphasizes the role of state performance and effectiveness to legitimacy, and equates political stability with popular belief and support of state effectiveness in fulfilling its functions.[74]

Bivariate analysis is also conducted on royal symbols of power, gender, education, domain, and salary range (see table 3.4). Only bay'a diplays high levels of significance in relation to education, age, and region. The younger population's perception of bay'a is cast in terms of a relationship between the king and the people (33% of 17–30 years olds; 66% of people under 16 years-old). This relationship is neither religious nor traditional. In the survey, 41% of those between the age 31 and 40 view bay'a as a religious symbol compared to 39% of those between 41 and 50 years-old, who perceive it as a traditional symbol. This slight generational difference in terms of perceptions is also displayed when education is further analyzed in relation to bay'a. The analysis shows that as the education level increases, bay'a is perceived less as a religious symbol and more as a covenant relationship between king and people. Forty-six percent of those who have a secondary education, and 28% of those with a college education, view bay'a as a relationship between king and people, whereas 48% of illiterates perceive it as religious.

Table 3.4 Bivariate Analysis of Royal Symbols (in *p* scores)

	Baraka %	Sharif (Prophetic Lineage) %	Bay'a %	Amir %
Age	17.3	2.9	**0.01**	2.91
Gender	4.7	4.8	36.8	11.22
Education	9.1	5.6	**0.01**	**0.01**
Sector	27.9	27.1	**0.01**	**0.08**
Income	6.5	**0.06**	1.8	4.2

All very significant relationships are set in bold type(<0.1%)

Bay'a is also significantly related to sector (urban and rural). Forty-six percent of the rural population in the survey considers bay'a a religious practice, whereas only 21% of the urban population views it in religious terms. Forty percent of those surveyed in urban areas perceive bay'a as a relationship between king and people. This relationship may or may not involve religious or traditional elements, but the fact that those respondents chose not to describe it as either religious or traditional is significant.

The commander of the faithful variable features two significant relationships with education and sector. According to the survey, respondents of different educational backgrounds view amir al-mu'minin purely as a religious symbol. However, as education levels increase, the frequency of that belief decreases. For instance, 84% of illiterates perceive commander of the faithful as a religious symbol, compared with 70% of those with primary education, 54% with secondary education, and 45% with college education. Commander of the faithful is also significantly related to sector, where the majority of respondents in both urban and rural areas perceived it as a religious symbol. However, that perception is higher in rural areas, where 80% of the respondents saw it as religious, compared to 55% in urban areas.

The findings of the survey show a strong correlation between perception of regime rituals and symbols of power, especially bay'a and amir al-mu'minin, and levels of education and sector (urban and rural). While these rituals are popular across all segments of population, they seem to be viewed more as religious and traditional symbols in rural respondents and as levels of education decrease. The findings also contradict the performance-popular belief thesis in the literature. The monarchy still manages a stable political system, its rituals and symbols of power have tremendous social appeal, and the public

(at least in the sample of respondents in the survey) displays high levels of confidence in it. This is particularly puzzling when coupled with the government's lack of effectiveness and lagging performance. According to the World Bank, 20% of the 30 million Moroccans live below the poverty line (1999 estimates), an increase of 8% from 1992, and 16% of Moroccans are unemployed (2002 estimates); however, if we consider the scope of the shadow economy and informal sector employment in Morocco, the rate is estimated to be above 20%. Morocco's annual growth rate from 1990 to 2003 is 2.7%, a decrease from 4.2% in the previous decade.[75] In addition, Morocco's record in education is abysmal as the country counted a 52% adult literacy rate in 2004.[76] The existence of government's poor performance does not constitute a legitimacy deficit as many of the institutionalist explanations assume. The link between lagging economic performance and legitimacy is not sufficiently established empirically in the literature on monarchical authoritarian survival.

CONCLUSIONS

The chapter advances the argument that the ritualization of the political discourse in Morocco is an important independent variable explaining the stability of monarchical authoritarianism in Morocco. The ritualization of the political process is the usage of ceremonies, spectacles, and public performances as rituals of state power to advance a positive iconographic and hagiographic account of the king as the arbiter and guarantor of order and stability. This practice of ritualization relies, by definition, on rituals and symbols of socioreligious importance to society.

By invoking culturally and historically resonant symbols, the regime engenders legitimacy and submission, without the costly use of violence. These symbols are not independent as the monarchy helps shape the way they are perceived in society. Rituals are seen as mediating tools between symbolic divisions to produce social solidarity and maintain social equilibrium. The state in Morocco manufactures symbols that become important in society because they are tied to, and used by, the regime. This contention sustains the argument in the literature that political authority lies with those who control dominant cultural narratives, in addition to dominant political and economic structures.

The chapter particularly focuses on the material interpretation of cultural symbols, while insisting on ethnographic detail. It also explores various manifestations and significance of rituals and

symbols in Moroccan political culture. The lengthy description of the bay'a ceremony showcases the practice of ritualization in its full vigor. Bay'a and other state rituals of power reinforce the supremacy of the monarchy in the Moroccan political culture and enjoy tremendous popular appeal as shown in the survey findings of 287 respondents in the greater Marrakech region. Ritualization of political discourse fosters a duality of the state in Morocco. Moroccans view government separately from the king, who is practically immune from criticism in areas of socioeconomic performance. This duality finds strong support in the findings of the survey and informal discussions conducted in Morocco. The question, then, remains as to how this duality and the king's monopoly over sociocultural of authority play to his advantage in relation to oppositional forces, especially Islamist groups, which rely in their discourse on sociocultural themes and can potentially contest monarchical monopoly. This is the central question the next chapter seeks to examine.

4

Rethinking Political Islam: The Public Sphere and Islamic Activism in Morocco

Although the Islamists do not directly challenge the monarchical regime, they have managed to force a debate on the relationship between Islam and the state, and possible democratic change. More importantly, the Islamists have tried to change the nature of the state, although not necessarily the regime that controls the state and society. In so doing, the Islamists, especially 'Adl wal Ihsane, engage the monarchy in a conflict over the territory of the sacred and its religious symbols of monarchical power. Moroccan Islamists are varied in their discourse and strategies. Unlike the contentious 'Adl wal Ihsane, the 'Adala wa Tanmiya has opted since the late 1990s to participate in the political system in Morocco. The variegated strategies emanate from a different view of the regime and the role of state in society. They also showcase, as I argue later in the chapter, a varied response to the monarchy's ritualization of the political discourse in Morocco.

Between the time that Hassan II came to power in Morocco in 1961 and his death in 1999, the country fared comparatively well relative to its neighbors. Relations between the monarchy, the government, and the people were still stable. But this stability was in large part due to the personal skills of Hassan II and his ironclad leadership. In addition to the religious and personal factors, the monarchy in Morocco has also used external factors to channel mass support and legitimacy. For a long time, opposition to Algeria, which began after its independence in 1956 and manifested itself in the dispute over the Western Sahara, has constituted the major political focus that helped unify the monarchy and the people.[1] Despite isolated incidents of political unrest, such as the failed military coups of 1971 and 1972, Morocco has experienced a divided political environment.[2]

In such an environment, the monarchy has allowed certain political opponents, such as the pro-monarchy Constitutional Union and the Islamist 'Adala wa Tanmiya to participate in the political system, while excluding others such as the Islamist party of 'Adl wal Ihsane. As a result, the monarchy in Morocco has fostered a set of political practices—adjusted in turn by Mohammed V, Hassan II, and currently by Mohammed VI—that meet the needs of a modern state and allow for the effective concentration and application of power.[3] Such practices are not solely institutional; they also are symbolic drawing on cultural themes with great legitimacy within Moroccan society.

Faced with the tremendous legitimacy of those symbols, Islamists had no alternative but to moderate their discourse and change their strategies. The Islamists' challenge to the territory of the sacred in Moroccan culture proved unsuccessful when faced with the monarchy's skillful use of its symbols of power. The use of rituals of power has undercut any Islamist claim to a religious mandate over society in Morocco. Morocco in this respect is unique in the Arab Muslim world, because religious authority rests squarely on the shoulders of the monarch. In Egypt, for instance, the religious institution was established, stabilized, and politicized in the great Azhar Mosque. This difference is apparent in both countries' history with Islamism. In Egypt, for instance, Islamists take on the religious state through its Ministry of Religious Affairs, while in Morocco no such institutional mediation exists. Abdessalam Yassine, head of the 'Adl wal Ihsane, for example, directly rebuked the king of Morocco in his famous 1974 letter "Islam or the deluge."

This chapter examines the state of the study of political Islam and draws on the literature on Islamic activism in order to sketch the development of the modern Islamist movement in Morocco and its main actors. It also forces a rethinking of the concept of civil society and the public sphere, viewed in this research as a sphere where informal discursive strategies are undertaken in state-society relations. This discursive sphere is important to the argument that chapter six advances as it focuses on the goals and strategies of the two leading Islamist groups in Morocco: Al 'Adl wal Ihsane and Al 'Adala wa Tanmiya.

The Study of Political Islam: Towards Conceptual Clarity

The study of political Islam has been the subject of various scholarly works and theoretical attempts, which seek to explain the reemergence

of the Islamist movements in the Muslim world. Defining the boundaries of the study of religion and politics has been central to all conceptual attempts to investigate the motives, goals, and strategies of Islamists. Such queries center, first, on the definition of Islamism. Islamists are those groups and individuals that are active in the political arena and use Islam and its values as the body for their political agenda. An Islamist, therefore, is "anyone who believes that the Koran and the Hadith contain important principles for Muslim governance and society, and who tries to implement these principles in some way."[4] Such individuals and groups are engaged in what is often called by scholars as political Islam, which is an attempt at *"ideologizing"* Islam.

Ideology is a set of political and social statements and ideas. It is a form of thought that arises in sociopolitical environments in times of change. Therefore, ideologies come as a reaction to social and political crises and usually provide an alternative to the status quo. Stephen Humphreys, for instance, argues that ideology is a "critique of a given sociopolitical order that simultaneously describes that order and calls upon its members either to defend and preserve it or to overthrow and transform it."[5] Finally, an ideology is a description of society and a program of political action. Like ideology, political Islam uses the beliefs and teachings of Islam to cast a new politicized version that seeks to address the sociopolitical situation in a Muslim world, dominated by relatively repressive and corrupt regimes from Morocco to Indonesia. Political Islam advocates the return to Shari'a law and the establishment of an Islamic polity. For Islamists, Islam is *"din wa dawla"* (religion and state) and its teachings are capable of bringing about political and societal change.

The study of political Islam is at the center of scholarly debate and various methods have been utilized in its conceptual and empirical investigation. Some have suggested a macro-level historical approach to the study of religious revival in the Middle East. Roger Owen, for instance, argues that the study of politics of religion should not focus on the study of religion itself, but "its influence on the policies and the distribution of power within a modern state."[6] The study of religious politics should also be extended to an examination of the political influence of all three major Middle Eastern religions: Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, and their respective religious movements. In so doing, a grand attempt should be made to delineate the commonalities between the religious movements.[7] Finally, any study of religious politics in the Middle East has to take into consideration the concept of communalism defined as "an ethnic marker defining

one community against another,"[8] and the concept of protest, which consists of social criticism of the ills of a particular society. In the context of the Islamist movement, protest is important because religious groups have called attention to the failure of the government to rule according to religious beliefs. Islam is the alternative solution to the wrongs of the society. This macro historical approach is important in examining the development of the phenomenon of political Islam, but it is unable to elucidate the exact intellectual content of Islamism, which has been subject to more theological and textual analyses.

Gudrun Kramer adopts such a theological and textual approach in her study of pluralism in Islam. Kramer, interested in the distinction between the theoretical and practical application of the concept of pluralism in Islam, provides an alternative to the monolithic view of the Islamist movement commonly perceived in the West. As Kramer puts it, "the larger themes are implicit in the distinction between a theoretical level, seeking to present the position of Islam on pluralism and a practical level constituted by the actual positions and actions taken by Islamist activists."[9] On pluralism in Islam, Kramer identifies two opposing camps: unitarian/totalitarian and pluralist. Both camps center on the doctrine of *Tawhid* (Divine Unity) in Islamic jurisprudence; however, the former is less tolerant of any divergence of opinions, particularly in regard to doctrines and practices of the religion. The pluralist vision of Islam recognizes the diversity of opinions and creed in Islam based on the *Qur'anic Sura al-Hujurat* (the Walls) 49:13.[10] The pluralist camp, however, is constrained by a distinction between the roots of jurisprudence (*Usul al-Fiqh*) and the details/branches of jurisprudence (*Furu al-Fiqh*). Therefore, any debate on religion ought not to change the foundations of the faith (*Islam al-Thabit*).

William Shepard also adopts a textual analysis of the doctrine of *Jahiliyya* in Sayyid Qutb's writings. Considered as a father of contemporary Jihadist Islam, Sayyid Qutb has had a strong impact on the development of the discourse of modern militant Islam in the twentieth century. Key to Qutb's brand of militant Islam is the doctrine of *Jahiliyya*, literally "ignorance." According to Shepard, Qutb defines Jahiliyya as "the rule of humans by humans because it involves making some humans servants of others, rebelling against the service of God, rejecting God's divinity *(Uluhiya)* and, in view of this rejection, ascribing divinity to some humans and serving them apart from God."[11] Jahiliyya, as Qutb uses the term, therefore, is not a reference to the historical period prior to the advent of Islam, but is a rejection of divine authority in favor of human governance.[12] Qutb denounces

both the West and the Muslim world as Jahili, since in both the sovereignty is given to individuals and political institutions, and not to God. As for all Islamists, Qutb's alternative lies in Islam as a solution to the immorality of Jahili societies. His course of action is of two phases, which mirror Prophet Muhammad's own life and journey from Mecca to Al-Medina.

The Meccan phase is one of emotional, but not physical, isolation from the society within the concept of *mukhalata ma'a tammayyuz* (socialization with distinction) and *'uzla shu'uriyya* (emotional separation).[13] This period of religious preparation and purification leads the way to the second phase in Qutb's second course of action, the Al-Medina phase, which is one of *Jihad* as a means to achieve an Islamic society and rectify the *Jahili* society.[14] This goal is shared by almost all Islamist groups in the Muslim world. In Morocco, this Jihad takes the guise of cultural contestation of the dominant rituals of power perpetuated by the regime.

Shepard's textual analysis is a useful addition to the study of political Islam. However, he largely ignores the particular political and socioeconomic contexts within which political Islam is usually fomented. In this sense, Shepard's methodology of textual analysis can be contrasted with more ethnographic approaches, which seek to contextualize the study of political Islam. James Toth's case study on the Islamist movement in southern Egypt is an exemplar of this kind of hermeneutic and interpretive approaches.

Toth's major contribution is a distinction between the Islamist movement in Sa'id and the one in Cairo. The former is insurrectionist and seeks to topple the government, while the latter is more ideologically and socially driven. Therefore, the use of violence is different, as the Cairene targets social shortcomings of the state within an associational character, and the Sa'idian is directed towards the abuses of government and can be understood within the tribal practice of revenge *Al-Thar*. Toth presents a rather benign image of the Islamists as people of faith and charity, who are often driven towards militant actions because of the repression of the government and the dire socioeconomic situation of Egypt. The Islamist movement in southern Egypt is comprised of two social groups: middle class indigents and middle class professionals, who migrated to cities throughout the south and to Cairo.[15] In Egypt, the Islamists capitalized on the government's inadequacy in providing social and economic services. This is also a major commonality in all Islamist movements as they have taken advantages of the Arab state's failure to provide basic social services to mobilize popular support for their Islamic alternative.

This strategy can be seen in Morocco's 'Adl wal Ihsane's developed social welfare program of Islamic schools, health centers, and soup kitchens.

Taken together, the four abovementioned works contribute to the understanding of political Islam from different perspectives. However, Kramer's and Toth's articles are particularly illuminating as they reinforce the diversity of the Islamist movements and place them within a socioeconomic and political perspective. In both articles, Islamism is not presented as a monolithic movement, but one with a great deal of diversity. Kramer's argument, however, is too narrow as it only focuses on the dichotomy between the unitarian and the pluralistic camps. A closer look at this dichotomy reveals that the two opposing camps are in fact a variation on the same theme of Tawhid. The pluralist view in Islam can be conceptualized as a sublevel of the main unitarian camp, as both views penalize any criticism of the roots of the faith.

Shepard's textual analysis can only be useful if placed within a political context. Sayyid Qutb's ideas are of no value if not understood within the historical, socioeconomic, and political circumstances of his time. Apart from these methodological limitations, Shepard's analysis of Qutb's doctrine of Jahilliya's influence on Islamist movements appears rather superficial. Shepard argues that, with the exception of the *Takfir wal Hijra,*[16] the doctrine of *Jahiliyya* is implicitly present in the discourse of modern Islamist movements such as the Military Group Academy, Islamic Jihad, and the Jama'a al-Islamiyya in Egypt.[17] The Islamist groups espoused Qutb's Jahili ideas, condemning their "godless" jahili governments and society as a whole for its adoption of Western mores.

As mentioned earlier, Shepard's methodology largely ignores the socioeconomic and cultural contexts within which militant Islam is fomented. This is where Toth's ethnographical study is superior to the rest of the approaches. It provides an endogenous view of the phenomenon under study from "the actor's point of view."[18] Toth's ethnographical approach is much more intersubjectivist and aims to observe, record, and analyze a culture. More specifically, the ethnographer must interpret signs to gain their meaning within the culture itself. Hence, the use of violence in the Sa'id is not ideological with political goals; rather it resides closely in the tribal nature of the Sa'id and the practice of Thar.

In Toth's case study of the Islamist movement in southern Egypt, this thick description is holistic and takes into consideration a variety of socioeconomic and political factors. It also presents a more

endogenous view of the Islamist movement in Egypt. This view presents a rich contextualization of the Islamist movement and anchors it in its local realities. In Morocco, this kind of approach is important as it distinguishes between the different goals of the Islamists and how cultural factors motivate their contestation of the regime's monopoly of traditional religious symbols. Islamist activism is not merely institutional with the aim of challenging the state and its institutions; it should be examined also as a cultural phenomenon that cuts deeply through local Muslim societies and engages the regime in a public sphere of contested symbols and rituals. This cultural dimension is largely neglected in the literature on Islamic activism; instead, issues of the compatibility of democracy and Islam occupy most theoretical debates.

Islamist Activism: Freeing Ourselves from Illusions

Scholarly discourse on the Islamist resurgence falls under two main interpretations: confrontationist and accommodationist. Confrontationists view political Islam as an antidemocratic and violent trend that advocates acts of terrorism, endangering regional stability in the Muslim world and in the West. James Walsh argues that Islamism raises concerns for lives and freedoms, stirs European fears that Islamists might destabilize Muslim societies, and suffers from "terrorism, intolerance and revolution for export"[19] Similarly, Bradford McGuinn reflects the confrontationist view and affirms that "the U.S. stands to lose a great deal if it signals a willingness to abandon albeit rickety allies in favor of popular Islamic forces."[20] In general, confrontationists conceive of Islamism as a monolithic phenomenon that is hostile to a decadent and secular West.

Accommodationists, in contrast, argue that hostility and violence are not inherent in all factions of the Islamist movement, and that the West should reach out to cooperate with this rising wave of Islamist movements. In contrast to the phobia of the confrontationists, Graham Fuller argues for a true understanding of Islamic fundamentalism as "a movement that is both historically inevitable and politically tamable."[21] Accommodationists call for a full integration of Islamist movements into the political processes of their countries as a way to withstand their challenge. John Esposito argues that Islam and most Islamic movements are not necessarily anti-Western, anti-American, or antidemocratic. In addition, he points out that the most significant aspects of Islamism are the social services it provides to the

people: "The battle is often one of the pen, tongue, and heart rather than the sword."[22]

Accommodationists argue that it is important to distinguish the moderate from extremist Islamist groups and allow them the opportunity to work from within the contours of the political system, to prevent extremist factions from seizing power. Accommodationists contest monolithic perceptions of Islamic movements and stress the point that Islamists are not "wild-eyed fanatics . . . but rational actors who respond to stimuli and create social movement much the same way as others around the world."[23] Political Islam, accommodationists maintain, should not be treated as a threat to regional or global stability; instead, it deserves treatment as a potential contender for future political rule over states with which the West must continue its relations. This distinction between extremist and moderate Islamist groups is fundamental to this research as my analysis turns to the discourse of Jihad as conceived by militant and extremist groups. Political Islam is not a monolithic movement, and there exist different voices and factions that differ on the strategies to alleviate socioeconomic grievances. Moderate Islamists call for gradual change that is to be done from within the political system. The more radical or militant of these groups insist upon revolutionary change that is to be imposed by violence and force through the practice of bellicose jihad.

Islamist militancy, sometimes called fundamentalist or extremist, is the actual violent group behavior committed collectively against the state or other actors in the name of Islam.[24] Contemporary Islamic militant ideology finds its roots in the ideas and writings of three intellectual Muslim activists: Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt; Imam Mawdudi, founder of the Jamaat e-Islami in Pakistan; and Sayyid Qutb, who provided much of the intellectual zeal behind contemporary militant political Islam. These three ideologues have been influential in creating the vision of modern Islamic reform. They also have had considerable impact on contemporary Islamic groups and on their ideas about Islam, Islamic revolution, Jihad, and modern Western society. In addition to the three models of militant Islamism, the Iranian revolution left indelible marks on Moroccan Islamism and the Islamist movement in general, as the first established Islamic state under the effective control of Islamic clerics and subject to Islamic laws.

Theoretically, the debate about the compatibility of Islam and democracy remains the most fervent and the least consensual within the literature on Islamic activism. Some scholars have adopted extreme confrontationist positions vis-à-vis political Islam in general, not just

its militant factions, and called for marginalization of all Islamists from any democratic processes. Judith Miller, for instance, argued that Islam is incompatible with democracy and human rights. Islamists, for Miller, should be excluded from any political reforms, since their inclusion could result in tremendous electoral success.[25] Miller's argument is replicated elsewhere by Martin Kramer and Bernard Lewis, who maintain the incompatibility of Islam and democracy.[26] Their arguments call on Western governments to oppose Islamist movements, since "they are likely to remain anti-Western, anti-American and anti-Israel."[27] These positions obfuscate differences that exist between Islamists, who do not form a monolithic movement with the same strategies and goals. Such positions rest on hypothetical scenarios, since no Arab Islamist party has ever made it to the higher echelons of power. Moreover, there is simply no empirical evidence to know that they would be anti-American or anti-Western if they come to power.

Empirical studies suggest that many conceptions about Islam, politics, and particular features of democracy are not accurate. In his cross-national study of the relationship between Islam and regime type, Steven Fish finds that "Muslim societies are not more prone to political violence; nor are they less 'secular' than non-Muslim societies; and interpersonal trust is not necessarily lower in Muslim societies."[28] Elsewhere, Alfred Stepan and Graeme Robertson's historical data analysis of electoral competitiveness in Muslim majority states provides support for an *Arab,* not Muslim, electoral deficit. Stepan and Robertson find that the "non-Arab Muslim world has for the last thirty years been much more electorally competitive than the Arab Muslim World."[29]

The Islamist movement is not wholly against modernity and democracy as some argue. Islamists, with the exception of the minority Jihadist, takfirist, or bellicose factions, have sought since the years of early revivalism to deal and adopt an Islamic view towards modernity. Islamists such as Hassan al-Banna of the Muslim Brothers, for example, sought to "Islamize modernity."[30] Similarly, Islam is not inimical to democracy, for Islam could potentially accommodate pluralistic views of the state and various constitutional checks in its teachings. The Qur'an can definitely be reinterpreted to support various democratic practices.[31] The resulting polity is a synthesis of democracy and Islam and will not be a perfect liberal democracy in the image of the West. It is a polity that has strong Muslim features that do not infringe on the individual's basic civil and political rights. Most people who deny Islam's compatibility with democracy focus on

the secular aspect of liberal democracy, which Islam simply can never accommodate, because it does not recognize any separation between state and religion. However, many Islamists have been espousing ideals of pluralism and citizenship rights.[32]

Various Islamist parties are taking part in the democratic process and have in the last decade achieved substantial electoral gains in their countries' legislative bodies. Morocco's 'Adala wa Tanmiya, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Muslim Brotherhood's Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan, and the Yemeni Reform Group are but a few examples of Islamists who have declared their commitment to working within a democratic pluralist system. Engaging Islamists in the political system has often been criticized because of the perception that Islamists are intransigent on issues of pluralism, human rights, or the status of Israel. The notion that no Islamists are willing to play by the democratic rules of the game for deep cultural reasons is reductionist and is belied by empirical evidence from various parts of the Middle East. In addition to the Adala wa Tanmiya in Morocco, the Wasat movement in Egypt split from the Muslim Brotherhood in the mid 1990s in order to form a political party that could take part in the political system and play by the rules of the game. Islamist parties have participated in most of the elections in the Arab world and have registered some electoral gains: Hizbollah in Lebanon (11%), PJD in Morocco (14%), and Muslim Brotherhood (20%).

As Islamist groups gain more power in Muslim societies, scholars have become more apprehensive of the Islamists' genuine goals. Some argue that Islamists may be engaged in a form of dissimulation and for the time being are adopting democratic rhetoric. However, once they reach power, they would work to subvert the democratic process and adopt a policy of "one man, one vote, one time."[33] The dichotomy between violence and peaceful participation is ever present in recent literature on Islamic activism. Islamist democratic commitment is further scrutinized in view of Islamic teachings and whether Shari'a law can accommodate democratic ideals, especially in its treatment of women and non-Muslims groups.[34]

Islamists have formed political parties, interest groups, and effective civil society networks. Once within the apparatus of the state, Islamists have displayed a tendency to moderate their rhetoric and positions. In the 1990s, Hizbollah demonstrated this tendency to moderate its Islamist rhetoric when a law to renew casino licenses was brought before the Lebanese parliament. On the day of the vote, Hezbollah deputies were conspicuously absent from the floor and brought forth no condemnation of the casino licenses. In what he

identifies as the "inclusion argument," Norton argues that once an entity is entrenched in a political system, its political behavior changes out of pragmatic necessity.[35] Accordingly, political inclusion can be an antidote for ideological fervor while exclusion breeds militancy. As Norton bluntly puts it as follows:

> So long as the fundamentalist movements are given no voice in politics, there can be no surprise that their rhetoric will be shrill and their stance uncompromising. In contrast, well-designed strategies of political inclusion hold great promise for facilitating essential political change.[36]

Noah Feldman supports Norton's assertion that Islamists have built support through democratic means and have little incentive in thwarting democratic ideals when they get to power. Feldman argues that "building support through democratic means can have a transformative effect as Islamists discover that their credibility is enhanced by their adoption of nonviolent means that enable self-government."[37]

The biggest impediment to democracy in the Middle East remains the authoritarian state in which Islamists and other political actors operate. Most of the literature has focused on the nature of the authoritarian state in the Middle East and the institutional mechanisms used to hinder action by political parties usually through electoral engineering, institutional and coercive manipulation of the opposition, and legal constraints. Political reforms, although minimal, have provided a space for the political mobilization of Islamist activism. Islamists have taken advantage of the state's failure in providing adequate social services. In addition, in the Middle East all have developed an important social service network and have sought, in varying degrees, to delegitimize the state through provision of these services.[38] Islamists boast tremendous organizational structures and have proved resilient against state control and repression.

Through the institutions of mosques, religious gatherings, and dense societal networks, religious activists in the Middle East sustained its contestation of the state.[39] This view of Islamic activism is reminiscent of resource mobilization theory's de-emphasis on the role of ideology in the Islamists' repertoire of contention. In particular, how particular ideas are framed to construct a discourse of opposition to prevalent cultural symbols. This is where the present study focuses as it seeks to delineate the specific symbols subject to contestation between the Islamists and the state in Morocco, in addition to the resulting strategies that have been manifested in the course of

that contest. Resource mobilization also de-emphasizes the goals of Islamic mobilization. These goals have been subjected to a more rational choice approach adopted mainly in cases of violent Islamism.

Rational choice approaches to Islamic activism emphasize the strategic decision making behind Islamist violent action. Disputing the myth about the irrationality of religious-based violence, scholars such as Mohammed Hafez and Stathis Kalyvas have shed light on the strategic logic of Islamist violence. In his study of Islamist violence in Algeria and Egypt, Hafez argues that the Islamist armed groups have adopted violent struggle in response to "an ill-fated combination of institutional exclusion" and to the "indiscriminate repression that threatens the organizational resources and personal lives of the Islamists."[40]

Similarly, Kalyvas analyzes the violence in civil wars and uses, as a case study, Algeria's insurgent civil war violence. Unlike earlier studies that focused on the causes and outcomes of revolutions and rebellions, or those that just avoided political violence, Kalyvas's article places large-scale massacres on the center stage of comparative political studies.[41] Kalyvas approaches civil war violence from a "rationalist perspective" and perceives the massacres in Algeria within an incumbent (army and security forces)/insurgent (Islamist groups: GIA and AIS) dichotomy. In Algeria, Kalyvas argues that both political actors seek to gain public support and sanction defection and that "most massacres were not random and senseless but selective and targeted."[42] Kalyvas rejects the ideological discourse, which argues that such massacres can be explained within an ideological framework.[43] Rational choice scholars' treatment of Islamic activism suggests that violence is a reaction to a state's repression and to the various political and legal constraints that hamper Islamist activism.

The Islamist movement is a complex and diverse movement that is a reaction to the excesses of the ruling elites and their supporters inside and outside the Muslim world. Islamists seek to change their societies by deriving their ideology from Islam, and they differ in methods, approaches, and styles. However, they all agree on the relevance of Islam as the solution to the ills of the Muslim society.[44] Islamist groups, broadly speaking, are composed of those individuals seeking to change their societies by deriving their ideology from Islam.[45] Much of what has been written about the goals of Islamist movements revolves around the building of a new social order based on Islam.

In the Muslim world, Islamists are not the only groups that claim Islamic teachings and symbols in their repertoire. Various other

religious groups use Islam to legitimate the state and serve regime interests. These are made of the official state ulama, religious clergy who are bureaucratized within the state apparatus and organized often under their ministries of religious affairs. It is important to stress that even some seemingly "secular" political actors claim Islamic teachings as guiding principles in their political action. For instance, the nationalist Hizb al-Istiqlal (Party of Independence) in Morocco has an Islamic class made up of religious scholars and nationalist activists who forged an alliance with Sultan Muhammad V to fight against French occupation.

The literature about Islamic activism largely focuses on the Islamists' perception of these political constraints and draws on preexisting literature on the prevalence of authoritarianism in the Middle East. Scant attention is devoted to the discursive contests, in which the Islamists project an alternative view of the regime's sources of legitimacy. As was pointed out in chapter one, scholars of authoritarianism in the Middle East focus on institutional factors of regime stability vis-à-vis the Islamists and advance the regime's manipulation of electoral rules and political space as regime strategies of survival. For instance, Brumberg's two factors of "dissonant" and "nonhegemonic" approaches to governance, in addition to control over economic resources, function equally to lend legitimacy to autocrats by reducing the perceived autocracy of their regimes.[46] Promotion of somewhat dissonant politics, along with hegemonic restraint, lends societies figurative, if not literal, pluralism, discourse, and competition. By feigning support for pluralistic politics, autocrats manage to convey the false impression that they are committed to political reforms.

At the heart of politics of dissonance and nonhegemonic discourses lie the Islamists. Competition between Islamists and non-Islamists, and among Islamist parties serves autocratic interests of survival. The politics of dissonance create a system of government Brumberg labels as "liberalized autocracies." These have been more successful in Arab monarchical regimes, because "these kings have more institutional and symbolic room to improvise reforms than do Arab presidents."[47] In Morocco's liberalized autocracy, 'Adl wal Ihsane remains opposed to any participation in the political system. They are, instead, interested in contesting the symbolic realm in an arena where the monarchy has a palpable advantage. 'Adl wal Ihsane and 'Adala wa Tanmiya each contend against the monarchy from different vantage points. The former group is discursive in its challenge to the monarchy, while the latter ('Adala wa Tanmiya) follows a dual track

of institutional and discursive strategy in political contestation of the state. This monarchical advantage is clearly manifested in Morocco and Jordan, in which the monarchy has capitalized on its symbolic power and institutional prerogatives to craft a stable authoritarian regime. Monarchies in those countries also manifest a cultural advantage over symbols and rituals of power. In Morocco, for instance, surveys conducted in the field in the greater Marrakech region do confirm the monarchical advantage, as the majority of the surveyed sample expressed tremendous belief in monarchical rituals of power as religious and traditional symbols of legitimacy. This support for monarchical traditional legitimacy is crucial to stave off the Islamist challenge, which draws largely on Islamic religiosity in its criticism of those regimes.

Brumberg and other scholars examined in the first chapter of this study belong to an institutional trend in the literature, which have focused on party politics and elections as important variables in the authoritarian formula in the Middle East.[48] These studies are thought provoking, judicious, and engaging. Their use of formal modeling is original and provides a much needed emphasis on the microdynamics of the politics within the Arab authoritarian system. Elections in these studies are considered exclusively from the perspective of the state, which engineers them, as some scholars see them as "safety valves"[49] and preemptive strategies of stabilization during times of crises.[50] Or as this research sees them, echoing Wedeen's study of the Yemeni case, as grand state spectacles that "the regime invents to reproduce its political power."[51] In this sense, elections are co-opted by the state rituals of power. Political actors do not take them seriously as evidenced in the various interviews conducted with Moroccan political actors, who see limited elections as a way to mitigate the authoritarian nature of the state. Participation in these limited elections is a strategy pursued by political parties in order to position them to contest the rules of the game within the political system.[52]

This should help us to conceptualize the relations between state and political actors (Islamists included) through a different lens with a view to those particular cultural symbols that the regime uses to ritualize the public discourse. This also warrants rethinking the notion of civil society, since Islamists do contest the regime on a more ideational dimension and not solely through futile electoral races. The distinction between state, regime, and government is important in this analysis. The state is seen in this research as the set of institution and structures with monopoly over legitimate use of coercion, while the regime is the political order, which encompasses not only the

institutions of governance, but the set of cultural symbols and rituals used to further its legitimacy. Since in Morocco, the state serves to buttress the religious and traditional legitimacy of the regime, they are used interchangeably in this analysis. Government is distinguished from state and regime, as the temporary political structure that is subject to great manipulation by the regime, and to which most dissent is directed from political opposition. In most of the Middle East, the distinction between state and regime is crucial, as regimes built along tribal or religious lines preceded state building in terms of institutions and structures. Morocco is one such case, in which the Alaoui dynastic regime predated the process of state formation, which largely took part with the advent of colonialism.[53]

Rethinking Civil Society in the Muslim World

The study of civil society is hotly debated by intellectuals and political actors in the Middle East. Civil society has clearly become part of the political discourse of the Middle East and North Africa. However, the study of civil society is different as it is channeled and curtailed within the state. Hence it is useful to conceptualize the study of civil society with an understanding of the state's role in promoting or limiting the space of action for civil society. In the Middle East, the term "civil society" is often used by the state to legitimate their projects of liberalization, which are mainly strategies meant to safeguard their central authority.

The civil society literature relies on specific case studies, in which the state has managed to shape the discourse within "civil society" in the Middle East.[54] It also highlights the difficulty in studying civil society in the Middle East. Some scholars readily refute the Western definition of civil society as a separate sphere of civic associations that can limit state power and serve as a space between the state and individual. Roger Owen, for example, proposes the term "informal politics" to describe the different degrees of separation and association between state and society in the Middle East.[55] Informal politics are arenas where issues of identity and interest are contested between the state and different actors. In addition, most of the Middle Eastern societies are tribal in nature, which suggests an additional variable for analysis in state-society relations.

The literature on civil society highlights the complex nature of state-society relations in the Middle East. This complexity is outlined by Richard Antoun in his anthropological study of civil society and

tribalism in Jordan. Antoun is particularly critical of the Western conception of civil society in the Middle East, especially in its conception of tribes and tribalism as a collection of "values and norms associated with hospitality, honor, independence, and fierce loyalty to the group."[56] Antoun contends that such a conception ignores the important indigenous process of conflict resolution.[57] Antoun provides an indigenous view of civil society in Jordan and is explicitly critical of Norton's approach to the study of civil society in the Middle East, which is ethnocentric and structural in its focus on formal structures and organization. Instead, Antoun prefers an alternative approach to civil society as "the specific patterns of generating trust in human beings."[58] Thus, for Antoun, the study of civil society in the Middle East should focus more on "an investigation of beliefs, values and everyday practices."[59]

This book echoes Antoun's concerns and questions the applicability of civil society in Morocco. Instead, it adopts the notion of the "public sphere" as a more appropriate locus for studying contests fought over a regime's cultural hegemony. In Morocco, this sphere is not just made up of a "mélange of associations, clubs, guilds, syndicates, federations, unions, parties, and groups" that constitute a "buffer between state and citizen."[60] Rather it is a collection of cultural values and beliefs that are specific to the region's historical and religious past. More importantly, and as emphasized throughout this study, this sphere is controlled by the state and is subject to continuous contestation by various political actors.

The notion of public sphere adopted in this research is different from its Western liberal roots and now it has been written about in Western liberal thought. Habermas's definition of the public sphere as "the sphere of private people' [coming] together as a public"[61] is limited when adopted in Islamic societies, because it presupposes the formation of bourgeois private individuals, "who voluntarily form a civil society at work in the public sphere."[62] Such a conception of the public sphere cannot be applied beyond those bourgeois societies where there is some expectation of freedom of expression and association. In addition, Habermas's definition is anchored in secular rationality as the discursive norm of the public life, which limits its applicability in nonsecular contexts and, notably, in Muslim majority societies such as Morocco.

This research moves away from Habermas's notion of public sphere and adopts a view of the concept as an arena of intense contestation over cultural ideas and symbols of political and social authority. The public sphere approach is much more encompassing of the dynamics

of state-society relations than the notion of civil society, as "civil society entails a public sphere, but not every public sphere entails a civil society."[63] This approach has been adopted in the literature notably in Lynch's study of state identity, interests, and behavior in Jordan. Lynch argues that "there has been significant change in the conception of Jordanian identity and interests; that this has produced the result of public sphere contention; and that this has produced changes in Jordan behavior which cannot adequately be explained in rational terms."[64] For Lynch, the public sphere is where the state reproduces interests "through interaction, as states produce collective meanings and interpretations of the situation, as well as interpretations of themselves and others."[65]

While Lynch resurrects theoretical considerations for the study of the public sphere in the Middle East, he does not adequately distinguish between state interest and regime interest, and between domestic political opposition forces in general and Islamic forces in particular. Such differentiation is important in the case of Morocco where most of the opposition forces' contention is targeting the state, and not so much the regime, and where non-Islamist parties pursue different strategies than their Islamist counterparts in the public sphere. The public sphere in Muslim societies is where the informal and formal sector's of political and social contestation takes place. This sector is more appropriate in the study of the dynamics of cultural hegemony at play in the Moroccan case. Finally, Habermas's conceptualization of the public sphere, predicated on the notion of civil society of private individuals, does not consider the conditions under which the state introduces and cultivates rituals of power with the aim to discipline and legitimize their political authority.

The Islamists have adopted different approaches within the public sphere in Morocco. First, they questioned the legitimacy and the traditional authority of the monarchy and its attendant rituals of power. The failure to contest those symbols imposed a different strategy on the Islamists and other political actors. The Islamists started their struggle with the aim of capturing the state in the 1970s and 1980s; however, today's Islamists, including those outside the political system, are attempting to change society and subsequently alter the state. As the next chapter makes clear, the Islamists in Morocco failed in their early attempt to rule the state and to found an Islamic polity, for to do that they have to successfully challenge the regime's monopoly over religious discourse.

Gramscian ideas on civil society are important for this study, since they highlight the importance of culture as a locus of state-society

relations. For Gramsci, a careful understanding of state dynamics requires an equally important emphasis on hegemony and the institutions of civil society. In his analysis of the "ethical state," Gramsci argues that the collisions of interests, power, and identity are culturally embedded and define the contours of civil society, as the state

> educates consent by raising the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level, the level which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for development and hence to the interests of the ruling class. These initiatives and activities form the apparatus of the political and cultural hegemony of the ruling class.[66]

Ayubi applies Gramsci's framework in the Middle East and argues that state-society relations in the region are characterized by states' attempts to control and capture the political system through administrative and coercive means. Ayubi negates the existence of single class hegemony and uses, instead, the term ruling caste, which once in power

> has no intention of giving it up, but the techniques of maintaining power vary from case to case—although there are two important types. In situations where the preservation and enhancement of the privileges of the group that captures the state would require serving the status quo, the ruling caste would strive to co-opt other groups, in a "consociational" manner if possible . . . in situations where the promotion of the interests of the group/fraction that captures the state would require changing the status quo via acts of social engineering, the political techniques would include both political co-optation and political isolation.[67]

Ayubi's two forms of corporatist state do not focus on how the state constructs hegemonic discourse that enable state domination of the political system. Ayubi's state types also neglect civil society's ability to constitute an autonomous sphere of contention of state hegemony. The state's cultural hegemony is only fought within a larger public sphere of ideas and symbols. In Morocco, for instance, the public sphere constantly accommodates popular and resonant cultural themes and provides an arena for Islamists and other political actors to challenge the public hegemonic discourse, where a direct insurrectionist war (war of maneuver) against the state is not possible. An insurrectionist war aims at the destruction of the state and the radical transformation of state and society. This study argues that the Islamist movement's initial rebellious discourse and attempt to undo

political authority in the 1970s and 1980s were unsuccessful, not just because of state coercion, but also due to their inability to break the regime's cultural hegemony, traditional legitimacy, and its rituals of power. Evidence from interviews carried out in Morocco with Islamists from both 'Adl wal Ihsane and 'Adala wa Tanmiya suggests that the state's ritualization of public discourse has served to consecrate the monarchy in society as the sole religious sovereign above political struggle in the public sphere. As a member of the 'Adala wa Tanmiya states, these rituals have elevated the monarch to "a status of divinity . . . and only source of religious authority in the country."[68] This has helped the monarchy to enjoy a tremendous and remarkable stability despite efforts to oppose its cultural hegemony.

The failure of these groups in the public sphere has forced a shift in the grand strategy of the Islamists to bring about an Islamic caliphate in Morocco. They are currently vying to change the state in a Gramscian war of position or "passive revolution."[69] In this war, these groups try to mitigate the authoritarian effects of the state on society and act mainly as a "shadow opposition"[70] pressing for accountability based on Islamic teachings for justice and social solidarity. This position is due to the lack of a meaningful discursive challenge to the monarchical religious authority and legitimacy, and their failure to contest the ritualized use of power through religious symbols, which proved "difficult to contest in a society that readily accepts them as axiomatic."[71]

In almost all of the 50 interviews carried out in Morocco in the period between December 2005 and August 2006, political actors, Islamists included, maintain that the monarchy's use of symbols of power has contributed to the perception of its authority as sacrosanct and immune from all reproach and, as a politician asserts "a cultural heritage that is unique to Moroccan case and identity."[72]

They have also expressed their inability to challenge them publicly because they are widely perceived to be legitimate in the Moroccan society. This perception is empirically supported by the findings of the survey conducted in the greater Marrakech region in the period of December 2006–January 2007. According to the survey, 74% of the respondents believe the king as the commander of the faithful to be a religious and traditional symbol. Similar wide support is also shown with regard to the other symbols; 72% viewed king's baraka as religious and traditional, while 77% expressed that the king's prophetic lineage is religious and traditional in its essence. Finally, 56% of respondents consider bay'a as religious and traditional symbols of authority. Interestingly, 30% viewed bay'a as a particular relationship tying them directly to the king.[73] The religious legitimacy of the

monarch, as shown through the survey results and interviews with Islamists and non-Islamists, hinders the opposition forces' ability to challenge monarchical status in the public sphere and in the political system.

A war of position presupposes a limited public sphere and involves the gradual change of society by exerting moral and intellectual leadership over civil institutions and processes.[74] A war of position in the Gramscian sense is a type of political struggle that is launched in the absence or impossibility of violent, insurrectionist protest. Such war of position or passive revolution focuses on the slow capture of society by exerting moral and intellectual leadership over civil institutions and processes. The primary locus for this war of position is in the sphere of civil society, where hegemonic discourses are subject to demystification.[75] Gramscian "passive revolution" (or a "war of position") aims not simply at capturing state power (as the insurrectionists do in their "frontal attack") but also on the gradual capture and possession of the society.[76] A true revolution, for Gramsci, involves not just winning the state power but capturing the society by institutional, intellectual, and moral hegemony. "A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise leadership before winning governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions for the winning of such power)."[77]

As chapter five argues , this Gramscian war of position in Morocco exists along a purely spiritual-social, political gradient that reflects the strategies adopted by the various political actors in Morocco. Opposition forces have begun to put their passive revolution, to build that ideological infrastructure into practice through extensive networks and grassroots structures. The Islamists of 'Adala wa Tanmiya and 'Adl wal Ihsane founded organizing cells, alternative mosques, schools, youth associations, women's organizations, clinics, work cooperatives, as well as athletics, and charitable groups. Not only did these networks spread Islamic sentiments, they concomitantly served to fulfill some fundamental material and spiritual needs of the ordinary Moroccans.

The adoption of such a conscious strategy of "passive revolution" is itself evidence of the failure of political actors in Morocco to challenge regime, state-traditional legitimacy, and its attendant rituals of power. The two main Islamist groups feature different strategies in their war of position against the state in Morocco. 'Adl wal Ihsane's is purely discursive and focuses on cultivating spiritual and religious education through community social services, while 'Adala wa Tanmiya's war of position is discursive/institutional as it seeks to foster an Islamic society institutionally through electoral contests.

5

The Islamist Challenge to Regime Hegemony in Morocco: Contested Legitimacy and Positionary Strategies

This chapter argues that the literature's emphasis on political liberalization, while important in understanding the political dynamics of state and political Islam relations, should be treated as a proximate reason for the emergence of political Islam, while the underlying reason lies in more idiosyncratic factors within the country under study. In Morocco, the underlying reason is the Islamists' perception of the fragility of the monarchy's hold over the traditional religious territory. This chapter shows how in the conflict between the state and political Islam, this religious and symbolic public space is constantly challenged and redefined. Because of the monarchy's traditional legitimacy and vibrant use of rituals of power, opposition groups have failed to penetrate and demystify the existing dominant cultural hegemony. This failure has forced a shift in strategy for both Islamists and other non-Islamist actors, who no longer seek to capture the state or change the existing political order; rather, their goal today is to mitigate the authoritarian effects of the regime and to introduce a dimension of political accountability within the state.

Political actors in Morocco are engaged in a Gramscian war of position, along a discursive-institutional spectrum corresponding to the various strategies used to press for social justice based on Islamic teachings. Evidence from elite interviews suggests that the monarchy's religious authority and its rituals of power hinder the mobilizational capabilities of opposition forces in Morocco and weaken their ability to shake societal belief in the legitimacy of the regime. The lack of a successful challenge to the legitimacy of the regime accounts

for the stability of the political order in Morocco. The use of force and coercion is de-emphasized in the presence of a dominant cultural hegemony, which is practically immune to discursive penetration.

This chapter is largely informed by extensive interviews conducted in Morocco in summer 2006, December 2006–January 2007, summer 2008, and follow-up interviews in June–July 2009 with representatives of the 'Adala wa Tanmiya and members of 'Adl wal Ihsane in order to assess the impact of state rituals of power and regime's traditional authority on their action in the political system and in the public sphere in Morocco, and their response to the state symbolic discourse. In other words, one of the main goals behind these interviews is to examine how these symbols hinder political action and mobilization in the Moroccan political system.

Interviews also facilitate narratives that define both the interviewee and the social-political context. Interviews, of course, "contain a mix of true and false, reliable and unreliable, verifiable and unverifiable information."[1] The use of interviews supports the theoretical and conceptual aspect of the research. The use of interviews is also important as it serves two crucial purposes: theory building through induction and theory testing through process testing. The development of novel and creative hypotheses cannot result from a deductive process alone. As demonstrated by King, Keohane, and Verba, it is usually necessary to begin the theory-building process from general observations and the connection of empirical insights. A few interviews with well-informed political actors can lead to the observation of patterns and relationships.[2]

These interviews are particularly important in the context of the Islamist challenge to the monarchy. While the Islamists have capitalized on institutional opportunities afforded within the process of liberalization, their challenge to the monarchy's legitimacy has failed because of the resilience of the rituals of power and the institutionalized symbols of the monarchy's legitimacy. Interviews with Islamist groups, inside and outside the political system are thus conducted to analyze the factors behind this failure and to provide a causal link between that failure and the monarchy's stability.

Islam and the State in Morocco

In 2003, Islamist violence finally reached Morocco when two Islamist-motivated terrorist attacks rocked Casablanca killing 33 people. Many attribute this latent Islamist resurgence to the discursive difference between the state religious speech and that of the ever increasingly

populist Islamist discourse.[3] Islamism is one of the major challenges facing the monarchy in Morocco, which has espoused its legitimacy with Islam and Islamic-inspired rituals of authority.

For centuries, Islam has been the principal force by which Moroccan monarchs have legitimized their authority. Moroccan kings have always assumed hegemony over both the spiritual and the secular realms. However, this dual role bears with it an important point, which is the reluctance of Moroccan kings to allow their religious role to be reduced in the field of politics. King Hassan II asserted this claim in one of his interviews:

> As you know, I am the Commander of the Faithful . . . I received this title at birth, without asking for it, without wanting it. That means that I am one of the descendants of the prophet, which is not exactly common, and which means that as deeply rooted as I am in Morocco for generations, my original tribe is that of Mecca. This title "Commander of the Faithful," for some, including the Iranians who have accorded such an importance to the question of the descent of the prophet, does not meet with indifference. It is a title that imposes a great deal of humility and, all the same at certain times, great deal of responsibilities.[4]

Clearly Hassan II considered it a divine duty to rule; he legitimized his reign by associating himself with the prophet. For decades, Hassan established a balance between secularism and religion in the state, and for a long period of time, he managed to anchor the religious discourse within the heart of the state; thus reducing the space for religion-based protest. This latter was made as a reaction to the few secular modernist provocations made by the regime: the welcoming of the Shah of Iran, and contacts with the Jewish community and the state of Israel. Those protests were sporadic and not sustained; they lacked organization and meaningful leadership. They were also met by a great deal of repression from the regime.[5] Hassan was successful in presiding over an ideological synthesis of Islam, Arabism, local nationalism, and modern discourse of democracy that together constitute the core of his traditional legitimacy. Thus, Hassan was able to forge a "religious-nationalist-modern synthesis" that has wide appeal among different classes in the Moroccan society.[6]

The monarchical interpretation of Islam dominates in Morocco's political discourse and, as argued earlier, religious legitimacy and the ritualization of the public discourse is the basis of the power of the monarch in Morocco. This claim is further buttressed by the monarch's claim of ancestral descent from the prophet's family, which

makes him "God's shadow on earth."[7] This quasi-holy stature is manifested in the bay'a, which Moroccan monarchs command from their subjects every year and is done following an old Islamic tradition of political succession.[8]

In July 1999, King Hassan died after 38 years on the throne, and his successor, King Muhammad VI, assumed office with the same broad constitutional powers, which include appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers, vetoes of parliamentary legislation, and dissolution of parliament. Unlike his father, Muhammad VI launched many reforms that were shelved during Hassan's reign. The reforms include codifying a body of law, encouraging economic and fiscal reforms, and promoting more civil rights for Moroccans.

In 2000, Muhammad VI released all political prisoners and prisoners of conscience. All political exiles were allowed back to the country to take part in the new democratic process. In addition, the government has implicitly recognized official responsibility for persons who were arrested in the past and are still missing or who died while in detention. The government even offered material compensation to the families of the victims.[9]

Second, the new king also launched a campaign against poverty and unemployment, and further endorsed the process of structural economic adjustment already initiated by his father and supervised by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. But perhaps his most controversial step, which sparked massive Islamist protest and brought the Islamists on the scene of Moroccan political protest, was government's tentative plan to give women more rights. This plan's aim was to grant women a 33% quota of seats in parliament, raise the age of marriage from 14 to 18 years, end the obligation for women to marry only with the consent of a male guardian, change divorce from male repudiation to a judicial decree, and ban polygamy. For the first time Islamists demonstrated over an issue of national concern since the 1970s: Islamists flexed their muscles on March 12, 2000 by staging a large demonstration in the Moroccan capital.

This event marked the first significant manifestation of the Islamist movement in Morocco since the early 1980s and, most importantly, it showed the public acknowledgment of a long, organized, and popular Islamist opposition. The ulama marched alongside the banned Adl wal Ihsane and its rival parliamentary party 'Adala wa Tanmiya. Despite the Islamists' protests, the king's reforms of the Mudawanna were finally introduced and implemented in recent legislation that gave women equal rights in family matters and put more restrictions on polygamy.

There are no clear indications as to why the state has initiated the process of liberalization, which coincides with the reemergence of the Islamist movement. This study argues that the whole process of liberalization was a by-product of the dire economic situation in Morocco, which presented the monarchy with the challenge to provide basic social services for all its citizens. This political maneuver provided political space for protest movements, such as the Islamist ones to emerge.

This argument echoes Wiktorowicz's overall thesis in a study of the growth of civil society in monarchical Jordan. Wiktorowicz argues that regime legitimacy in certain Middle East countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, have been largely undermined by high levels of debt, trade deficits, and inflation during the last two decades. According to Wiktorowicz, economic crises reduced regime legitimacy, as it failed to provide for the basic commodities and services for its people. This also forced most regimes to adopt liberalization policies and to engage in what he called "defensive democratization." These policies lacked any real commitment on the part of the state and were "part of a regime survival strategy in the face of deteriorating economic conditions."[10] Like Wiktorowicz, this study posits that state-sponsored political reforms led to the growth of civil society in Morocco and not the opposite. The regime in Morocco has, therefore, managed the process of democratization to control collective action "by making it visible to the administrative apparatus."[11] The process of liberalization in Morocco lacks commitment on the part of the government. It is merely used as a strategy to counter the Islamist challenge to its legitimacy, which have resulted from the government's failure to provide basic public goods for its citizens.

The state still has full control over the rules of the political game in Morocco. Even the release of Yassine, leader of ʻAdl wal Ihsane, from house arrest, which was viewed as a victory of Islamists over the state and a potential indicator at the Monarchy's vulnerability, only applies to the man not to his group. Lately, Yassine has suggested that his movement may participate in the legislative process. But in case he had any illusions about the status of his organization, the same week that the authorities let him out, they banned his party newspaper and dismantled preparations for its summer camps. The government also prevented Yassine from visiting a dozen members of his movement still in prison. Until further notice Yassine's association is still banned and all ʻAdl wal Ihsane's members are under tight surveillance, especially in the aftermath of the Casablanca attacks.

The monarchy in Morocco seems still less endangered by the threat of political Islam than its counterparts in Saudi Arabia and Jodan. While there are several socially active Islamic groups with different orientations and activities, there is no single mainstream movement spearheading Islamist activism. The fragmented nature of the Islamic movements can be attributed to the political structure of Morocco, and the tremendous religious legitimacy that the monarchy has. It is also a by-product of what Lust-Okar calls, the divided political environment in Morocco, in which the monarchy "has allowed the growth of Islamic opposition in the early 1980s to counter its secular opponents."[12] In such divided environment, loyalists and radicals have different interests and each has divergent mobilization costs. Loyalists help maintain the system, in exchange for royal benefits and access. In contrast, radicals take advantage of popular discontent in order to mobilize support.[13]

The loyalist/radical dynamic is apparent in the monarchy's relationship with the two Islamist parties subject to analysis in the next section. The regime has adopted several measures in its relation with the Islamist movements: confinement, suppression, and co-optation. How the state treats the movements depends on the movement's acceptance of the political agenda as set by the monarch. The two main Islamist movements in Morocco the 'Adl wal Ihsane and the parliamentary 'Adala wa Tanmiya illustrate the different ways, by which the Moroccan monarchy has been able to placate the Islamist challenge.

In Morocco, we should perhaps speak of two political systems, modern rational and traditional primordial that exist in a symbiotic relationship and inform those rules of participation and exclusion that exist in the formal political system. Lust-Okar's argument that government's opponents are capable of mobilizing popular support, but they are unwilling to do so, is also problematic. Lust-Okar does not advance any evidence of those groups' ability to mobilize. The reality in Morocco is that most political parties and unions garner little popular support and, despite what their claims are, they are unable to have a wide societal appeal. In a 2005 study conducted by High Commission of Planning in Morocco, the percentage of membership in political organization and trade unions was marginal (11%). Political parties counted a meager 2% membership with similar percentage for trade unions.[14] The Islamists are the closest to having a popular base, the 'Adala wa Tanmiya is firmly committed to a constructive political participation, while the 'Adl wal Ihsane is increasingly losing mainstream appeal faced with monarchical religious-based legitimacy, its

unpopular mystic, Sufi brand of Islam, and Sheikh Yassine's purported visions.

Maghraoui, for instance, argues that the regime in Morocco has been successful in depoliticizing the public discourse and in "the marginalization of questions of legitimacy and sovereignty."[15] Maghraoui is partially correct as the public discourse in Morocco is depoliticized, however, public space in Morocco is also ritualized and the issues subject to that process of ritualization are the same questions of legitimacy and sovereignty that Maghraoui readily dismisses. 'Adl wal Ihsane 's goals for instance are to provide an alternative Sufi interpretation of power, which could challenge the dominant monarchical monopoly over rituals of power. This challenge is not only institutional; it is primarily symbolic and engages the regime and its ritualistic use of power. The repertoire of contention comprises the monarchy's use of symbols of legitimacy and does not exclude potential institutional gain.

Nothing in their written goals or in the interviews conducted with leading Islamists suggests that they seek to overthrow the existing political order. However, we cannot ignore Islamist resistance and transgression against the monarchy's territory of the sacred, since the Islamists' repertoire of resistance could lead to a growing consciousness, which could ultimately prove fatal for the regime. However, currently the Islamists have not been able to challenge successfully the monarchy's traditional legitimacy and its rituals of power. This has led to a shift in their strategy of opposition to the monarchy from a war of maneuver to a war of position, in which they act as watchdog for Islamic accountability at the state level. Islamists have established themselves as credible challengers for state and regime in the Muslim world. The resurgence of Islamism has been paralleled by a theoretical interest in the study of political Islam and Islamic activism, its goals and strategies.

A Topology of Islamists in Morocco

The religious arena in Morocco is rife with symbols and contested sacred territories. Religion is perhaps the most important locus of conflict, both hidden and public, and its core issues deal with questions of legitimacy, sovereignty, and continuity. Religion in Morocco remains a core channel of exercising authority for the monarchy that builds its legitimacy on several religious symbols and rituals of power, and for other civil and political institutions that resort to religion to register their positive participation in the general state system.

Monopoly of religion and religious discourse is, therefore, crucial for all political actors in Morocco. The religious movement in Morocco was on the whole a partner in the process of state building, and the monarchy has traditionally relied on an alliance with different religious groups.[16] This general interest in religion by different actors provides for a conceptual ambiguity of how to define Islamists in Morocco. Are they those co-opted by the state within its governmental institutions? Or are they those parties that have adopted the rules of the political game as dictated by the regime? Or maybe they are those that still refuse to have any political participation in the monarchical political system? Lastly, can one also include those clandestine radical groups who adopt violent means and perpetrated the terrorist attacks in Casablanca in 2003?

The historical evolution of the Islamist movement in Morocco is seen as a function of the overall development of the state religious discourse with its Sufi interpretations, and the subsequent reaction and contestation of state monopoly of religious symbols. This has yielded a variegated religious map in Morocco, in which we can distinguish between various types of Islamists and Islamic groups. For the purpose of conceptual clarity, this research identifies three Islamic elite groups in Morocco. First there is the traditional religious elite, comprised of Sufi mystics, lodges, and marabouts, which have historically forced a religious alliance with the monarchy and have legitimized its long rule. These elite use a particular form of folk Islam, which has particular relevance to the Moroccan experience and which consists of ritualized daily practices of Sufi Islam. Folkloric Islam has been bureaucratized within the state and its spiritual symbols still feature in today's monarchical rituals of power.[17]

Next to the Sufi mystic Islamic groups are the elite that represent official Islam in Morocco. State religious officials are the guardians of religious authority and are fully co-opted in the state apparatus comprised of the various religious city councils, grand Muftis, and religious establishment of the ʻulama under the aegis of the High Council of the ʻulama and the Ministry of Habous (Religious Endowment) and Religious Affairs. The official religious elite is highly structured and is characterized by its utter submission to the interests of the state, as its raison d'etre remains the extension of state's official religious discourse. State religious officials promote the various symbolic representations of the monarchy as commander of the faithful, sharif, and the sole sovereign over religious authority in Morocco.

The Ministry of Habous and Religious Affairs is the principal organ and catalyst in the process of ritualization of the public discourse. Its

agents of official state Islam constantly cultivate this religious dimension to the political authority in Morocco through several means such as during the Friday prayer sermon in mosques, religious ceremonies, literature, and through special programs on the state television channels and radio stations. Mosques are particularly important channels through which the state disseminates the religious authority and consecrates the legitimacy of the monarchy. Mosques are an integral part of the state's policy of bureaucratizing religion in Morocco. Thus, imams of mosques are all appointed by the state and are part of its religious bureaucracy. The Ministry of Religious Affairs is hierarchically organized into five directorates that govern anything religious from mosques to religious education. Religious sermons delivered during the weekly Friday prayers are written by the state and usually cover a whole range of political, social, and economic issues. The bureaucratization of religion is manifested in state control of religious sermons and mosques, which are only open during times of prayer to undercut any religious movement's ability to use the mosque as tools of social mobilization.

This cultivation of the religious discourse through the bureaucratization of religion endows the regime with legitimacy, and placates the Islamist opposition. This also "surrounds the regime with an aura of holiness, which takes for granted the legitimacy of the monarchy, rather than submit the issue as an intellectual and polemical question."[18] Cultivation of the holy stature of the monarchy leads to the production of various symbols and rituals of power. As one of the foremost observers of Islam and politics in Morocco asserts, no political regime can stabilize its political authority without rendering its legitimacy axiomatic for both society and political elite.[19] This observation is confirmed in all elite interviews carried out in Morocco. Political officials have maintained the idea of the monarchy as sacrosanct and its religious legitimacy as a given.

In addition to Sufi Muslim groups and the official Muslim elite, the third group in Morocco's religious map features various Islamist groups, which share a concern with the plight of the Moroccan society and call for the adoption of Islamic laws and teachings. The Islamists in Morocco are not a homogeneous group, as they differ in their strategies and approaches to the state authority. Four main Islamist trends are manifested by Moroccan: the da'wa, political participation, rejection/exclusion, and radical militancy. These trends and strategies mirror the broad manifestations of Islamism in the Muslim world in general and the predispositions of committed Islamists, whether they are social Islamists concerned with promoting Islamic spirituality

through joint collective action or political Islamists using Islamic symbols and identity in a quest to establish an Islamic state.[20]

Da'wist Islamist groups in Morocco such as Jama'at ad-Da'wa wa Tabligh, are social Islamists that are not overtly politically active and limit their discourse to advising on the proper everyday Islamic practices and rituals. Da'wists owe their intellectual formation to international origins of Islamist activism in the Muslim world. For instance Jama'at ad-Da'wa wa Tabligh is deeply influenced by Pakistani Jama'at i-Islami of Mawdudi.[21] The group does not contest the religious authority of the monarchy and does not question its rituals of power. The da'wists' leading figure was a mosque imam in Tangier named Fqih Abd al-Bari al-Zamzami, who had a large following of laborers and shopkeepers. His sermons, sold in audio cassettes, deal with a wide range of Islamic matters of individual piety and religious righteousness.[22]

Unlike the da'wists, Islamists in the political participation approach have taken advantage of state political reforms as they have become regular contenders in the elections and active within the political system. The 'Adala wa Tanmiya exemplifies this inclusionary approach. Not all Islamists have joined the political system in Morocco, others, such as'Adl wal Ihsane, have refused to take part in the political game because of its rejection of political system and the rules of inclusion as set by the regime. This group has adopted a post-Islamist educational strategy in order to achieve a true Islamic society and never fails to register its resistance to state policies.

Finally, militant Islamists are a growing but small category in Morocco. Such groups are inspired by international Jihadist movement led by Al-Qaeda. They share Al-Qaeda's literalist Wahhabi interpretations of the Qur'an and share their messianic vision for a radical transformation of the world in the image of Islam. In Morocco, *Salafiyya Jihadiyya* (Jihadist salafis/revivalists) and its members are the self-appointed apostle of Jihad, who seek a radical transformation of state and society. Its leading ideologues, Hassan Kettani, Mohamed Fizazi, and Abdelouhab Rafiki (aka Abou Hafs), have been jailed since 2003 after the Casablanca attacks.[23] This group, allegedly part of the Al-Qaeda network in North Africa, serves as an umbrella organization for various clandestine militant cells that seek to topple the existing political order and establish an Islamic state. This group views society as Jahili, which is a pre-Islamic pagan state of ignorance that warrants a violent Jihadist response.[24] Although all these Islamist groups are important in their influence on society and the state, this research focuses primarily on two groups in the

political participation and rejection/exclusion strand, since they are the only visible groups that mounted in the past a challenge to the state monopoly over religious discourse. Although somewhat similar in their goal to establish an Islamic state, the exemplar of these two strand—'Adl wal Ihsane and 'Adala wa Tanmiya—differ in the context within which they operate and strategies they have adopted. The former, led by Abdessalam Yassine, has adopted a militant path, refusing any rapprochement with the state. The latter has, since 1997, been part of the Moroccan parliament, opting for a less exclusionary strategy than that of 'Adl wal Ihsane.

Early Political Islam in Morocco

Morocco's Islamist revival is relatively recent and dates back to the early 1970s and, in general, Moroccan Islamists are less violent than their counterparts in some of the Muslim societies in the Middle East. This is remarkable given the degree of violence that has engulfed neighboring Algeria in the last decade. Islamist movements seem to have chosen a "more moderate path that emphasizes public dialogue and discourse rather than confrontation and violence."[25] With the exception of *Jam'iyyat al-Shabiba al-Islamiya* (Association of Islamic Youth), founded by Abdelkrim Moutii and Kamal Ibrahim in 1972, the Islamist movement has followed different peaceful strategies towards the regime and state in Morocco. These strategies reflect varying reaction to the monarchy's traditional legitimacy and the Islamists' failure to challenge its cultural hegemonic power as the sole religious sovereignty in the country.

The first Islamist movement in Morocco, the Islamic Youth Association, was a reaction to leftist and Arab nationalist ideologies, which threatened to sweep Morocco's society during the highly tumultuous years of Nasser's pan-Arab propaganda. Ironically, Abdelkrim Moutii, the founder the association, was himself a member of the socialist National Union of Popular Forces, who grew disillusioned with the party's secular policies. The Islamic Youth Association (IYA) was widely successful in recruiting students and professionals in the first years of its existence between 1972 and 1975. Their success was due largely to the dual strategy of its leadership of pandering to the state's discourse of religious education and apolitical activism while launching a crusade to fight leftist secular tendencies in Morocco. The association was prominent in calling for the Arabization of education, fighting un-Islamic practices in society, and implementing Islamic laws in societal affairs.

Moutii's war against Marxists culminated in the infamous assassination of leftist activist Oman Ben Jelloun in 1975. This act was detrimental to the association as its leader, who was later sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment, fled the country. Once in exile in Belgium, Moutii's rhetoric became more radical, denounced the monarchy's religious authority, and called for the establishment of an Islamic republic.[26] Moutii continues to live outside Morocco and unlike his early pronouncements, he has shifted his rhetoric from directly combating the monarchy's traditional legitimacy to a more theological contestation of the Islamist movements' strategies. Muhammed Darif, one of the foremost scholars of political Islam in Morocco, observes that Moutii is not interested in changing the system through the use of violence. Instead, he "has been transformed into a theoretician endeavoring to formulate a new vision of political Islam."[27]

In the late 1970s, the IYA later disappeared due to state repression and internal disputes, which saw some of its former members led by Abdelillah Ben Kirane, form the *Jama'at al-Islamiya* (Islamic group) in 1983. From its very inception, the Jema'a announced its rupture with Moutii's IYA and committed to participating in the political system as a legal political party.[28] The group was forced to change its nomenclature several times to obscure any Islamic references. A decade later, Ben Kirane's group of former IYA members regrouped under the banner of the *Harakat al-Tawhid wal-Islah* (Movement for Unification and Reform), which joined forces with Abdelkrim Khatib, a former resistance leader, to form the largest and first legal Islamist political party in Morocco, 'Adala wa Tanmiya, which along with 'Adl wal Ihsane constitute the two most prominent Islamist groups in Morocco.[29]

Despite different views of the religious authority of the monarchy, both the 'Adala wa Tanmiya and 'Adl wal Ihsane agree that one of the biggest impediments to their social mobilization and overall societal appeal is deeply held societal belief regime's traditional legitimacy and its attendant rituals of power. These symbols clutter the public space making it difficult for the Islamists to project alternative views and symbols that could challenge and contest monarchical hegemony in the public sphere. Monarchical religious legitimacy has established the institution above any reproach socially and politically. As such, social, political, and economic problems are blamed on the government, while the monarchy is immune from any opposition. This view of the monarchy as well as the disciplinary coercive approach of the state have led to the stability of the regime in Morocco, which is

largely challenged in a passive war of position whereby the opposition does not seek a change in the existing political order.

Interviews were also instrumental in suggesting alternative ways to approach some of the key variables in this study. For instance, the concept of baraka, viewed in chapter three as an abstract power wielded by charismatic leaders, was contested by a member of the 'Adala wa Tanmiya in Marrakech, who instead views it as a form of tangible power manifested in relationships, most of which are shifting and largely affected by political processes. Baraka, for my interviewee, is "political, religious and is observed in royal ceremonies and governmental discourse. It gives royal authority a sacred dimension as everything we do in the political system is bestowed upon us through the Baraka of *Sidna*."[30] Baraka, henceforth, is politicized and is a fluid concept subject to multiple usages in the public discourse in Morocco.

The interviews confirm what has been labeled in the literature as post-Islamism, in which Islamism in the Muslim world is said to have reached its end.[31] Islamists, accordingly, are "shifting towards practical and ideological compromises vis-à-vis politics."[32] Post-Islamism posits the failure of Islamism to challenge the state in the Muslim world. In Morocco, this failure has led to the adoption of alternative strategies for dissent. 'Adl wal Ihsane's discursive methods seek to rehabilitate its mystic origins and focus on individual moral and spiritual change, while 'Adala wa Tanmiya exemplifies the growing trend of Islamist electoral and institutional contestation. In this trend, post-Islamists have tempered their rhetoric towards the state and feature less radical goals than their Islamist predecessors. While post-Islamism scholars do not discuss the reason behind the failure of Islamists beyond the coercion and state's institutional manipulation, this study argues that in Morocco, this failure is largely due to their inability to challenge the regime's religious authority and its societal belief in its rituals of power.

A Mystic Rebel: Abdessalam Yassine's Post-Islamist Vision

The best known Moroccan Islamist, Abdessalam Yassine, now 79 years old, came to the forefront of the political scene in 1974 after he sent his famous epistle to Hassan II "Islam or the Deluge," in which he challenged the king's religious legitimacy and called on him to rule in accordance to Islamic laws and principles. Yassine had six particular pieces of advice in his open letter: (1) adopt Islamic laws

and forsake any Western secular trends in politics and society; (2) all Islamic rulers have to repent their sins and commit to Islamic socio-political reforms; (3) rulers have to redistribute their wealth among all Muslims in a just and fair manner; (4) dissolve all political parties and choose a high religious shura council made of Muslim scholars and clerics; (5) to adopt an Islamic-inspired economic system and to ban all forms of socialist and capitalist economic models; (6) a general public redemption, by which all Western secular manifestations that are contradictory to Islam are banned.[33]

In his epistle, Yassine's discourse is particularly bold and vociferous as he held the monarchy accountable for all societal and economic problems. In all my interviews with members of the Yassine's group, their spiritual leader's epistle is always singled out as a turning point in the group's struggle against the regime. Yassine's courage in sending this "unprecedented letter sought to demystify the king and his religious authority," says one member in Marrakech.[34]

After writing this letter, Abdessalam Yassine was expecting death as a martyr; instead, he was sent to a psychiatric hospital for three years. In 1983, he was sentenced to two more years in prison. Ultimately, he was sentenced to house arrest in 1989. Faced with mounting repression, the Islamic movement in Morocco went into abeyance that lasted until the late 1990s. This abeyance compelled the Islamic movement to keep a low profile and to engage more in informal political activities mostly confined within mosques and university campuses.

Yassine's religious formation was largely mystical within the Boutchichiya Sufi order.[35] However, by 1973, Yassine left the Boutchichi order and formed, along with some former Boutchichi members, *Ousrat al-Jama'a* (Family of the Community) in 1981. Ousrat was a religious association primarily devoted to religious education and spiritual predication. According to Darif, Yassine's association was also a reaction to his failure to unite all Moroccan Islamists under one activist banner.[36] The association published *al- Jama'a* journal around a new clandestine political association by the same name in 1983. The new association sought social activism and fought for political existence, which was repeatedly denied by the state. *Al-Jama'a* was very critical of societal depravation and corrupt political leaders, charging that,

> in our country, the citizens who respect the time of prayer at work are threatened with dismissal. Now it is the apostates, the sinners and the drunks who govern the country while the real believers are prevented

> from practicing their religion. The management of politics and the economy is the prerogative of a class of exploiters. The precepts of God are pushed aside.[37]

Yassine's condemnation of Moroccan elite and government's corrupt practices is widely popular in society, but was largely considered taboo. While critical of society, Yassine rejects Qutb's and other radical Islamists' notion of a Jahili Muslim society, characterized by a departure from the principles of the Islamic faith and a substitution of human for divine sovereignty. Instead, Yassine suggests that Moroccan society is in a state of *fitna* (faith):[38]

> We live in a fitna, not in a Jahili era. Even though there are those among us and among our leaders who are apostates, our ummah [Islamic community] is still that of our master Mohammed, its core Islamic beliefs are intact and Jahili beliefs cannot penetrate it.[39]

Similarly, Yassine does not share Qutb's radical Jihadist solutions for changing existing political orders. Yassine believes that the tribulations of fitna are due to the inability of state leaders to follow the true path of Islam and that there is still hope to reform Muslim societies peacefully if Islamic teachings are properly followed.[40]

Building on his rising popularity, Yassine formally established 'Adl wal Ihsane in 1987 with religious and political goals.[41] The association is largely a protest group that appeals to a wide range of Moroccan people. Its success lies in the social services it provides for thousands of Moroccans in urban and rural areas. The association provides literacy courses and basic welfare in areas the state does not, especially in poor urban centers. The association has a strong base among university students and in the main cities. In the suburbs of the big cities, for instance, 'Adl wal Ihsane and its associations encourage women to wear the veil by offering better health care than the state. The association is increasingly gaining followers in the shantytowns in Tangiers, Rabat, Marrakech, and Casablanca. Its Charities run blood banks, help people organize funerals and, on feast days, they offer lamb to the needy.[42]

Much of the support of the association is attributed to Yassine's leadership and his Sufi influences that focus on moral and spiritual programs, which make it more attractive to a wider following, especially within the middle and lower classes, civil servants, peasants, and workers. These classes have always been recruits of the Sufi order. Yassine is also an intellectual force and a prolific Islamic scholar.

Between 1975 and 1989, he published 15 works of religious syntheses and commentaries on Sufism, state, Marxism, secularism, and nationalism. For instance, His *al Minhaj Annabawi* (the Prophetic Way) is a masterpiece synthesis of Sufism in Islam and an excellent analysis of Hassan al-Banna's and Sayyid Qutb's ideas, which have influenced Islamist activism in the Muslim world.

Adl wal Ihsane has been allowed to transform into a political party since 1989, the same year its leader Abdessalam Yassine was put under house arrest. It is also true that the king has issued an invitation for the movement to participate in the political system. However, the association still refuses to take part in the rules of the game as stipulated in the current system. However it is informally active through its many offshoot associations. For example, the Association's League for the Protection of the Family was one of the principal catalysts behind the famous Casablanca rally in protest of the king's planned reforms of the Mudawanna in 2000.

In February 2000, 'Adl wal Ihsane issued a public reprimand to the newly enthroned king Muhammad VI. Abdessalam Yassine posted a memorandum to "The King of the Poor." In this memorandum, 'Adl wal Ihsane broke the taboo on discussion of the royal wealth and appealed to Muhammad VI to repatriate his father's alleged $40 billion fortune to pay off the national debt (estimated at $17 billion). Yassine also criticized the traditional ceremony of allegiance to the king's bay'a which he described as "an abomination and sacrilegious."[43] He concluded with these words: "I wish the young king plenty of courage and, as I bid him farewell, I repeat to him: redeem your poor father from torment by giving back to the people the things that belong to them by right. Redeem yourself! Repent! Fear the king of kings!"[44]

Twenty years earlier, the king's father Hassan II, had Yassine dispatched to a mental asylum for similar talk. This time the Internet site was briefly removed from the web. In the wake of the incident, the state Ministry for Religious Affairs made the official league of "ulama" denounce Yassine. However, a month later the traditionalists were at the Casablanca rally marching together with his supporters.

On May 14, 2000, Sheikh Abdessalam Yassine was freed from his house arrest after several appeals from some members of the government and also after much pressure from international organizations. Despite his release, Yassine's movement is still tightly controlled. Prior to his release, Yassine's discourse was that of a militant Islamist against Zionism and any state attempt to co-opt his association into

the government. Yassine views the government as a corrupt and unfair entity that is not worthy of his alliance.

After his release, Yassine appeared to be less militant in his discourse. Now he is the picture of quiescence. So far his movement has kept a low profile vis-à-vis the state. In a press conference after his release, a journalist asked Yassine what his political agenda now was. Yassine evaded the question and said: " 'Adl wal Ihsane is a movement focused on spiritual education, not a political party . . . but we are partly interested in politics".[45] The 'Adl wal Ihsane still questions the monarch's religious authority, and still demands the implementation of Shari'a laws. 'Adl wal Ihsane's discursive shift is a strategic calculation and an outcome of their failure to challenge the Islamic foundations of the monarchy in Morocco. The survey results suggest that their attempt to demystify the monarchy is largely unappealing in society, as the majority of the sample showed great support for the monarchy's traditional and religious sources of legitimacy.[46] This constitutes one of the impediments to social mobilization as interviews with members of the association suggest. Adl wal Ihsane is in a transitional phase towards remodeling its strategy of dissent.

In interviews with representatives of 'Adl wal Ihsane, members were keen to share some of their historical struggle with the regime since the 1970s. In all of the interviews, they described state repression and decried "corrupt un-Islamic practices"[47] rampant in society at large. In fact, in all interviews with members of 'Adl wal Ihsane themes of corruption and lack of Islamic values in society and government were important.

'Adl wal Ihsane still does not recognize the religious authority of the monarchy, because "it does not rest on the sovereignty of the people within an Islamic context."[48] For 'Adl wal Ihsane, the new political system should rest upon "the supremacy of Allah's commandments and principles of Islamic social justice."[49] However, members of 'Adl wal Ihsane interviewed do not support an outright overthrow of the current monarchical regime. Rather, they seek "a political system that is Islamic, in which the king is upholding the articles of the Islamic faith within the boundaries of Allah's Shari'a."[50]

One of the members of 'Adl wal Ihsane in Rabat expressed his utter disgust with what he called "the false appropriation of religious symbols,"[51] cultivated by the regime. Symbols of baraka, prophetic lineage, and rituals of power such as bay'a do not make the monarch a legitimate leader; rather, they are misused for purely political reasons and to "sanctify the ruling family."[52] Nor did this member recognize the Moroccan king as commander of the faithful. Interviewees from

'Adl wal Ihsane were particularly critical of bay'a as a symbol of submission, as one member argues: "I think that the ceremony of bay'a and its ritualization through TV broadcasts inculcates a relationship of domination in society. Since this relationship, symbolically, in the minds of Moroccans is like that of a father and son. It is also a position of servitude of subject towards the king as the holder of power."[53] This view of bay'a strips it from its religious significance and exemplifies 'Adl wal Ihsane's condemnation of it as a ritual of power.

However, group members expressed their frustration with these symbols, which they contend are falsely used, still garner wide societal belief in Morocco. In the words of a member in Casablanca: "It is difficult to argue against the religious legitimacy of the king with a predominantly illiterate society. Even if those religious rituals are un-Islamic, they do have importance for Moroccans and do minimize our ability to articulate our message."[54] 'Adl wal Ihsane's message is "not political" maintained another member of 'Adl in Rabat, "it is a social Islamic association with political goals in the future . . . goals, which include steering society back on the right path of Islam."[55]

This societal belief in the religious legitimacy of the monarchy hinders their penetration of the religious public sphere and their social mobilization capabilities. Ultimately, 'Adl wal Ihsane is unable to shake the aura of the king as the legitimate religious authority in Morocco. Thus, the group concedes religious legitimacy to the monarchy and focuses more on challenging the state and governmental actions from outside the political system, but still within the public sphere in a discursive positionary struggle that centers on religious and spiritual education. Ultimately, the association hopes to provide an alternative religious example to the regime's religious hegemony, which could help demystify the regime.

The association is largely positioning themselves as a watchdog movement "against secular and western corrupt manifestations in our Moroccan Islamic society."[56] Yassine's shift of strategy signals a return of the aging rebel to his mystic origins. Yassine has recently espoused Sufi mystic ideology in seeking a radical transformation of the individual rather than state and society. Yassine's discursive war of position focuses largely on the spiritual and ethical dimensions of Islam. Yassine is much closer to the da'wist discourse than before as he emphasizes the "re-Islamization of society,"[57] rather than adopting a confrontationist stand towards the state and regime in Morocco. For Yassine, Islamists' focus on Islamizing the state is only possible and more meaningful if coupled by a deep Islamic reformation of society and individuals. Such reformation can only be achieved through

spiritual education and guidance, as one member states: "our future path is one of Islamic education and to serve as the Islamic conscience of society against government's corruption."[58]

Despite a long history of state coercion, 'Adl wal Ihsane's uncompromising language has generated sympathy and has drawn supporters to the association. 'Adl wal Ihsane has been steadily reaching into the educational system, enlisting high school teachers and university students. It is estimated that most student leaders of the country's 14 universities belong to the 'Adl wal Ihsane. Competing for the same constituency is the parliamentary party 'Adala wa Tanmiya led by AbdelKarim Khatib and Abdelillah BenKirane.

'Adala wa Tanmiya: Islamist Democrats?

'Adala wa Tanmiya was founded by former IYA and its splinter Jama'at al-Islamiyya members led by Abdelillah Ben Kirane. In 1994, Ben Kirane's Jama'at regrouped under the banner of the Harakat al-Tawhid wal-Islah, which joined forces with Abdelkrim Khatib, a former nationalist leader, to form the party of 'Adala wa Tanmiya . On social issues the party is surprisingly more conservative than its rival Adl wal Ihsane. 'Adala wa Tanmiya also claims leading scholars and university professors among its members. 'Adala wa Tanmiya took part in the 1997 legislative election and won just nine of parliament's 325 seats.[59] Operating within the Moroccan legislative branch, 'Adala wa Tanmiya set itself as the defender of the faith and public morality, scolding the government for tolerating interest on money (*riba)* and alcohol. Like the 'Adl wal Ihsane, they do not attack the religious identity of the Moroccan monarchy. Instead they advocate working within the regime's legal and constitutional framework.[60]

The party is committed to a nonviolent path and their agenda centers on two main goals: reviving Islamic culture and values in Moroccan society, and working with the regime within the principle of "critical support."[61] Under this principle, the party supports the government but at the same time it serves as a watchdog for the implementation of Islamic laws. The party's means of dissemination consist of a Fatwa hotline and pamphlets that are issued in response to questions from the public that range from what makes righteous government to how much flesh women should bare in the streets. So far, the party has only served as a critic of the government's sluggish performance in economy and its failures in providing social services to the Moroccan people. Many Moroccans feel that the party's success in getting nine members in parliament could not have happened

without a helping hand from the authorities, who were anxious to draw support away from its rival 'Adl wal Ihsane.[62]

Much like Yassine's association, 'Adala wa Tanmiya starts from a conservative ideological Islamist discourse much similar to that made by Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb's Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. However, 'Adala wa Tanmiya differs from Qutbist discourse in its opposition to violence. 'Adala wa Tanmiya's discourse reflects Hassan al-Banna's strategy of positioning the Muslim brotherhood parallel to the state in order to "to work for the reform of our selves, of our hearts and souls, by connecting them to God the all-high; then to organize our society so that it becomes a virtuous community which calls for the good and forbids evildoing, then from the community will arise the good state."[63] This strategy is reminiscent of Gramscian passive revolution that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, like the 'Adala wa Tanmiya in Morocco, have adopted in their attempt to change the state and its structures through cultivating a solid associational character and a strong commitment to social mobilization within the institutions of civil society.[64]

Theologically, 'Adala wa Tanmiya also differs from Qutbist Jahili discourse. On the applicability of the Shari'a law, for instance, 'Adala wa Tanmiya maintains a progressive view of the Islamic law and argues, "Shari'a law ought to be informed by the context of the times in which the community lives, not by literal hasty interpretations of sacred texts."[65] This opinion mirrors the general view of Shari'a for the 'Adala wa Tanmiya and its absence from the general charter of the party.

Both parties have adopted the same slogans made by their counterparts in the Middle East. Their major objective is the establishment of a truly Muslim society and an Islamic state through legal channels of reform, namely "the Islamic education of the individual, promotion of the integrity of the family, and the incorporation of Islamic values into the whole society."[66] Both movements have become important in the Moroccan society and have taken advantage of the government's limitations and inability to provide basic social services to its people. They also have similar means of disseminating their ideas and of recruiting supporters. Both rely on their publications and sources of communications such as the Internet to reach their supporters.

It is worth noting here that both the 'Adala wa Tanmiya's and 'Adl wal Ihsane's discourse has undergone certain changes before and after the initiation of the state's liberalization reforms. Prior to this process, both movements, especially Yassine's 'Adl wal Ihsane, challenged the authority of the king. 'Adl wal Ihsane claims that the

king's authority does not conform to the Islamic laws of Shari'a. One member of Al 'Adl stated that "the monarchy has not adopted any Islamic laws in the penal code or economic laws of the land. Even the Mudawanna (family code) is not un-Islamic."[67] The movement also had an anti-West discourse articulated by its leader Yassine in his own periodical "*Al-Jama'a*," which has been banned since 1985 for its critical and militant tone. According to his anti-Western discourse, Yassine views the West as undermining the Islamic faith and as constantly waging a cultural war on Islam. Yassine also claims that this Western "satanic" cultural invasion is taking the form of media campaigns against the Islamic faith.[68]

After the initiation of the process of liberalization in Morocco, both movements have changed their discourse and strategies. Both focus more on social issues such as, poverty, solidarity, and education. However, both movements diverged in the strategies they use to achieve their goals. 'Adl wal Ihsane has remained loyal to its path of nonrapprochement with the state and is largely discursive in its dissent of the state and the regime. 'Adala wa Tanmiya has, however, transformed itself into a political party and has moderated its agenda to take advantage from electoral opportunities and to work for social and political reforms within the political system.

Interviews with 'Adala wa Tanmiya members reveal a highly nuanced approach to the regime's religious authority and its rituals of power. On the one hand, they have no objection to the monarchy's religious authority and do concede that the monarch is the commander of the faithful. On the other hand, they call on the monarchy "to honor that title" and exercise that religious authority in accordance to Islamic laws.[69] 'Adala wa Tanmiya members interviewed expressed no dissent about the monarchy's rituals of power and recognize them as specific cultural traits of Morocco. In the words of a high ranking 'Adala wa Tanmiya member of the parliament: "the monarchy holds religious power and traditional authority, which has the support of the Moroccan public."[70] 'Adala wa Tanmiya representatives were also quick to note that Morocco's religious-based political system and the monarch's religious legitimacy should be used to further and highlight that "unique Muslim civilizational heritage."[71] Such heritage rests upon certain symbols and "Islamic" manifestations of power. For instance, a 'Adala wa Tanmiya member of the city council in Marrakech views bay'a as

> a legitimate Islamic bond between the ruler of this ummah (Islamic community) and the Moroccan people. It is also through bay'a that

> Amir al-mu'minin (commander of the faithful) shows his commitment to honor its content, by defending the faith and ruling in accordance with Islamic laws.[72]

In terms of their political action, 'Adala wa Tanmiya members expressed that they have to compete constantly with monarchical religious legitimacy, which is an impediment to their social mobilization. Using their Islamic discourse "inevitably clashes with the monarchy's religious legitimacy and is something that we don't view as an impediment to democracy. What we want is for the monarchy to cooperate with political actors for the general good."[73] Unlike 'Adl wal Ihsane's purely discursive opposition to the regime, the 'Adala wa Tanmiya has adopted an institutional strategy that seeks to challenge the state within the political system and rules of political inclusion set by the regime.

In the absence of a meaningful challenge to the legitimacy of the monarchy, the 'Adala wa Tanmiya has turned to contesting government corruption and un-Islamic practices. A member of the 'Adala wa Tanmiya expressed that the 'Adala wa Tanmiya's goals are "to take part in the political process during this transition period in order to fight corrupt un-Islamic trends in the government and bring about meaningful political, social and economic reforms through institutional and peaceful means."[74] Another member of the 'Adala wa Tanmiya compares the party to "the Christian Democratic parties in Europe, whose platforms are informed by their Christian principles…our party is a civil and nationalist political party with an Islamic point of view."[75] While 'Adala wa Tanmiya is committed to constructive participation in the political system, they are frustrated with the "lack of state commitment to true democratic change and past cosmetic sheepish reforms"[76]

The 'Adala wa Tanmiya's institutional positionary strategy was manifested in 2002 when the party broke their support of the socialist-led government of Abderrahmane El Youssoufi and his party Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), which came to power along with other smaller socialist and nationalist parties in the aftermath of 1997 legislative elections as the first opposition party to gain power in Morocco. According to former 'Adala wa Tanmiya party leader Abdelillah Ben Kirane, the lack of support was due to the failure of the socialist-led government to fight corruption in the Moroccan bureaucracy and legal system, and its lack of commitment to the process of democratization. However, many observers saw this rupture as a strategy of the party to regain its supporters and to reach out to

more Moroccans, who are increasingly following the 'Adl wal Ihsane Association.

In a previous interview with Abdelillah Ben Kirane, he denied these claims and maintained that this break up with the government was intended as protest against the political, social, and economic failures of the government. This strategy paid dividends in the 2002 parliamentary elections, in which the party received 12.92% percent of the votes and 42 seats in the 325-member Chamber of Deputies.[77]

'Adala wa Tanmiya continues to be an important oppositional force in the political system. In the recent legislative elections of September 2007, the party managed second place in seats after the nationalist Istiqlal party. 'Adala wa Tanmiya won 46 out of the 325 seats in the lower house of the parliament and is the major opposition bloc in the political system. Many observers of Moroccan politics view the latest elections as a failure for the 'Adala wa Tanmiya, whose leader Sa'ad Eddine Othmani, prior to the elections, predicted to gain a landslide victory and the first Islamist government in the history of Morocco. The failure of the 'Adala wa Tanmiya in the last elections is probably due to its lack of reach and support in rural areas. Election results show that the majority of the seats won by the party were in predominantly urban areas.

Conclusions

This chapter examines the effects of the ritualization of the political process on opposition forces in Morocco. In particular, this chapter focuses on the Islamist challenge to monarchical religious authority and its rituals of power. After a review of the study of political Islam and Islamic activism in the Middle East, the study suggests a rethinking of the notion of civil society, and introduces the concept of the public sphere as an arena of intense contestation over cultural ideas and symbols of political authority. The public sphere is much more encompassing of the dynamics of state-society relations than the notion of civil society. The public sphere in Muslim societies is the informal space of political and social contestation. It is the locus where various opposition groups try to penetrate and demystify the existing dominant cultural hegemony. This informal sector is more appropriate in the study of the dynamics of cultural hegemony at play in the Moroccan case.

Modern Islamist activism in Morocco displays interesting characteristics that signal a shift in position from early political Islam in Morocco. Today, Islamists' goals are not solely institutional, and they do not seek to capture the state as much of the literature focuses on,

instead, their aim is to change society and contest the major symbols that legitimate the regime control of people's lives. Through extensive interviews with members of the two leading Islamist groups in Morocco, the chapter argues that the monarchy's religious authority and its rituals of power impede Islamists' social and political mobilization abilities and their penetration of Moroccan society, which largely believes in the monarchy as the only legitimate authority.

The strategies of Islamists in Morocco feature a Gramscian "passive revolution" in which they seek to capture society and its moral and symbolic elements.[78] This grand shift of strategy from institutional to symbolic contestation is largely due to the Islamists' failure to contest the regime's religious and traditional authority, which has been reinvigorated by state's rituals of power. State rituals of power and the state's disciplinary powers have served to set the monarchy above the public space and to weaken opposition discursive and institutional strategies towards the monarchy. The prevalence of this cultural and social hegemony stabilizes the political order. The weakness of the social mobilization abilities of political actors contributes to the stability and resilience of the regime in Morocco.

6

General Conclusions

This research provides a culturally grounded explanation to the survival of the monarchy and persistence of authoritarianism in Morocco. In doing so, it de-emphasizes, but does not ignore the institutional factors that may have contributed to the monarchy's success in Morocco. This research suggests that those institutional variables are to be understood within a cultural context, which takes into account the tremendous religious and charismatic capital that the monarchy has in Morocco. Thus, the monarchy has continually mixed this traditional discourse, to fend off the Islamist challenge, with a more modern rhetoric, to address the more secular opposition manifested through the major political parties. This discourse makes use of particular rituals of power (ROPs) with tremendous appeal in society.

The ritualization of the political process is the use of ceremonies, spectacles, and public performances as state ROPs to advance a positive iconographic and hagiographic account of the king as the arbiter and guarantor of order and stability. The use of the ROPs of bay'a, Prophetic lineage, commander of the faithful, and baraka clutter the public sphere and hinder the mobilization capabilities of opposition forces (i.e., Islamists), economize on the use of violence, and foster a duality in perception of the state in Morocco. More importantly, ROPs are effective as they alter oppositional forces' strategies.

Field research and extensive interviews with members of the two leading Islamist groups in Morocco suggest that ROPs set the monarchy in society as the sole religious sovereign above political contestations in the public sphere. The ritualization of the public discourse has forced a shift in the grand strategy of the Islamists, who are engaged in a Gramscian war of position. Consequently, Islamists are not pursuing a resurrectionist war to topple the state. Instead, they have established themselves as a "shadow opposition" trying to mitigate the authoritarian effects of the state on society.

The Islamists' war of position exists along a purely spiritual-social and political gradient that reflects the strategies adopted by the various political actors in Morocco. 'Adl wal Ihsane's is purely *discursiv*e and focuses on cultivating spiritual and religious education through community social services. 'Adala wa Tanmiya's war of position is *discursive/institutional* as it seeks to foster an Islamic society institutionally through electoral contests.

The strategies of Islamists in Morocco feature a Gramscian "passive revolution," in which they seek to capture society but not change the regime in an insurrectionist strategy.[1] State rituals of power and the state's disciplinary powers have served to depoliticize the public space and to weaken oppositionary discursive and institutional strategies towards the monarchy. The prevalence of this cultural and social hegemony provides for a peaceful and stable political order. The weakness of the social mobilization abilities of political actors contributes to the stability and resilience of the regime in Morocco.

In Morocco, there is an elite consensus on the spiritual-temporal supremacy of the regime. The ritualization of the public discourse effectively isolates political parties from any direct challenge to monarchical power. The regime's ability to co-opt new discursive bases of hegemony serves to clutter the public sphere, making it less susceptible to alternative discourses from opposition forces. The regime's recourse to coercion is less preferred and is subtler. Islamist and non-Islamist parties choose to take part in limited elections in order to position themselves within the political system and to negotiate the rules of game, with the hope of inducing the government into adopting liberal reforms. Political parties' behavior is a product of playing "games in multiple arenas," as they are simultaneously working within the rules and seeking to change them.[2]

Institutionalized Symbols as Cultural Frames

Rituals of power resonate in Morocco because they appeal to a cultural narrative that is well entrenched in the Moroccan political culture and identity. The task of studying these symbols and their impact on the political system is an empirical task, which seeks to trace how and why they resonate in the Moroccan sociopolitical arena. This study drew on the literature of social movement theory, and particularly its cultural framing processes, as a theoretical guide that could elucidate the impact of these symbols. According to this literature, sociocultural and

political frames are "interpretive schemata"[3] that resonate within local societies and explain much of sociopolitical dynamics of a given case.

Frames provide a tool for interpreting and "making sense of experiences and events in the 'world out there.'"[4] These frames are the mechanisms by which rituals and symbols are communicated to the society at large. They provide a social constructive process that generates support and collective action. Although much of the social movement literature is directed at social movements' capacity to build a rationale for collective action within perceived political opportunities by the state, this literature is relevant for the current study as it highlights the importance of cultural frames for political behavior. In fact, the proposed study examines the Islamist challenge to the monarchy as an instance where cultural frames are contested by the state, which provides its own cultural repertoires of legitimation that are based on institutionalized symbols of legitimacy.

Frames are especially effective when they resonate with local cultural, historical symbols, and identities. In Morocco, the cultural frames of bay'a, commander of the faithful, baraka, and sharifian lineage as part of the authority of the makhzen reverberate within the Moroccan local sociopolitical identity, and have always been accepted as integral parts of the monarch's legitimacy. The religious symbols have contributed to the mystification of the monarchy and have reinforced its "hierarchies of deference and dominance."[5] The metaphorical uses of institutions of authority, subsumed under the term makhzen, have elevated the monarchy above the political sphere as an arbiter among conflicting political forces in the country. Kings throughout the history of Morocco have always set themselves apart and above all temporal political or tribal conflicts. In these frames and cultural narratives, the king is painted as "the emblem of nation, the icon on which the whole gazes and constructs and experiences their commonality, even when the gazing is made in critique."[6]

The monarch is also the protector of the faith, a fact codified in the Moroccan constitution and monitored by the state through the ministry of religious affairs, which supervises the mosques, religious institutions, and appoints *imams*. The monarchical interpretation of Islam dominates Morocco's political discourse and as this study illustrates, religious legitimacy is the basis of the power of the monarch. This claim is buttressed by the monarch's claim of ancestral descent from the prophet's family, which makes him "God's shadow on earth."[7] This quasi-holy stature is consecrated in the bay'a, which Moroccan monarchs command from their subjects every year and is done following an old Islamic tradition of political succession.

The monarchy has proved resilient because its religious legitimacy is historically and culturally grounded in the political culture in Morocco, within the contours of the historical authority of the makhzen. The ethical-legal foundation and the function of the government are important for Arab monarchs, who fulfill their duties as Islamic rulers, defend the faith, implement Shari'a law, and guarantee order. Thus, Islamists in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco do not question the institution of the monarchy, but call for basic reform and renewal of the state and society following the Islamic law.[8]

Theoretical Contributions

The research makes two main theoretical contributions. First, the proposed study speaks of the debate on the prevalence of "monarchical authoritarianism" in the Middle East region. The dominant institutionalist approach to the prevalence of authoritarianism de-emphasize cultural variables as tertiary, whereas at the same time highlighting their role as survival tools, especially for monarchical regimes.[9] This research reintroduces cultural variables into this debate and focuses on the microdynamics of symbolic power. In so doing, the study examines the factors behind authoritarian monarchical survival and the resulting difficulties in establishing democratic rule in the Arab world.

Institutional explanations for regime survival in the Middle East emphasize the role of state institutional strategies—manipulation of political parties, Islamist groups, parliament, and press—as major variables.[10] Accordingly, monarchies in the Middle East face Islamist and other secular challenges through a careful process of liberalization. The stagnation of the political reforms is partly due to regime reluctance to undergo further reforms that may jeopardize its survival. These explanations are limited in the case of Morocco. While the regime substantially limited the political space of dissent for the Islamists, mainly by adopting the two strategies of confinement and co-optation, Islamist groups still managed to level a substantial challenge to the monarchy and its coalition, through considerable gains in electoral elections and a wide popular appeal. Chapters four and five show that in the public sphere, regime and oppositional forces have been engaged in the process of defining and redefining the rules of political inclusion.

In Morocco, the monarchy has been particularly successful in combining both institutionalized symbols of the monarch's legitimacy with political manipulation, coercion, and patronage. The monarchy

resorted to a process of liberalization to promote its "authoritarian pluralism."[11] Although the political system is ostensibly a multiparty system with an active civil society, in practice the various parties and forces operating within the system have always been under the effective control of the monarchy.[12] The monarchy has, to a great extent, been able to penetrate and co-opt civil associations. The regime has also been able to limit the boundaries of acceptable discourse about the political system.[13] Despite all these institutional manipulations, however, oppositional forces were at times able to contend regime's monopoly over state power.

Criticism of the monarchy historically has been restricted, and Moroccans, by and large, have been willing to abide by those restrictions. This is not only a result of regime's extensive coercive mechanisms; this is also explained in terms of the monarchy's ritualization of public discourse. The monarchy has been a sacrosanct institution that is above any reproach. This status, for instance, is clearly institutionalized in the Moroccan constitution, and emanates from its particular status within the historical authority of the makhzen.

The second theoretical contribution this study provides is an alternative way to conceptualize political legitimacy and power in the Middle East by revising the performance-popular belief thesis prevalent in the literature on legitimacy and assumed in the institutional approach to authoritarian survival in the Arab world. This thesis emphasizes the role of state performance and effectiveness to legitimacy, and equates political stability with popular belief and support of state effectiveness in fulfilling its functions, usually, in capitalist and democratic societies.[14]

The performance-popular belief thesis is not sufficient, since it runs into empirical difficulty. In Morocco, for instance, the monarchy still manages a stable political system, despite the state's lack of effectiveness and performance in managing the economy. According to the World Bank, 19% of the 31.9 million Moroccans live below poverty line (1999 estimates, an increase of 13% from 1991), 9.6% of Moroccans are unemployed (2008 estimates);[15] however, if we consider the scope of shadow economy and informal sector employment in Morocco, the rate is estimated to be above 20%. Morocco's annual growth rate in 2009 is 4.9%, a decrease from 7.8% in 2006.[16] In addition, Morocco's record in education is abysmal as the country has only a 56% adult literacy rate as of 2008.[17] The existence of socioeconomic challenges does not constitute a legitimacy deficit as many of the institutionalist explanations assume. The link between lagging

economic performance and legitimacy is not empirically established in the literature on monarchical authoritarian survival.

The survey conducted in Morocco confirms popular dissatisfaction with living conditions in general (95% of the sample surveyed in the greater Marrakech region). Given this high level of dissatisfaction, respondents' views of government performance are not surprising. The majority of respondents show little confidence in all institutions, except for the monarchy. This presents a puzzle for the literature on legitimacy, which presupposes a close link between state socioeconomic performance and legitimacy. Performance and popular satisfaction in Morocco do not translate well into legitimacy.

The survey suggests that the respondents hold governmental institutions and political parties accountable for the dire living conditions in Morocco, but not the king. Of the respondents, 65% either trust a lot or somewhat trust the king, compared to 71% lack of trust for local authorities. The validity of these findings could be established in view of other results about government performance. Survey respondents were openly critical of the state, but do believe that the monarchy is separate from the government and relatively immune from that criticism. Only 25% of the respondents expressed their distrust of the king.

A third contribution of this research suggests a rethinking of the notion of civil society, and introduces the concept of the public sphere as an arena of intense contestation over cultural ideas and symbols of political authority. The public sphere is much more encompassing of the dynamics of state-society relations than the notion of civil society. The notion of the public sphere is more appropriate in the study of the dynamics of cultural hegemony at play in the Moroccan case and in other Muslim societies. It is an arena where the informal space of political and social contestation takes place, and where various oppositional groups try to penetrate and demystify existing dominant cultural hegemony. This theoretical formulation on the concepts of civil society, the public sphere, and Gramscian hegemony constitute an important tool that could facilitate future research on the nature and dynamics of state-society relations in the Arab world.

Rituals of Power in the Arab World: Future Research Agenda?

While this book is principally directed at explaining the causes of the persistence of authoritarianism in Morocco, rituals of power exist in varying degrees in the rest of the Arab world as well. In Arab monarchical

regimes of the Gulf and the Hashemite monarchy of Jordan, various religious symbols of prophetic lineage, and custodianship of the Holy Mosques are used by Jordanian and Saudi monarchies respectively to generate legitimacy in their public sphere. These sources of religious legitimacy go back to the process of state building. Moreover, in Saudi Arabia, authority is invested in tribal leaders (Al-Saud family) by virtue of their close alliance with Wahabi religious teachings. Thus, rituals and symbols of power associated with this alliance are fertile grounds for future research on its effects on the dynamics of state and society relations. Future research on rituals of power is also warranted in Oman where, as in the case of Morocco, political authority has been vested in a sacrosanct leader within an imam-chief model congruent with Ibadi Muslim faith.[18] In other Gulf monarchies, rituals of power could be located in their strong tribal identities. In countries such as Qatar, Bahrain, and the U.A.E., tribalism has played an important role in the process of state building and is still a major characteristic of their dynastic political authority. Although, these monarchies do not base their authority on religious symbols, their tribal affiliation is an important factor in their political authority.

In the Arab republics, rituals of power are not religious or tribal, but personalistic. In her study of contemporary politics in Syria, Lisa Wedeen argues that among the various symbols that have served to buttress the predominance of the military wing of the Ba'th Party over the last three decades, none has proven more potent and durable than the depiction of President al-Asad "as omnipresent and omniscient."[19] This image stifles dissent in at least two ways. By "cluttering public space," it makes it impossible for "alternative symbols, discussions, and language" to be articulated.[20] By underscoring the president's presumptive role as head of Syria's "national family," it is a trope that promotes "understandings of obedience and community in terms of a chain of filial piety and paternal authority that culminates, and stops, in Asad."[21] Research on rituals of power in other Arab republics is anemic and most of the explanations favor institutional frameworks, which emphasize the role of violence and coercion in maintaining Arab authoritarianism. However, these explanations do not depict a full picture of Arab politics today and "fail to account for the ways in which language and symbols mediate structure, define, and continually reassert political power and obedience."[22] Even as the Arab world is challenging its authoritarian regimes, future research could shed tremendous light on personalistic rituals, their manifestations in political power, and where they have failed or succeeded in stifling opposition forces.

Looking Ahead: Rituals of Power and Democratic Change in Morocco

This account of the Moroccan monarchy suggests that Moroccan society is under tight constraints. However, Morocco is undergoing quick changes linked to rapid urbanization and increased demands for political reforms, especially in light of the Arab youth spring that already swept dictatorial regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. Morocco also faces tremendous socioeconomic problems, which Mohammed VI acknowledged in his first interview as a king: "First of all, there is unemployment and drought in the countryside. There is also the fight against poverty. I could talk about this endlessly: poverty, misery, illiteracy."[23] These problems have resulted in changes in Moroccan society. Customs have undergone drastic changes and the younger generation seems to be rebellious against the previous cultural framework. The rise of militant Islam is also a by-product of these changes. In the aftermath of the Casablanca attacks, Mohammed VI vowed to rein in radical clerics and to counteract their rhetoric with more moderate discourse. The government has embarked on large and sweeping reorganization of the country's 32,000 mosques in order to spread a government-sanctioned Islam and to "shield Morocco against the perils of extremism and terrorism."[24] The government also cracked down on Islamists as it jailed 2,000 people and sentenced 900 of them amidst criticism from human rights organizations.[25]

The monarchy seems secure and immune from any significant dangers to its longevity. However, it still has to deal with certain pressing issues in order to ensure its rule. Chief among these is the process of liberalization that should extend beyond just securing the survival of the monarchy. The monarch ought not to manipulate cycles of political opening and exclusion in his relationships with various political forces. No real democratization can take place without limiting the monarch's widespread role in the polity. With the monarch out of the political system, the political process would be freed from the dominant clientalisitic structures. This would also foster a new political culture based on political participation rather than blind allegiance.

The monarchy has carried out liberal reforms as it has promoted limited pluralism within a civil society, probably among the most vibrant ones in the Middle East. Civil society, conceived in terms of formal organizations and structures, has made substantial impact on policymaking especially in areas of women's rights and

human rights. Associations such as the *Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc* (ADFM) and the *Union Action Féminine* (UAF), articulated new discourses of women's rights and human rights, and adopted a "self-limiting framework" that is independent of political parties.[26] The increasing freedom of these associations translated into a parallel relative latitude of the press to tackle issues of human rights and political reforms and the emergence of the Berber/Amazigh discourse. Such associations increasingly contest the state's hegemony in the public sphere. The state response was to address rather than to suppress these issues. Accordingly, the strategy of the state was to reassert its hegemony in the public sphere and to channel these discourses within state councils. The creation of the *Conseil Consultatif des Droits de l'Homme* (CCDH), for instance, was an attempt to co-opt the human rights discourse and to create a national consensus based on monarchical prerogatives.

Despite the relative freedom of civil society, democratic reforms have been lagging as the monarchy still dominates the institutional realm in Morocco. The ritualization of the political process has had a detrimental effect on any change towards democratic governance. The sanctified leadership of the monarchy with its rituals of power is an amalgam of temporal and spiritual powers. In fact, the amalgam between the religious and the temporal is institutionalized in the bay'a and Article 19 of the constitution. All royal decisions are sacred since they emanate from amir al-mu'minin, whose will is divine and whoever obeys his command "obeys God."[27] The synthesis between the religious and the temporal assigns primacy to the religious stature of the monarchy and sets it above all political changes. As one political official suggests, "the monarchy is the only constant in the political system and is set above all to arbitrate and mediate between the various sources of political conflict."[28] The monarch in Morocco dominates the constitutional edifice from the height of his spiritual rank. The resulting political picture is a monarchy that is above separate branches of government, which prompted Hassan II to once state that "the separation of powers does not concern in any case our [monarchy's] supreme authority."[29]

Rituals of power and the monarchy's religious status hinder any passage to meaningful democratic change in Morocco. As long as royal powers are unlimited and firmly anchored in religious terms, democracy has a slim chance of taking hold in Morocco. The use of dahir further exacerbates the plight of authoritarian rule in Morocco. Dahirs are the source of all legislations and laws, and are

ceremoniously handled by government officials and members of the parliament.[30] Similarly, the monarchy is secure from any instability as long as it dominates the religious discourse and continues to utilize it, as it has for the past three decades, to clutter the public discourse and offset opposition forces ability to mobilize along religious lines.

Appendix A




Figure A-1 Diagram of the Moroccan Administration.

Appendix B

Socioeconomic Data from the Survey

Table B-1 Socio-Economic Data from the Survey

Sex

	N	% Cit.
Male	**186**	**64.8**
Female	**101**	**35.2**
Total	**287**	**100.0**

Age

In Years	N	% Cit.
<16	**3**	**1.0**
17–30	**132**	**46.2**
31–40	**94**	**32.9**
41–50	**42**	**14.7**
>50	**15**	**5.2**
Total	**286**	**100.0**

Sector

	N	% Cit.
Rural	**133**	**46.3**
Urban	**154**	**53.7**
Total	**287**	**100.0**

Neighborhood

	N	% Cit.
Popular	**206**	**71.8**
Middle Class	**33**	**11.5**
Upper Class	**48**	**16.7**
Total	287	**100.0**

Education

	N	% Cit.
Koranic School	**2**	**0.7**
Primary	**17**	**5.9**
Secondary	**100**	**34.8**
College	**57**	**19.9**
Illiterate	**111**	**38.7**
Total	**287**	**100.0**

Salary range

In Dhirams	N	% Cit.
>1000	**92**	**32.1**
1001–2000	**78**	**27.2**
2000–3000	**73**	**25.4**
3000–5000	**27**	**9.4**
>5000	**17**	**5.9**
Total	**287**	**100.0**

Parents' Occupation

	N	% Cit.
Unemployed	**23**	**8.0**
Artisan	**27**	**9.5**
Daily	**23**	**8.0**
Official	**67**	**23.4**
High Official	**0**	**0.0**
Other	**42**	**14.7**
Peasant/Farmer	**104**	**36.4**
Total	**286**	**100.0**

Parents' Occupation

	N	% Cit.
Artisan	**8**	**2.8**
Daily	**2**	**0.7**
Official	**28**	**9.8**
High Official	**0**	**0.0**
Housewife	**235**	**82.2**
Other	**13**	**4.5**
Total	**286**	**100.0**

N= Number.
% Cit. = Percentage Cited.

Appendix C

Islamists in Morocco




Figure C-1 Islamists in Morocco of Sufi Origin.




Figure C-2 Islamist Groups in Morocco of International Origins.

Appendix D

Results of the Legislative Elections in Morocco (1984, 1993, 1997, 2002, and 2007)

Table D-1 Morocco 1984 Legislative Election

Chamber	House of Representatives
Dates of Election	September 14, 1984 *
Voter Turnout	67.4%
Number of Seats Available	306 **
Length of Legislative Term	5 years

	Number of Seats			Percentage of Seats
	Direct	Indirect	Total	
Constitutional Union (UC)	56	27	83	27.1
National Assembly of Independents (RNI)	39	22	61	19.9
Popular Movement (MP)	31	16	47	15.3
Independence Party (PI-*Istiqlal*)	24	17	41	13.3
Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP)	35	1	36	11.7
National Democratic Party (PND)	15	9	24	7.8
Moroccan Labor Union (UMT)	0	5	5	1.6
Democratic Confederation of Labor (CDT)	0	3	3	0.9
General Union of Moroccan Workers (UGTM)	2	0	2	0.6
Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS)	2	0	2	0.6
Organization for Democratic and Popular Action (OADP)	1	0	1	0.3
Social Center Party (PCS)	1	0	1	0.3

* Balloting for 100 indirectly elected members took place on October 2, 1984.
** 206 members were directly elected, 100 indirectly elected.

Table D-2 Morocco 1993 Legislative Election

Chamber	House of Representatives
Dates of Election	June 25, 1993 *
Voter Turn out	62.8%
Number of Seats Available	333 **
Length of Legislative Term	5 years

	Number of Seats			Percentage of Seats
	Direct	Indirect	Total	
Constitutional Union (UC)	27	27	54	16.2
Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP)	48	4	52	15.6
Popular Movement (MP)	33	18	51	15.3
Independence Party (PI-*Istiqlal*)	43	7	50	15
National Assembly of Independents (RNI)	28	13	41	12.3
Popular National Movement (MNP)	14	11	25	7.5
National Democratic Party (PND)	14	10	24	7.2
Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS)	6	4	10	3
Democratic Party for Independence (PDI)	3	6	9	2.7
Action Party (PA)	2	0	2	0.6
Organization for Democratic and Popular Action (OADP)	2	0	2	0.6
Independents	2	2	4	1.2
Candidates affiliated with labor organizations	0	9	9	2.7

*Indirect election took place on September 17, 1993.
** 222 members were directly elected, 111 indirectly elected

Table D-3 Morocco 1997 Legislative Election

Chamber	House of Representatives
Date of Election	November 14, 1997
Voter Turn out	58.3%
Number of Seats Available	325
Length of Legislative Term	5 years

	Number of Seats	Percentage of Seats
Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP)	57	17.5
Constitutional Union (UC)	50	15.4
National Assembly of Independents (RNI)	46	14.1
Popular Movement (MP)	40	12.3
Independence Party (PI-*Istiqlal*)	32	9.8
Democratic and Social Movement (MDS)	32	9.8
Popular National Movement (MNP)	19	5.8
National Democratic Party (PND)	10	3.1
Popular Constitutional and Democratic Movement (MPCD)	9	2.8
Democratic Forces Front (FFD)	9	2.8
Party for Renewal and Progress (PRP)	9	2.8
Socialist Democratic Party (PSD)	5	1.5
Organization for Democratic and Popular Action (OADP)	4	1.2
Action Party (PA)	2	0.6
Democratic Party for Independence (PDI)	1	0.3

Table D-4 Morocco 2002 Legislative Election

Chamber	House of Representatives	
Date of Election	September 27, 2002	
Voter Turnout	51.6%	
Number of Seats Available	325	
Length of Legislative Term	5 years	

	Number of Seats	Percentage of Seats
Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP)	50	15.38
Independence Party (PI-*Istiqlal*)	48	14.77
Popular Constitutional and Democratic Movement / Justice and Development Party (MPCD/PJD)	42	12.92
National Assembly of Independents (RNI)	41	12.62
Popular Movement (MP)	27	8.31
Popular National Movement (MNP)	18	5.54
Constitutional Union (UC)	16	4.92
Democratic Forces Front (FFD)	12	3.69
National Democratic Party (PND)	12	3.69
Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS)	11	3.38
Democratic Union (UD)	10	3.08
Democratic and Social Movement (MDS)	7	2.15
Socialist Democratic Party (PSD)	6	1.85
Democratic Party for Independence (PDI)	2	0.62
Others	23	7.08

Table D-5 Morocco 2007 Legislative Election

Chamber	House of Representatives	
Date of Election	September 7, 2007	
Voter Turnout	37%	
Number of Seats Available	325	
Length of Legislative Term	5 years	

	Number of Seats	Percentage of Seats
Independence Party (PI-*Istiqlal*)	52	16
Justice and Development Party (PJD)	46	14.1
Popular Movement (MP)	41	12.6
National Assembly of Independents (RNI)	39	12
Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP)	38	11.6
Constitutional Union (UC)	27	8.3
Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS)	17	5.2
National Democratic Party PND-Al Ahd (Union PND-Al Ahd)	14	4.3
Front of Democratic Forces (FFD)	9	2.7
Democratic and Social Movement (MDS)	9	2.7
Union PADS-CNI-PSU	6	1.8
Labour Party (PT)	5	1.5
Environment and Development Party	5	1.5
Party of Renewal and Equity (PRE)	4	1.2
Socialist Party (PS)	2	0.6
Moroccan Union for Democracy (UMD)	2	0.6
Citizens' Forces (FC)	1	0.3
Alliance of Liberties (AL)	1	0.3
Citizenship and Development Initiative (ICD)	1	0.3
Party of Renaissance and Virtue (PRV)	1	0.3
Others	5	1.5

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11. See: Nazih N.M. Ayubi, "State Formation in the Modern Era: The Colonial/Indigenous Mix," in *Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East* (London: IB Tauris, 1995), 86–134; Illiya Harik, "The Origins of the Arab State System," in Giacomo Luciani (eds.), *The Arab State*. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1990), 1–28.
12. Harik, "The Origins of the Arab State System," 4.
13. Ibid., 5.
14. The process of colonialism according to Harik created only Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Palestine.
15. Harik, "The Origins of the Arab State System," 5–6.
16. Fred Halliday, *The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 77; see also: Roger Adelson, *London and the Invention of the Middle East: Money, Power, and War, 1902–1922* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 22.
17. Roger Owen, *State, Power, and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992).
18. Simon Bromley, *Rethinking Middle East Politics: State Formation and Development* (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1994), 177.
19. Joseph Andoni Massad, *Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 276.
20. The Alaouites in Morocco are not to be confused with the ruling Alawite Shi'a subsect in Syria.
21. *Marabout* is a local saint; *Zawiya* is a Sufi mystic retreat, convent, or religious order. Zawiya is also a place devoted to religious education.

22. Abdallah Laroui, *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), 271.
23. *Makhzen* lit., storehouse; in Morocco, it refers to the state apparatus or administration. However, makhzen also possess a spiritual and symbolic dimension built around the king's symbols of *Baraka, Sharaf, Bay'a,* and *Amir al-Muminin.*
24. Maxwell Gavin, *Lords of the Atlas: The Rise and Fall of the House of Glaoua, 1893–1956* (New York: Dutton, 1996), 29; See also: Allen R. Meyers, "Slave Soldiers and State Politics in Early 'Alawi Morocco, 1668–1727," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 16:1 (1983), 39–48.
25. Maxwell Gavin, *Lords of the Atlas*, 275–276. For an in-depth study of Muhammad III, see Ramon Lourido Diaz, *Marruecos en la Segunda Mitad del Siglo XVIII Vida Interna: Politica, Social Y Religiosa Durante El Sultanato de Sidi Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah, 1757–1790.* (Madrid, Spain: Instituto Hispano-Arabe de Cultura, 1978).
26. *Caliph* is the title of the leader of the Islamic Ummah (community). It is an anglicized/Latinized version of the Arabic word *Khalifah* which means "successor" or "representative". *Sultan* is an Islamic title used by certain Muslim rulers who claimed full sovereignty in practical terms. *Sharif* is one who claims descent from Prophet Muhammad.
27. Rachida Cherifi, *Le Makhzen Politique au Maroc: Hier et Aujourd'hui* (Casablanca : Afrique Orient 1988), 13.
28. *Habous* are pious endowments bestowed by the king and other private individuals on religious foundations. For an excellent study of the history and legal details of Moroccan Habous, see Joseph Luccioni, *Les Fondations Pieuses "Habous" au Maroc depuis les Origines jusqu'à 1956* (Rabat: Imprimerie Royal, 1982); see also: Norman Stillman, "*Waqf* and the Ideology of Charity in Medieval Islam," In Ian Richard Netton (eds.), *Studies in Honour Of Clifford Edmund Bosworth.* (vol I) (Leiden, NY: E.J. Brill, 2000), 357–372.
29. Cahen, Cl., Mantran, R., Lambton, A.K.S., Bazmee Ansari, A.S. "Ḥisba," in P. Bearman , Th. Bianquis , C.E. Bosworth , E. van Donzel, and W.P. Heinrichs (eds.), *Encyclopaedia of Islam.* (Leiden, NY: E.J. Brill, 2008).
30. Laroui, *The History of the Maghrib,* 210.
31. Arroub*, Al-Makhzen Fi al-thaqafa al-Assiyassiya al-Maghhrebiyya,* 29–30.
32. Robert Montagne, *Les Berberes et le Makhzen dans le Sud du Maroc* (Paris: F. Alcan 1930), 390.
33. John Waterbury, *Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite, A Study in Segmented Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 17–18 and 31.
34. Mohamed Salahdine, *Maroc: Tribus, Makhzen et Colons* (Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1986), 103–104.
35. Germain Ayache, *Etudes d'Histoire Marocaine: Société marocaine des éditeurs réunis* (Rabat: SMER, 1983), 160, 167–168 and 176.

36. Arroub, *Al-Makhzen Fi al-thaqafa al-siyassiya Al-Maghhrebiyya*, 30.
37. Driss Ben Ali, *Le Maroc Precapitaliste* (Rabat: Editions SMER, 1983), 165.
38. Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 79.
39. Abderrahim Al-'Atri, *Sina'at al-Nukhba bi Al-Maghreb* (Rabat: Annajah Al Jadida, 2006), 44–45.
40. Ayache, *Etudes d'Histoire Marocaine,* 99.
41. Abdellatif Agnouche, *Ta'rikh Al-Mouassassat wa Al-waqa'ii A- Ijtima'iya* (Casablanca: Afrique-Orient, 1987), 51.
42. Cherifi, *Le Makhzen Politique au Maroc,* 14.
43. Remy Leveau, "Le Makhzen: La Monarchie a l'Epreuve," *Les Cahiers de l'Orient* 74 (2004), 55.
44. Bourqia and Miller (eds.), *In the Shadow of the Sultan,* 245–248 .
45. Abdellah Hammoudi, *Master and Disciple: The Cultural Foundations of Moroccan Authoritarianism* (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1997), 5.
46. Ibid. 139–140.
47. The constitutions of 1962, 1970, 1972, 1992, and 1996 have all acknowledged the religious principles of the political power in Morocco. For instance, Articles 6 and 7 of the constitution proclaim "Islam shall be the state religion" and that "The motto of the Kingdom shall be: GOD, THE COUNTRY, and THE KING." In addition, Article 19 declares: "The King, "Amir Al-Muminin"(Commander of the Faithful), shall be the Supreme Representative of the Nation and the Symbol of the unity thereof. He shall be the guarantor of the perpetuation and the continuity of the State (...) and defender of the Faith." Finally, Article 23 consecrates royal power: "The person of the King shall be sacred and inviolable."
48. Bay'a is an Arabic term denoting, in a very broad sense, the act by which a certain number of persons, acting individually or collectively, recognize the authority of another person. Thus, the bay'a of a Caliph is the act by which one person is proclaimed and recognized as head of the Muslim State. It was established between early Muslims and Prophet Muhammad, and was subsequently revived by later caliphs and sultans throughout the different Muslim empires. Today, only Morocco in the entire whole Muslim world has kept this practice alive in its glorified and spectacular vigor. See for instance, Tyan, E, "Bay'a," in Bearman et al. (eds.), *Encyclopaedia of Islam.*
49. Ahmed R. Benchemsi, "Le Culte de la Personalite," *TelQuel*, Issue 236–237 (29 July–8 September 2006), 44–45.
50. Baraka is a hereditary divine blessing that all sharifian sultans possess by virtue of their prophetic lineage.
51. Based on a field interview conducted in Marrakech, Morocco in July 2006.
52. The Dahir (royal edict/decree) of 1984 stipulates that each mosque, religious school or zawiya is a habous property maintained and led by the ministry of habous and Islamic affairs.

53. Germain Ayache, "La Fonction d'Arbitrage du Makhzen," *Bulletin Economique et Social du Maroc* 138–139 (1978), 5.
54. Ernest Gellner, "Introduction in Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation," in Ernest Gellner & Charles Micaud (eds.), *Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa* (London: Duckworth, 1972), 11.
55. Ibid., 18.
56. Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed,* 78; See also: Dale F. Eickelman, *Moroccan Islam: Tradition and Society in a Pilgrimage Center* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976), 16, 85–88 and 102–105.
57. Ibid.
58. Nationalist leader Ahmed Belafrej in Robin Leonard Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule:: French Administration of Tribal Areas 1912–1956* (London: Frank Cass, 1973), 18.
59. Article 1 of the treaty organizing the French protectorat of Morocco, 30 mars 1912 as translated by the author. For a full text of treaty, see Hassan II, *Le Defi* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1977), Appendix IV.
60. Benoist-Mechin, *Lyautey l'Africain ou Le Reve Immole* (Paris: Librairie Academique Perrin, 1978), 178.
61. Hermassi El Baki, *Etat et Société au Maghreb: Étude Comparative* (Paris: Anthropos, 1975), 78.
62. Ayubi, *Overstating the Arab State,* 121.
63. Timothy Mitchell, *Colonizing Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 179.
64. Andre De Laubadere, *Les Reformes des Pouvoirs Publics au Maroc: le Gouvernement, l'Administration, la Justice* (Paris: R. Pichon & R. Durand-Auzias, 1949), 25.
65. Ayubi, *Overstating the Arab State*, 121.
66. Dale F. Eickelman, *Knowledge and Power in Morocco: The Education of a Twentieth Century Notable (*Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 135–136. See also: William A. Hoisington, Jr., "Cities in Revolt: The Berber Dahir (1930) and France's Urban Strategy in Morocco," *Journal of Contemporary History* 13:3 (1978), 433–448.
67. Robert Rezette, *Les Parties Politiques Marocains* (Paris: Armand Collin, 1955), 137.
68. Waterbury, *Commander of the Faithful, 195*–203.
69. For instance in his national address of May 8, 1958, king Mohamed V declared himself as the incarnation of national sovereignty and as a vigilant guardian.
70. King Hassan II in a royal press conference on December 13, 1962.
71. William L. Cleveland, a *History of the Modern Middle East* 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004), 94–201.
72. Royal address of December 11, 1965.
73. From a field interview in the Moroccan upper house of councilors, July15, 2006.

74. Article 83 of the 1996 constitution reads: "Sentences shall be passed and executed in the King's name."
75. Royal address of October 13, 1978.
76. See for instance, dahirs n. 1-71-95 and 71-134 of April 28 and August 17, 1971 delegate autonomous regulatory powers to the prime minister as the head of the Ministers' Council.
77. The constitution of 1993; emphasis added.
78. Mohamed Lahbabi, *Le government Marocain a l'Aube de XXeme Siecle* (Casablanca: Editions Maghrebines, 1975), 101.
79. Ibid., 180.
80. Press conference of December 13, 1962
81. Ayubi, *Overstating the Arab State*, 122.
82. Cherifi, *Le Makhzen Politique au Maroc,* 57.
83. Ibid., 57–58
84. Remy Leveau, *Le Fellah Marocain: Defenseur du Trone* (Paris: Presse de la Fondation de Science Politiques, 1976), 11.
85. Cherifi, *Le Makhzen Politique au Maroc,* 62 (translated by the author from French).
86. See figure 2 in the appendix for a diagram of the Moroccan administration in the post-colonial era.
87. Nick Pelham, "Freedom with Caveats," *The Middle East International* (June 2, 2000), 16.
88. Bourqia and Miller (eds.), *In the Shadow of the Sultan,* 245–248.
89. Hammoudi, *Master and Disciple,* 5.
90. Ibid., 139–140.

3 Politics and Culture in Morocco: A Disciplinary-Cultural Approach to Power

1. See for instance Brumberg's discussion in "The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy," 56–68 of the dual role of the monarchs in Jordan and Morocco "as modern leaders of a nation (watan) and traditional patrons of the Islamic community (umma)," 62 and their use of ideological and cultural "dissonance" to maintain their regimes. Lisa Anderson, "Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East," *Political Science Quarterly* 106:1 (1991), 1–15, also emphasizes the role of the institutionalization of bay'a in the resilience of the Monarchy in Morocco. 9. For a more comprehensive review of this literature, see chapter one.
2. Marc Howard Ross, "Culture and Identity in Comparative Political Analysis," in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 42.
3. Ibid., 46–52.
4. Ibid., 47.

5. Morteza Gharehbaghian, “Oil Revenue and the Militarisation of Iran: 1960–1978,” *Social Scientist* 15: 4–5 (1987), 87–100.
6. Richard T. Antoun, “Fundamentalism, Bureaucratization, and the State’s Co-optation of Religion: A Jordanian Case Study,” *International journal of Middle East Studies* 38:3 (2006), 329–393.
7. James Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 39; see also: James Scott’s *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).
8. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1965), 61; see also: Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1972), 12–13.
9. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak,* 315.
10. Stuart Hall, “The Toad in the Garden: Thatcherism among the Theorists,” in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (eds.), *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 44.
11. Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1991), 23. For an excellent discussion of hegemony and false consciousness, see David D. Laitin, *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change Among the Yoruba* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 19–20; see also: John Gaventa, *Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in An Appalachian Valley (*Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1980).
12. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak*, 38–39.
13. Ibid., 316–318.
14. Ibid., 318–319.
15. Comaroff and Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution,* 23.
16. See for instance Lisa Wedeen’s study of Syria, in which she shows that the dynamics of official rhetoric in Syria are consistently challenged by the Syrians. Lisa Wedeen, *Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric and Symbols in Contemporary Syria* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
17. The complete analysis of the survey is explained later in this chapter.
18. See chapter two for more on the relationship between the monarchy and state building in Morocco.
19. M. Elaine Combs-Schilling, “Performing Monarchy, Staging Nation,” in Bourquia and Miller (eds.), *In the Shadow of the Sultan*, 176.
20. Wedeen, *Ambiguities of Domination*, 49.
21. Cults of personalized power are also found in many other places, from Africa, Asia, and some Latin American dictatorships, to Fascism and Communism.
22. Geertz Suggests similar argument in his study of state power in Bali in the nineteeth century. See Geertz, “Centers, Kings, and Charisma” 130–134.

23. Clifford Geertz, "Toward an interpretive Theory of Culture," in *The Interpretation of Cultures:Selected Essays* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 5.
24. This point is suggested in Geertz's study of the Balinese political culture in the nineteenth century, when he argues, for instance, that "the pageants were not mere aesthetic embellishments, celebrations of a domination independently existing: they were the thing itself." In Clifford Geertz, *Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 120.
25. See for instance Timothy Mitchell, *Colonizing Egypt*; Brinkley Messick, *The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in Muslim Societies* (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1993).
26. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish,* 194.
27. Ibid., 293.
28. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance,* 48.
29. Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 223–224.
30. This is argued and demonstrated later in chapter five with regard to the Islamist challenge to regime hegemony in Morocco.
31. John P. Entelis, *Culture and Counterculture in Moroccan Politics* (Boulder: CO: Westerview Press 1989), 4.
32. Ibid.
33. Geertz, *Islam Observed,* 76.
34. Entelis, *Culture and Counter Culture in Moroccan Politics*, 8.
35. This refers to the alleged attempt by General Ahmed Dlimi, head of the Moroccan secret services and commander of the armed forces in the Western Sahara, to overthrow the monarchy in 1982–1983. King Hassan II moved first and arrested various dissident officers, and in January 1983, Ahmed Dlimi was killed in a car accident outside Marrakech. Soon after his death, rumors swirled that he was executed by people close to Hassan II. These rumors were fueled by the fact that the truck that hit his car was stolen and the driver fled the scene. It is widely believed that Dlimi was killed prior to the accident and his body placed in the car at the scene of the accident.
36. I use Amazigh and Berber interchangeably, since I do not think the word Berber conjures up any derogatory meanings as some Berber activists contend.
37. Henry Munson, Jr., *The House of Si Abd Allah: The Oral History of a Moroccan Family* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 49.
38. Entelis, *Culture and Counterculture in Moroccan Politics*, 11–13.
39. Cornell, Vincent J. *Realm of the Saint : Power and Authority in Moroccan Sufism*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1998.
40. Chapter two discusses in detail the relationship between Sufi lodges (zawiya), the monarchy, and subsequent state formation.
41. Dale F. Eickelman, *The Middle East and Central Asia: An Anthropological Approach* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998), 276.

42. The nomenclature of wali is debated within anthropological academic circles. The word marabout has been used to refer to the leaders of Sufi orders in Morocco, which is a French Anglicization of the Arabic *murabit*, meaning the "tied one"—a person responsible for preaching and tying Islam to the various tribes in the region. Murabit is also one who took part in a Sufi religious retreat, *ribat*. Cornell (1998) suggests that there are significant affinities between the role of these people in Sufi Islam and the Christian conception of a saint. Therefore, the use of the word 'saint' is accurate here. Throughout the book, I use saint and marabout interchangeably. For more on this debate, see ibid., 276; Vincent J. Cornell, *Realm of the Saint: Power and Authority in Moroccan Sufism* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1998), xxxiv; A.J. Arberry, *Sufism: An Account of the Mystics of Islam* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1950); J. Chabbi and Nasser Rabbat, "Ribāṭ," in Bearman et al. (eds.), *Encyclopaedia of Islam*.
43. Huston Smith, *The World's Religions: Our Great Wisdom Traditions* (San Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), 259.
44. El-Sayed El-Aswad, "Spiritual Genealogy: Sufism and Saintly Places in the Nile Delta," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 38:4 (2006), 501.
45. For more on the distinction between Sufism, Orthodox Islam, and Folk Islam, see Cornell, *Realm of the Saint,* 198.
46. Dale F. Eickelman, *Moroccan Islam: Tradition and Society in a Pilgrimage Center,* 236; see also: Ernest Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1969).
47. Entelis, *Culture and Counterculture in Moroccan Politics*, 39–40.
48. See Edward Westermarck, *Ritual and Belief in Morocco* (London: Macmillan, 1926).
49. Susan Ossman, *Picturing Casablanca: Portraits of Power in a Modern City* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 9.
50. See for instance El-Aswad study of Sufi order in the Nile Delta in Egypt cited above.
51. Geertz, "Centers, Kings, and Charisma," 135.
52. Sobhi Malek, *Islam: Introduction and Approach—An Independent-Study Textbook* (Irving, TX: International Correspondence Institute, 1992), 137.
53. Paul Rainbow, *Symbolic Domination: Cultural Form in Personal and Corporate Power* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 25
54. John Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 108.
55. Bourquia and Miller, *In the Shadow of the Sultan,* 8
56. Jean-Pierre Tuquoi, *Le Dernier Roi: Crépuscule D'une Dynastie* (Paris: Grasset, 2001), 213.
57. Personal Interview conducted with an elected official in Rabat, Morocco on July 17, 2006.
58. Ahmed R. Benchemsi, "Bay'a, Autorité et Grand Spectacle," *Jeune Afrique/L'Intelligent* 2065 (August 8–14, 2000), 39.
59. Mohamed Tozy as quoted in ibid., 40.

60. These interviews were conducted in July and August 2006; in the period between December 2006–January 2007, and June–July 2009. While the names of interviewees are held anonymous, the interviews include a wide range of politicians from different political and ideological leanings.
61. Interview with a top representative of the ‘Adala wa Tanmiya in Marrakech, Morocco. July 2006.
62. Combs-Schilling, “Performing Monarchy, Staging Nation,” 187.
63. Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, trans. J.W. Swain (New York: Free Press, 1965), 263.
64. Combs-Schilling, “Performing Monarchy, Staging Nation,” 184–189.
65. From an interview conducted in Marrakech in August 2006.
66. Massad, *Colonial Effects,* 276.
67. Wedeen, *Ambiguities of Domination,*156.
68. http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/morocco_statistics.html
69. United Nations Development Programme country document for the Kingdom of Morocco (2007–2011), 7; found at: http://www.pnud.org.ma/pdf/CPD_Morocco.pdf
70. See appendix for detailed tables of the demographic statistics.
71. Verba, “Sequences and Development,” 315–316.
72. King Mohammed VI made fighting poverty one of his priorities shortly after acceding to the throne in 1999. Due to these efforts, the king was dubbed “king of the poor” by various media and journalistic outlets in Morocco.
73. Lipset, *Political Man,* 77.
74. See for instance, Eckstein and Gurr, *Patterns of Authority,* 197; Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man,* 65. For a more comprehensive review of this literature, see chapter one.
75. All indicators are from the World Bank’s 2005 World Development Indicators at: http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/Toc.htm
76. United Nations’ Human Development Reports 2006: http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/countries.cfm?c=MAR

4 Rethinking Political Islam: The Public Sphere and Islamic Activism in Morocco

1. Khadija Mohsen-Finan, *Les Enjeux d’un Conflit Regional* (Paris: CNRS, 1997).
2. Lust-Okar, “Divided They Rule,” 162.
3. Waterbury, *The Commander of the Faithful.*
4. Graham Fuller, “Islamists in the Arab World: the Dance around Democracy,” *Middle East series: Carnegie papers* 49 (August 2004), 3.
5. Stephen Humphreys, “The Contemporary Resurgence in the Context of Modern Islam,” in Ali Hillal Dessouki (eds.), *Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 69.

6. Roger Owen, "The Military In and Out of Politics" in State, Power & Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York: Routledge, 2000), 173.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., 175.
9. Gudrun Kramer, "Islam and Pluralism," in Rex Brynen, Korany Bahgat, and Paul Noble (eds.), *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 113.
10. Ibid., 115.
11. William E. Shepard, "Sayyid Qutb's Doctrine of *Jahiliyya*," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 35:4 (2003), 524.
12. Ibid., 524–525.
13. Ibid., 530.
14. Ibid., 531.
15. James Toth, "Islamism in Southern Egypt: A Case Study of a Radical Religious Movement," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 35:4 (2003), 547–572.
16. *Takfir*, from the word *Kafir* in Arabic (unbeliever), means the act of excommunicating a previously Muslim person from the house of Islam. While Hijra means moving away from the straight path of Islam.
17. Shepard, "Sayyid Qutb's Doctrine of *Jahiliyya*," 535–536.
18. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures,* 14.
19. James Walsh, "The Sword of Islam," *Time International* (1992):18–22; Sana Abed-Kotob, "The Accommodationists Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 27:3 (August 1995), 321.
20. Bradford McGuinn, "The Islamic Challenge in Egypt: Has It Reached the Point of No Return?" *Middle East Insight* 9:1 (1992), 68.
21. Graham Fuller, "Islamic Fundamentalism: No Long-Term Threat," *Washington Post* (January 13, 1992), 3.
22. Esposito, *Islam,* 228.
23. Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 298.
24. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Islamic Militancy as a Social Movement: The Case of Two Groups in Egypt," in Ali Hillal Dessouki (eds.), *Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982).
25. Judith Miller, "The Challenge of Radical Islam," *Foreign Affairs* 72:2 (1993), 54–55.
26. Martin Kramer, "Fundamentalism at Large: The Drive for Power," *Middle East Quarterly* 3:2 (June 1996); Bernard Lewis, "Islam and Liberal Democracy," *The Atlantic Monthly* 271:2 (1993), 89–98.
27. Miller, "The Challenge of Radical Islam," 55.
28. Steven M. Fish, "Islam and Authoritarianism," *World Politics* 55:1 (2002), 5. I should note that Fish does not address issues of incompatibility of

Islam and democracy. Fish's research shows that Muslim-majority countries have lower Freedom House scores, even after controlling for many other factors. His findings show some evidence that this is due to the subordination of women.

29. Alfred C. Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson, "Arab, Not Muslim, Exceptionalism," *Journal of Democracy* 15:4 (2004), 140.
30. Bruno Etienne, *L'Islamisme Radical* (Paris: Hachette, 1987), 108ff; see also: Nazih N.M. Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 231.
31. John Esposito and James Piscatori, "Democratization and Islam," *Middle East Journal* 45:3 (1991), 434; see also: Gudrun Kramer, "Islamist Democracy," *Middle East Report* 183 (July–August 1993), 2–8.
32. Alfred C. Stepan, "Religion, Democracy and the 'Twin Tolerations'," *Journal of Democracy* 11:4 (2000), 37–57.
33. Vickie Langohr "Of Islamists and Ballot Boxes: Rethinking the Relationship between Islamisms and Electoral Politics," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33:4 (2001), 591.
34. For an excellent treatment of this argument, see Abdullahi Ahmed a-Na'im, *Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and International Law* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990).
35. Augustus Richard Norton and Farhad Kazemi, "Authoritarianism, Civil Society and Democracy in the Middle East: Mass Media in the Persian Gulf," *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin* 40:2 (2006), 201–202.
36. Augustus Richard Norton, "Inclusion Can Deflate Islamic Populism," *New Perspective Quarterly* 10:3 (1993), 50.
37. Noah Feldman, *After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), 224.
38. See for instance Quintan Wiktorowicz, *The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001); Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); Geneive Abdo, *No God but God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
39. Mohammed M. Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement," in Quintan Wiktorowicz (eds.), *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004).
40. Mohammed M. Hafez, *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World*. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 21–22.
41. Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria," *Rationality and Society* 11:3 (1999), 244–245.
42. Ibid., 257–266 and 259.

43. Ibid., 247 and 251.
44. Najib Ghadbian, *Democratization and the Islamist Challenge in the Arab World* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 59.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., 61.
47. Ibid., 66.
48. See chapter one for a detailed review and critique of this literature.
49. Roger Owen, "Socio-Economic Change and Political Mobilization: the Case of Egypt," in Ghassane Salame (eds.), *Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994), 190.
50. Glenn E. Robinson, "Defensive Democratization in Jordan," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 30:3 (1998), 387–410,
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52. From interviews with some officials of political parties, June–July 2009.
53. Chapter two examines the process of state building and relationship to regime installation in Morocco.
54. See for instance the following excellent studies: Richard T. Antoun, "Civil Society, Tribal Process, and Change in Jordan: An Anthropological View," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 32:4 (November 2000), 441–463; Amatzia Baram, "Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein's Tribal Policies 1991–1996," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 29:1 (February 1997), 1–31; Mary Ann Tetreault, "A State of Two Minds: State Cultures, Women, and Politics in Kuwait," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33:2 (May 2001), 203–220.
55. Roger Owen, "Some Important Non-State Actors," in State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East (London; New York: Routledge, 2000), 221–222
56. Antoun, "Civil Society, Tribal Process, and Change in Jordan," 441.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid., 443–445.
59. Ibid., 445.
60. Augustus R. Norton, *Civil Society in the Middle East* (Leiden, NY: E.J. Brill, 1995), 7.
61. Jurgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 27.
62. Armando Salvatore and Mark LeVine (eds.), *Religion, Social Practice, and Contested Hegemonies Reconstructing the Public Sphere in Muslim Majority Societies* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 5.
63. Shmuel Eisenstadt, "Concluding Remarks: Public Sphere, Civil Society, and Political Dynamics in Islamic Societies," in Miriam Hoexter, Shmuel

Eisenstadt, and Nehemia Levtzion (eds.), *The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002), 141.
64. Marc Lynch, *State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordan's Identity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 4–5
65. Ibid., 19.
66. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks,* 258.
67. Ayubi, *Overstating the Arab State,* 25.
68. Interview conducted in Rabat in July 2006.
69. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks,* 106
70. From an interview with a member of the Islamist 'Adala wa Tanmiya in the Moroccan Parliament's upper house of Councilors. July 19, 2006.
71. Ibid.
72. Interview conducted in Casablanca in July 2006. Interviews with Islamists are further discussed in the sections below on 'Adl wal Ihsane and 'Adala wa Tanmiya.
73. See chapter three for a detailed description and analysis of the findings of the field survey results.
74. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks,* 206–208.
75. Ibid., 106–114.
76. Ibid., 106–114 and 206–208.
77. Ibid., 207.

5 The Islamist Challenge to Regime Hegemony in Morocco: Contested Legitimacy and Positionary Strategies

1. Richard C. Smith, "Analytic Strategies for Oral History Interviews," in Jaber F. Gubruim and James A. Holstein (eds.), *Handbook of Research Interviewing: Context and Method* (2002), 712, as cited in Carol Warren and Tracy Karner, *Discovering Qualitative Methods: Field Research, Interviews and Analysis* (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Company, 2005), 22.
2. Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 46–48 and 86.
3. Ilhem Rachidi, "Morocco Tempers Islamists," *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 19, 2004. (Online edition at http//: www.csmonitor.com/2004/0719/p07s01-wome.html).
4. From an Interview with *Le Nouvel Observateur*, reported in *Le Matin du Sahara* (Saturday, October 3, 1987).
5. Francois Burgat and William Dowell, *The Islamic Movement in North Africa* (Austin: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, The University of Texas, 1993).
6. Hrair R. Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995).

7. Mustapha Sehimi, *Citations de S. M. Hassan II* (Rabat: SMER, 1981), 33
8. See chapter three for a detailed discussion of bay’a.
9. Nick Pelham, “Freedom with Caveats,” *The Middle East International* (March 24, 2000), 16
10. Wiktorowicz, “Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan,” 47–48.
11. Ibid., 46–47.
12. Lust-Okar, “Divided They Rule,” 162.
13. Ibid., 161.
14. Hassan Rachik, “50 ans de Development Humain au Maroc et Perspectives pour 2025,” *Study by the High Commission of Planning*, 2005.
15. Abdeslam Maghraoui, “Depoliticization in Morocco,” *Journal of Democracy* 13:4 (2002), 24.
16. Ayubi, *Political Islam*, 118.
17. See chapter three for a full and thorough account of folk Islam and the nature of its relationship with the Monarchy.
18. From an interview with a high official of the state religious council of the city of Marrakech, July 2006.
19. Muhammad Darif, *al-Nasaq al-siyasi al-MMaboin chapter 2> and go with “Maboin chapter 2> and go with “aghribi al-mu’asir: muqarabah susiyu-siyasiyah* (Casablanca: Afriqiya al-Sharq, 1991), 181.
20. Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism*, 2–3.
21. See appendix figure 2 on Moroccan Islamists of international origins.
22. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Meir Litvak, “Islamism and the State in North Africa,” in Barry M. Rubin, (eds.), *Revolutionaries and Reformers Contemporary Islamist Movements in the Middle East* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 73–74.
23. See figure 2 in the appendix. In April 2011, Mohamed Fizazi received a royal pardon and was released from jail.
24. See table 1 in the appendix for a map of Islamist groups in Morocco.
25. John Entelis, “Political Islam in the Maghreb: The Non-Violent Dimension,” in John Entelis (eds.), *Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997), 56.
26. Hassan Qurunful, *al-Mujtama’ Al-Madani wa An-Nukhba As-Siyasiyya: Iqsa’ am Takamul* (Casablanca: Afriquia Asharq, 1997), 111–112.
27. Muhammed Darif “Islamic Youth: A New Version,” *La Gazette du Maroc* (2003), 16; see also: Marvine Howe, *Morocco: The Islamist Awakening and Other Challenges.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 128.
28. Muhammad Darif, *al-Islam al-siyasi fi al-Maghrib: muqarabah wathaqi’yah* (Casablanca: al-Majallah al-Maghribiyah li-`Ilm al-Ijtima` al-Siyasi, 1992), 253–255.
29. See figure 3 in the appendix for a genealogical evolution of the Islamic Youth Association into the ‘Adala wa Tanmiya.
30. From an interview with a leading representative of the ‘Adala wa Tanmiya and member of the City Council of Marrakech. July 2006. Note, the usage of *Sidna* (our lord) to refer to the king.

31. This is largely argued by French scholars of political Islam such as: Olivier Carre, *L'Utopie Islamique dans L'Orient Arabe* (Paris: Presses de la foundation nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1991); Olivier Roy, *L'echec de l'Islam Politique* (Paris: Seuil, 1992); Gilles Keppel, *Jihad: Expansion et Declin de l'Islamisme.* (Paris: Gallimard, 2000).
32. Henri Lauziere, "Post-Islamism and the Religious Discourse of Abd Al-Salam Yasin," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37:2 (2005), 241.
33. Darif, *al-Islam al-siyasi fi al-Maghrib,* 314–317.
34. In fact, Yassine's direct challenge to the monarchy's religious authority is not unprecedented. Moroccan revivalist, Mohammed ben al-'Arbi al-'Alawi posed such challenge to the monarchy based on religious texts, however, his opposition was not revolutionary or political in nature.
35. The current minister of religious affairs, Ahmed Taoufiq, whom I interviewed in July 2007, is also member of the Boutchichya Sufi order.
36. Darif, *al-Islam al-siyasi fi al-Maghrib,* 315.
37. *Al-Jama'a,* 4 (December 1979–January 1980), 14.
38. Fitna is difficult to translate from Arabic. It is generally used to describe a period marked by schism, and societal division and disorder.
39. Abdessalam Yassine, *al-Islam Ghadan.: Al-'Amal As-Siyasi wa Harakiyat Al-Minhaj al-Nabawi fi Zaman Al-Fitna* (Casablanca: Annajah Al-Jadida, 1973), 470.
40. Ibid., 471.
41. See figure 1 in the appendix for a map of the development of Yassine's 'Adl wal Ihsane and its mystic origins.
42. John F. Burns, "Morocco's King Loosens His Grip," *The New York Times* (June 28, 1999).
43. From *Adl wal Ihsane's* webpage, www.yassine.net
44. The full text of Yassine's memorandum is available at http://www.yassine.net/lettres/ind_ memorandum.htm
45. Nick Pelham, "Freedom with Caveats," *The Middle East International (*June 2, 2000), 16.
46. For detailed results of the survey, see chapter three.
47. Interview with a member of 'Adl wal Ihsane in Marrakech, July 2006.
48. Interview with an 'Adl wal Ihsane member in Rabat, June 2009.
49. Ibid.
50. Interview with member of 'Adl wal Ihsane in Marrakech, July 2006.
51. From a personal interview with an 'Adl wal Ihsane member in Marrakech, July 2006.
52. Interview with 'Adl wal Ihsane member in Casablanca, August 2, 2006.
53. Interview in Marrakech, July 2006.
54. Interview conducted in Casablanca in August 2006.
55. Ibid.
56. Interview with a member of 'Adl wal Ihsane in Marrakech, June 2009.
57. Henri Lauziere, "Post-Islamism and the Religious Discourse of Abd Al-Salam Yasin," 250–252.

58. Interview conducted in Rabat/Sale, July 2006.
59. "Islamist Revival," *The Economist* (March 18, 2000), 44.
60. From the party's pamphlet entitled: *Al-Haraka Al-Islamiya Wa Ishkaliyat Al-Manhaj* (The Islamist Movement and the Problematic of the Methodology).
61. Interview with 'Adala wa Tanmiya member of the House of Deputies, Rabat in July 2006.
62. This claim is largely based on personal conversations I have had with people in Morocco.
63. Hasan Al-Banna, *Nadarat fi Islah al-Nafs wal-Mujtana'* (Cairo: Maktaba al-I'itisam, 1980), 62–63.
64. Asef Bayat, "Revolution without Movement, Movement without Revolution: Comparing Islamic Activism in Iran and Egypt," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 40:1 (1998), 161.
65. From an interview with 'Adala wa Tanmiya official in Casablanca, June 2006.
66. Based on a number of interviews with members of 'Adala wa Tanmiya, July 2006 and similarly confirmed in June 2009.
67. Interview with member of 'Adl wal Ihsane in Marrakech, July 2007.
68. From Adl Wal Ihsane's banned periodical *Al-Jama'a* at: www.aljamaa.org
69. Interview with 'Adala wa Tanmiya member in Casablanca. July 17, 2007.
70. Interview conducted in the House of Deputies in Rabat, July, 2006.
71. Interviews with a 'Adala wa Tanmiya member in the parliament, July 18, 2006.
72. Interview with a member of 'Adala wa Tanmiya in Marrakech, July 20, 2006.
73. Interview with a 'Adala wa Tanmiya member in Marrakech, 2006 and updated in 2010.
74. Interview with a 'Adala wa Tanmiya member in the parliament in Rabat, July 18, 2006.
75. Interview with a 'Adala wa Tanmiya member in city council of Marrakech, August 2006.
76. Interview with a 'Adala wa Tanmiya member in Casablanca, June 2006 and 2009.
77. From the Official site of the Moroccan Parliament at: http//: www.majliss-annouwab.ma
78. Asef Bayat, "Revolution without Movement, Movement without Revolution," 141–142.

6 General Conclusions

1. Bayat, "Revolution without Movement, Movement without Revolution," 136–169 and 141–142.

2. George Tsebelis, *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); see also: Andrea Schedler, "The Nested Game of Democratization by Elections," *International Political Science Review* 23 (2002),103–122.
3. Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism,* 15.
4. Ibid.
5. Bourquia and Miller (eds.), *In the Shadow of the Sultan,* 8.
6. Combs-Schilling, "Performing Monarchy, Stating Nation," in ibid. 176.
7. Sehimi, *Citations de S. M. Hassan II,* 33.
8. Ibid., 279–280.
9. See for instance Brumberg's discussion in "The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy," of the dual role of the monarchs in Jordan and Morocco "as modern leaders of a nation (watan) and traditional patrons of the Islamic community (umma)," (62) and their use of ideological and cultural "dissonance" to maintain their regimes. Anderson's "Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East," also emphasizes the role of the institutionalization of bay'a in the resilience of the Monarchy in Morocco. 9. For a more comprehensive review of this literature, see chapter one.
10. Marsha Pripstein Posusney, "Enduring Authoritarianism: Middle East Lessons for Comparative Theory," *The Journal of Comparative Politics* 36:2 (January 2004), 131.
11. Remy Leveau, "The Moroccan Monarchy: A Political System in Quest of a New Equilibrium," in Joseph Kostiner (eds.), *Middle East Monarchies* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 117.
12. Remy Leveau, "Morocco at the Crossroads," *Mediterranean Politics* 3:3 (Winter 1997), 114–122.
13. Tom Pierre Najem, "State Power and Democratization in North Africa: Developments in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya," in Amin Saikal and Albrecht Schnabel (eds.), *Democratization in the Middle East: Experiences, Struggles, Challenges* (New York: United Nations University Press, 2003), 189.
14. See for instance, Eckstein and Gurr, *Patterns of Authority,* 197; Lipset, *Political Man,* 65. For a more comprehensive review of this literature, see chapter one.
15. All indicators are from the World Bank's data bank at: http://data.worldbank.org/country/morocco (retrieved on April 2, 2011
16. World Bank data: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG (retrieved on April 2, 2011)
17. World Bank's data bank at: http://data.worldbank.org/country/morocco (retrieved on April 2, 2011)
18. Harik, "The Origins of the Arab State System," 7.
19. Wedeen, *Ambiguities of Domination,* 1.
20. Ibid., 33–49, 49.
21. Ibid., 49–65.

22. Ibid., 56.
23. "Whatever I do, it will never be enough," *Time Magazine* 125: 25 (26 June 2000) at: http://www.time.com/time/europe/magazine/2000/0626/kingqa.html
24. Rachidi, "Morocco tempers Islamists."
25. Ibid.
26. Sater, James N. *Civil Society and Political Change in Morocco.* London: Routledge, 2007, 69.
27. King Hassan II in a royal speech in 1994 quoted in *Tel Quel* N.125, (May 1–7, 2004) at: http://www.telquel-online.com/125/couverture_125_1.shtml
28. Interview conducted in Rabat, July 2006.
29. King Hassan II in a royal speech of August 13, 1978.
30. See chapter two for a detailed discussion of dahir.

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